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California Supreme Court Survey
March 1993 - May 1994
The CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof
the issues that have been addressed by the supreme court, as well as to serve as a
starting point for researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordancewith the importance of the court's holding and the extent to
which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline andjudicial misconduct cases have been omittedfrom the survey.

1.

APPELLATE REVIEW

A posiyudgment order denying an award of attorney
fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033(o)
is appealable; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving which portion of the total award represents
damages for personal injury when the plaintiff
claims prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291 on a judgment more favorable than the
pretrial offer to compromise; and prejudgment interest on personal injury damages under Civil Code
section 3291 may not be awarded on punitive damages:
Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries ............

11.

787

CONSTITIIONAL LAW

Although the NCAA, a nongovernmental entity, is
governed by the Privacy Initiative of the California
Constitution, its policy of drug testing collegiate
athletes does not violate the constitutional right to
privacy because it substantively furthers a countervailing interest:
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n...........
794

I.

COUNTIES

The Operations Committee of the Retirement Board
of the Orange County Employees Retirement System
is not a "legislativebody" within the meaning of the
Ralph M. Brown Act and, therefore, is not subject to
the open meeting requirements of the Act:
Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County
Employees Retirement System Board of
Directors . ................................. 813
IV.

CRIMNAL LAW
A. The term "clearproof' in section 26 of the California Penal Code places the burden on the prosecution
to prove by clear and convincing evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, that a minor knew of the
wrongfulness of the charged conduct for purposes of
determining when a child becomes a ward of the
state:
In re Manuel L.............................. 818
B. Jury instructions stating that mens rea for assault
is establishedwhen the state proves that a defendant
wilifully committed an act that by its nature will
probably and directly result in an injury to another
does not create an unconstitutional burden-shifting
presumption:
People v. Colantuono .......................... 822
C. To prove fear of immediate or unlawful bodily injury in rape cases, the prosecutionmust show that the
victim subjectively feared immediate bodily injury,
and that the fear was reasonable or that the defendant knew of the victim's unreasonable fear; the
prosecution may establish those elements without
showing resistance or an express statement of such
fear by the victim if the circumstances support such
an inference:
People v. Iniguez ............................ 830
D. Evidence of a criminal defendant's voluntary intoxication is admissible at trial to establish that he
lacked the requisitemental capacity to commit murder:
People v. Whitfield ........................... 835
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V.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

Misrepresentationsmade by employers in the course
of a wrongful discharge do not create a separately
actionablefraud:
Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc ....................... 839
VI.

INSURANCE LAw

A.

B.

VII.

A liability insurer has a duty to defend its insured
against claims arising out of criminal, wiQful, and
other noncovered conduct if the complaint alleges
potentially covered conduct; therefore, summary
judgment is improper unless the insurer can prove
that none of the claims asserted against the insured
are covered under the policy:
Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Barbara B ......... 845
Voluntary ingestion of a known hazardous and
illegal substance does not provide a basis for coverage within the terms of a life insurance policy affording coverage for death by accidental means:
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co ......... 851

JUVENILE LAW

The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing a motionfor change of placement where the
moving party failed to show changed circumstances
under which the requested placement would be in
the best interest of the child:
In re Stephanie M ............................ 859
VIII.

PROBATE LAW

Enforcement of a "no contest clause" against a widow pursuing surviving spousal rights to community
property assets included in the trust estate is consistent with Californialaw and does not prevent her
from obtaining all she is entitled to under community property or federal labor laws, but rather merely prevents her from obtaining those benefits in
addition to the property conditionally left to her
within the trust:
Burch v. George ............................. 866

IX.

SALES AND USE TAXES

The assumption of a corporate division's liabilities
by a wholly owned subsidiaryas part of the transfer
of division assets to the subsidiary constitutes consideration for sales tax purposes, even when the
parent corporationremains the primary obligor:
Beatrice Co. v. State Board of Equalization ........
X.

885

TORT LAW

A.

A contractingparty can not be held liable in tortfor
conspiracy to interfere with its own contract:
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. 893

B.

Parents who unsuspectingly administer a medication overdose to an infant, due to incorrect dosage
directions on the pharmacy label, cannot recover
personally from the pharmacy for negligent infliction of emotion distress because the parents are not
the direct victims of the pharmacy's negligence:
Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc .......

X1.

897

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

The superior court lacks subject matterjurisdiction
over an action to declare provisions of the Workers'
Compensation Act invalid and enjoin enforcement
of those provisions:
Greener v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. . 901
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I. APPELLATE REVIEW
A postjudgment order denying an award of attorneyfees
under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033(o) is appealable; the plaintiff bears the burden of proving which
portion of the total award represents damages for personal injury when the plaintiff claims prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291 on a judgment more
favorable than the pretrialoffer to compromise; and prejudgment interest on personal injury damages under
Civil Code section 3291 may not be awarded on punitive
damages: Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries,' the California Supreme
Court addressed three issues. First, the court considered whether a
postjudgment order denying an award of attorney fees under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033(o) is appealable.2 Next, the court assessed
which paity should bear the burden of proof in establishing the portion

1. 6 Cal. 4th 644, 863 P.2d 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (1993). Justice Mosk
authored the unanimous opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli,
Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, and George concurring. Id. at 665, 863 P.2d at 192, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 122.
2. Id. at 648, 863 P.2d at 181, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111. Section 2033(o) provides
in relevant partIf a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth
of any matter when requested to do so under this section, and if the party
requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document
or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the
court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to
pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make this order unless it finds that (1)
an objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived
under subdivision (1), (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, (3) the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to
believe that the other party would prevail on the matter, or (4) there was
other good reason for the failure to admit.
CAL CIV. PROC. CODE § 2033(o) (West 1994). See generaUy 2 B.E. WrrKIN, CAIFORNIA
EVIDENCE, Discovery and Production of Evidence §§ 1553-1567 (3d ed. 1986 & Supp.
1994) (discussing requests for admissions); 27 CAL. JuR. 3D Discovery and Depositions
§§ 225-252 (1987 & Supp. 1994) (discussing requests for admissions and the sanctions
available for failure to comply).

of the total award representing damages for personal injury when the
plaintiff claims prejudgment interest under Civil Code section 3291. Finally, the court determined whether Civil Code section 3291 authorizes

prejudgment interest on punitive damages.4
The trial court denied the plaintiff's motion for an award of attorney

fees incurred in proving facts that the defendants refused to admit." The
trial court also denied the plaintiffs motion for an award of prejudgment

3. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 657-58, 863 P.2d at 187, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117. Section
3291 provides in relevant part:
In any action brought to recover damages for personal injury sustained
by any person . . . it is lawful for the plaintiff in the complaint to claim interest on the damages alleged as provided in this section. If the plaintiff
makes an offer pursuant to Section 998 of the Code of Civil Procedure which
the defendant does not accept prior to trial or within 30 days, whichever
occurs first, and the plaintiff obtains a more favorable judgment, the judgment shall bear interest at the legal rate of 10 percent per annum calculated
from the date of the plaintiffs first offer pursuant to Section 998 ....
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3291 (West 1994). See generally 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1397, 1399-1400 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing prejudgment
interest on a judgment more favorable than the offer to settle); 16 CAL Jun. 3D Costs
§ 17 (1983 & Supp. 1994) (discussing Civil Code § 3291 and its application when the
judgment is more favorable than the offer to compromise made pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure § 998).
4. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 662-63, 863 P.2d at 190-91, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120-21. The
facts of this case may be summarized as follows: A truck driven by an employee of
the defendant trucking company, struck the plaintiffs car. Id. at 649, 863 P.2d at 181,
25 Cal. Rptr. at 111. The driver falsely identified himself and gave false insurance
information. Id, An official with the defendant trucking company denied the accident
had occurred. Id. The plaintiff filed suit for negligence and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Id. The plaintiff requested that the defendants admit the occurrence of the collision pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 2033, which governs requests for admissions. Id. The defendant trucking company denied the request on the
grounds that it had insufficient facts to either admit or deny that a collision had
occurred. Id. The plaintiff made an offer to compromise in the amount of $89,000
more than two years before trial. Id. The defendants did not accept the pretrial settlement offer. Id. At trial, the plaintiff established that the defendants had conducted
an internal investigation of the accident before her request for admission and that the
defendant trucking company knew the accident had occurred. Id. The jury found for
the plaintiff, awarding $100,000 In both compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The
plaintiff moved for an award of attorney fees incurred in proving the fact of the
collision which the defendants failed to admit. Id. at 649, 863 P.2d at 182, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 112. The plaintiff also moved for an award of prejudgment interest under
§ 3291 since her pretrial offer to compromise was less than the final settlement. Id.
5. Id. at 649-50, 863 P.2d at 182, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 112. The supreme court
recognized that the wording of § 2033(o) mandates an award of attorney fees unless
one of the four statutory exceptions are met. Id. at 650, 863 P.2d at 182, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 112. The court pointed out that the trial court denied the motion because
of its concern about the potential for double recovery, without reference to any of
the statutory exceptions. Id.
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interest allowed under Civil Code section 3291 on the ground that the
plaintiff failed to demand such interest in her complaint.' The plaintiff
appealed the denial of both motions.7
The court of appeal held that the postjudgment order denying attorney
fees was not appealable." The court of appeal also affirmed the trial
court's denial of prejudgment interest on the ground that the plaintiff
failed to demonstrate that the damages awarded were exclusively for
personal injury. The plaintiff appealed this decision, claiming (1) a
postjudgxnent order denying attorney fees is appealable'0 ; and (2) the
court of appeal erred in affirming the denial of her motion for prejudgment interest."
II.

A.

TREATMENT

The Majority Opinion
1.

A Postjudgment Order Denying Attorney Fees Is Appealable

The California Supreme Court, interpreting Code of Civil Procedure
section 904.1, found that an order following an appealable judgment is
itself appealable provided that two requirements are met. "2and accompanying text.
The first requirement is that the issues raised by the appeal from the
order must be different from those issues which would arise from an
appeal of the judgment itself." The supreme court, noting that the court

6. Id.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Disagreeing with the trial court, the court of appeal held that Civil Code
§ 3291 does not require a plaintiff to demand prejudgment interest in the complaint.

Id
10. Id.
11. Id at 656, 863 P.2d at 186, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
12. Id. at 651, 863 P.2d at 183, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113. Section 904.1 provides in
relevant part "(a) An appeal may be taken from a superior court in the following
cases: (1) From a judgment . . . (2) From an order made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph (1)." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 904.1 (West 1994). See generally 9
B.E. WrrIaN, CALIORNIA PROCEDURE, Appeal §§ 101-105 (3d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing appealability of orders made after the verdict or judgment).
13. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 651, 863 P.2d at 183, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113. The court
reasoned that without this requirement it would be possible to get around the time
limitations for appealing the judgment by raising the same issues in the appeal of a
postjudgment order. Id.

of appeal did not consider this requirement, found that an appeal from
the order denying attorney fees clearly "raises issues different from those
arising from the judgment itself."4 Thus, in the instant case, the court
held the first requirement was satisfied. 5
The second requirement is that the order must either affect the judgment or relate to its enforcement. 6 The court of appeal found that this
requirement was not met in the instant case, relying upon the "neither
adds nor subtracts" standard set forth in Redevelopment Agency v. Goodman 7 to hold that the order did not affect the judgment or relate to its
enforcement because it left the judgment intact. 8
The supreme court recognized the utility of the "neither adds nor subtracts" standard, yet pointed out that it is not the exclusive method to
determine whether the order affects the judgment or relates to its enforcement. The court found that postjudgment orders that neither add
to nor subtract from the judgment are still appealable provided they
either affect or relate to the enforcement of the judgment." The court
reasoned that an 'order denying attorney fees either affects the judgment
or relates to its enforcement because it determines with finality the
rights of the parties." Furthermore, the order denying attorney fees resembles orders the supreme court had previously found to be appealable.'
The supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeal, concluding that an order denying attorney fees requested under Code of
Civil Procedure section 2033(o) is appealable since it (1) raises issues
different from those which would arise from an appeal of the judgment
itself; (2) affects or relates to the enforcement of the judgment; (3) is not

14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 651-52, 863 P.2d at 183, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113 (citing Olson v. Cory, 35
Cal. 3d 390, 400, 673 P.2d 720, 726, 197 Cal. Rptr. 843, 850 (1983) (stating that an
order "must either affect the judgment or relate to it by enforcing it or staying its
execution" to be appealable)).
17. 53 Cal. App. 3d 424, 429, 125 Cal. Rptr. 818, 820-21 (1975) (stating that if the

order neither adds to nor subtracts from the judgment but instead leaves it intact,
the order does not sufficiently affect the judgment and is not appealable).
18. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 652, 863 P.2d at 183, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 113.
19. Id. at 653, 863 P.2d at 184, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
20. Id. at 654, 863 P.2d at 185, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 115.
21. Id. The court pointed out that this order would not be subject to appeal following some future proceeding. Id. The court reasoned that if an order is not preliminary to later proceedings or subject to appeal after some future judgment, it should
be appealable because it "finally determines the rights of the parties." Id.
22. Id. The court pointed to a number of postjudgment orders previously found
appealable and compared the order in question to those orders. Id. at 653-54, 863
P.2d at 184, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 114.
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preliminary to later proceedings; and (4) will not become subject to appeal in the future as a result of another judgment.'
2.

The Plaintiff Bears the Burden of Proof in Establishing Which
Portion of an Award Represents Damages for Personal Injury
When Claiming Prejudgment Interest Under Civil Code
Section 3291

The supreme court next considered where the burden of proof lies
when the plaintiff claims prejudgment interest under section 3291. The
court relied upon the holding in Morin v. ABA Recovery Service, Inc.'
in concluding that section 3291 authorizes prejudgment interest only for
that portion of a judgment that represents damages for personal injury.'
The court reasoned that because the plaintiffs claims for negligence and
intentional infliction of emotional distress sought recovery for personal
injury, section 3291 applied.'
Next the court considered whether the court of appeal correctly dismissed the plaintiffs appeal of the order denying prejudgment interest on
the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the damages were awarded
exclusively for personal injury." The plaintiff contended that the initial
burden of proof rested upon her to establish that any portion of the
award is for personal injury damages; once this is met, the burden shifts
to the defendant to establish that any portion of the award is not compensation for personal injury.' The supreme court rejected this idea,
relying upon Evidence Code section 5O0 in reasoning that since the
23. Id. at 656, 863 P.2d at 186, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 116.
24. 195 Cal. App. 3d 200, 208, 240 Cal. Rptr. 509, 513 (1987), overruled by Laldn v.
Watkins Associated Indus., 6 Cal. 4th 644, 863 P.2d 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (1993)
(holding that § 3291 mandates an award of prejudgment interest for personal injury
damages when the plaintiffs offer to settle is refused and the plaintiff recovers a

more favorable judgment at trial).
25. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 658, 863 P.2d at 187-88, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117-18.
26. Id. at 657, 863 P.2d at 187, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 117. The court contrasted the
nature of the plaintiff's claims in this case to those in Gourley v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 53 Cal. 3d 121, 126-27, 822 P.2d 374, 377, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 666, 669
(1991) (holding that § 3291 is not applicable to insurance bad faith actions because
such actions are for interference with a property right, not personal injury). The
court found that In the instant case, the plaintiffs claims were not equivalent to an
interference with a property right. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 657, 863 P.2d at 187, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 117.
27. Id. at 659-60, 863 P.2d at 188-89, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 118-19.
28. Id. at 660, 863 P.2d at 189, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
29. Evidence Code § 500 reads as follows: "Except as otherwise provided by law,

plaintiff is the party claiming prejudgment interest, the plaintiff bears the
burden of proving the amount of personal injury damages included in the
judgment.30 The supreme court ruled that the court of appeal incorrectly
concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet this burden and stated that
plaintiff never had the opportunity to carry her burden since the trial
court barred this motion on procedural grounds.' The court remanded
the case to the trial court to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to establish which portion of the total award represents compensatory damages
for personal injury.'
3.

Civil Code Section 3291 Does Not Authorize the Award of
Prejudgment Interest on Punitive Damages

The court next considered whether section 3291 authorizes the award
of prejudgment interest on punitive damages in personal injury cases.'
The plaintiff cited Greenfield v. Spectrum Investment Corp.' and related cases to support her claim that section 3291 allows for the award of
prejudgment interest on both compensatory and punitive damages attributable to personal injury.' The court, recognizing that section 3291
authorizes prejudgment interest for personal injury damages, considered
whether punitive damages are damages for personal injury as covered
under section 3291.1
The court noted that the purpose of section 3291 is to encourage settlement in personal injury cases." Further, the purpose of allowing prejudgment interest is to make the plaintiff whole as of the date of the
injury." The court found that awarding prejudgment interest on punitive
damages would not further either of these goals because the purpose of

a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of
which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting." CAL EVID.

CODE § 500 (West 1994).
30. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 660-61, 863 P.2d at 189, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119.
31. Id. at 661, 863 P.2d at 189-90, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 119-20.
32. Id. at 661-62, 863 P.2d at 190, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120.
33. Id. at 662-64, 863 P.2d at 190-92, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 120-22. See generally Baynard
F. Berman, Due Process, Punitive Damages and Civil Procedure: Does California
Law Pass Constitutional Muster?, 25 BEVERLY HILLS B. ASs'N J. 193 (1991) (discussing the policy behind punitive damage awards in California and the constitutionality
of such awards).
34. 174 Cal. App. 3d 111, 124-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. 805, 813-14 (1985), overruled by

Lakin v. Watkins Associated Indus., 6 Cal. 4th 644, 863 P.2d 179, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109
(1993) (finding that § 3291 allows the plaintiff to claim prejudgment interest on both
compensatory and punitive damages).

35.
36.
37.
38.

Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 662-63, 863 P.2d at 191, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
Id. at 663, 863 P.2d at 191, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 121.
Id.
Id.
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punitive damages is to punish the defendant, as opposed to making the
injured party whole.' Awarding prejudgment interest on these damages
would not make the plaintiff whole, but would instead provide a windfall
to the plaintiff. ' The court reasoned that although punitive damages
may arise from a personal injury claim, they are not ,damages for personal injury within the meaning of section 3291."' The court rejected the
holding of Greenfield and held that section 3291 does not authorize the
award of prejudgment interest on punitive damages.'
I.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court overruled an earlier line of cases which
allowed prejudgment interest on punitive damages. The court found that
the legislative intent of section 3291, which is to encourage settlements
in personal injury cases as well as to make the plaintiff whole as of the
date of the injury, would not be furthered by subjecting punitive damage
awards to prejudgment interest. This case may be seen as an attempt to
limit the impact of punitive damages to some degree by concluding that
they are not damages for personal injury covered under section 3291.
While it might be argued that a logical extension of this reasoning would
hold that punitive damages should be subtracted from the total award
when determining whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer
to compromise, the court expressly rejected this argument. '

CHRISTOPHER DALLAS

39. Id. at 664, 863 P.2d at 192, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122. See generally 6 B.E.
WITKN, SUMMARY OP CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1327-1328 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994)
(discussing the purposes and goals of punitive damages); 23 CAL JUR. 3D Damages
§§ 116-117 (contrasting the function of compensatory and punitive damages).

40. Lakin, 6 Cal. 4th at 664, 863 P.2d at 192, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 122.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. The defendant made this argument in Lakin, but the court found it unpersuasive. Id. at 662-63 & n.13, 863 P.2d at 190-91 & n.13, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 120-21 &
n.13.

II.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Although the NCAA, a nongovernmental entity, is gov-

erned by the Privacy Initiative of the California Constitution, its policy of drug testing collegiate athletes does
not violate the constitutional right to privacy because it
substantively furthers a countervailing interest:
Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Drug abuse is one of the greatest problems facing today's society.' The
battle against drugs is being fought on the streets, in the workplace, and
in colleges and universities.! In 1986, the National Collegiate Atheletic
Association (NCAA) responded to college atheletes' use of controlled
substances and performance-enhancing drugs by enacting a mandatory
drug testing program.' This program has sparked much debate regarding
the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing,4 generating challenges
based on both federal and state constitutional protections.'
Federal challenges to the NCAA program have little chance of succeeding.' In order to prevail, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged con-

1. See Annette Gibbs, Drug Testing and College Athletes: Conflicts Among Institutions, Students, and the NCAA, 67 ED. LAW REP. 1 (1991); Kerrie S. Covell & Annette
Gibbs, Drug Testing and the College Athlete, 23 CREIGHTON L REv. 1, 1 (1989/1990).
2. Covell & Gibbs, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 11, 865 P.2d 633, 638, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 834, 839 (1994).
4. See Covell & Gibbs, supra note 1 (discussing the courts' reactions to constitutional challenges to drug testing programs); Gibbs, supra note 1 (discussing recent
challenges to mandatory drug testing); Ted O'Neal, The Constitutionality of NCAA
Drug Testing: A Fine Specimen for Examination, 46 SMU L REV. 513 (1992) (discussing the "fierce legal challenges" facing the NCAA's program). It is important to note
that because the law review articles discussed in this Note were published prior to the
supreme court's decision in Hill, many rely heavily on lower court opinions to support
the theory that NCAA drug testing violates the state constitutional right to privacy. The
California Supreme Court, however, overturned the lower courts' decisions. See irfra
notes 76-107 and accompanying text.
5. See O'Halloran v. University of Washington, 679 F. Supp. 997, 1005 (W.D. Wash)
(claiming the NCAA drug testing program violates the Fourth Amendment), rev'd on
other grounds, 856 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1988); Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 9, 865 P.2d at 636, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 837 (claiming the NCAA drug testing program violates the right to
privacy secured by the California Constitution); see also, Annotation, Requiring Submission to Physical Examination or Test as Violation of Constitutional Rights, 25
A.LR. 2d 1407 (1952) (compiling older cases dealing with the problem of whether constitutional rights are invaded by compulsory testing).
6. See O7Ialloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1005; see also David R. Cochran, The Privacy
Expectation: A Comparison of Federal and California Constitutional Standards for
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duct constituted state action and that the "conduct deprived [the plaintiff] of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or

laws of the United States."' The United States Supreme Court has definitively stated that the NCAA is not a state actor.' Currently, student ath-

letes have been unable to establish that the drug testing program has
deprived them of a right guaranteed by the federal constitution.9 Therefore, challenges to NCAA drug testing will fail both prongs of a successful federal constitutional challenge. The right to privacy provided in the

United States Constitution, then, does not offer student athletes sufficient protection to prohibit the NCAA from testing athletes.
Because several state constitutions offer a greater level of protection

than the federal constitution,0 students have attempted to challenge the
NCAA program on state grounds." Recognizing the federal courts' inability to prohibit NCAA testing on federal Constitutional grounds, opponents hoped that these state challenges would be successful. 2 Many
commentators looked toward Hill v. National CollegiateAthletic Associ-

Drug Testing in Amateur Athletics, 17 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 533, 564 (1990) (stating
"federal courts are defeating constitutional challenges").
7. O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1001 (citing Parrat v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535
(1981)).
8. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988) (holding that
the NCAA is not a state actor).
9. See O'Halloran, 679 F. Supp. at 1007. For a detailed discussion of the federal
courts' approach to the constitutionality of the NCAA's drug testing, see Cochran, supra note 6, at 536-45 (providing a detailed analysis of O'Halloran and its impact on
the NCAA).
10. The California Constitution explicitly creates a right to privacy and provides that
"[a]l people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy." CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 1; see 7 B.E. WIThIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFoRNIA LAW, Constituional Law. § 454 (9th ed.
1988) (discussing the privacy rights enumerated in the California Constitution). Similarly, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act grants a right to privacy which reaches both
state and private actions. Covell & Gibbs, supra note 1, at 16-17 (discussing Massachusetts law and its effect on drug testing of athletes).
11. See, e.g., Bally v. Northeastern Univ., 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989) (challenging
drug testing under Massachusetts Civil Rights Act); Hill, 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (challenging drug testing under the California Constitution).
12. See, e.g., Covell & Gibbs, supra note 1, at 17-18 (stating "even though drug-testing cases continue to be litigated and hotly debated today, one can readily conclude
that student athletes who want to protect their right to privacy ought to seek protection under their state constitutions"); O'Neal, supra note 4, at 554 (stating "new life
has been given to challengers in the form of state constitutional provisions").

ation for a definitive statement that drug testing violates the right to

privacy. 13
In Hill,"' the California Supreme Court analyzed the Privacy Initiative

of the California Constitution in light of the NCAA's policy of testing
collegiate athletes for drug use. 6 To determine whether the NCAA's policy violated the students' right to privacy, and to clarify privacy analysis
for the lower courts, the court examined whether the right to privacy
enumerated in the California Constitution governs nongovernmental entities.'" Additionally, the court established the standards for determining
when an invasion of privacy occurs. 7 The court applied these findings
to the facts of Hi 8 and determined that the NCAA policy does not violate the California Constitution. 9
H1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1973, the NCAA enacted a rule prohibiting drug use by NCAA athletes.' Although there were no provisions governing the testing of athletes, several college students tested positive for prohibited drugs at the
Pan American Games." In January, 1984, based on the threat drugs
posed to the health of students and to the integrity of NCAA sporting
events, the Pacific 10 Conference introduced a resolution requesting that
the NCAA adopt mandatory drug testing.'
Responding to this resolution, the NCAA created a committee to study

drug use and testing. The committee concluded that the NCAA had "a

13. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 6, at 564 (stating "Hill is an example of a success
story in the student-athletes' war on drug testing"); O'Neal, supra note 4, at 514 (stating "[a]well-reasoned opinion in the Hill case could prove quite persuasive in other
jurisdictions").
14. 7 Cal. 4th 1, 865 P.2d 633, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (1994).
15. Id. at 9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
16. Id. at 15, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
17. Id at 20, 865 P.2d at 644, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845.
18. Id at 40-55, 865 P.2d at 657-67, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85969.
19. Id. at 9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838. Chief Justice Lucas authored
the majority opinion in which Justices Panelli, Arabian, and Baxter joined. Id. at 57,
865 P.2d at 669, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871. Both Justice Kennard and Justice George
wrote separately, concuning in part and dissenting in part. Id. at 58, 62, 865 P.2d at
669, 672, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 871, 874, respectively. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 73, 865 P.2d at 679, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882.
20. Id. at 10, 865 P.2d at 638, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
21. Id. Several students withdrew from the Pan American Games when they realized
that drug testing was required. Id.
22. Id. Prior to this resolution, a Michigan State University study of drug use by
college athletes revealed that 3696 of the athletes in the study used marijuana or hashish, 17% used cocaine, 896 used amphetamines, and 4% used steroids. Id.
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legitimate interest in maintaining the integrity of intercollegiate athletics,
including insuring fair competition and protecting the health and safety
of all participating student athletes. "' In 1986, the various institutions
within the NCAA overwhelmingly adopted the drug testing program.u
The NCAA's drug testing program prohibits the use of specific chemical substances by student athletes' and requires athletes participating in
NCAA competition to sign a consent form whereby they agree to be
tested for drugs.' Before testing, the student athlete is given written
notice that he or she will be tested.' If the drug test, conducted by urinalysis,' reveals drug use, the institution is notified and the student loses postseason eligibility.' A student's refusal to follow drug testing procedure bars the athlete from competition.'
Student athletes attending Stanford University sued the NCAA, contending that the drug testing program violated their right to privacy under the California Constitution.31 The superior court found that the
NCAA program violated plaintiffs' privacy rights and permanently enjoined its enforcement against Stanford athletes.' The court of appeal
affirmed this decision and upheld the injunction.'

23. Id. The committee also found:
The use of "performance-enhancing" drugs by individual student-athletes is a
violation of the ethic of fair competition, [and] poses a potential health and
safety hazard to those utilizing such drugs and a potential safety hazard to
those competing with such individuals. The most effective method of ensuring
that student-athletes are not utilizing "performance enhancing" drugs is
through a consistent, national drug testing program.
Id. at 10-11, 865 P.2d at 638, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
24. Id. at 10-11, 865 P.2d at 638, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839.
25. Id. The following categories of chemical substances were prohibited: "(1) psychomotor and nervous system stimulants; (2) anabolic steroids; (3) alcohol and beta blockers (in rifle events only); (4) diuretics; and (5) street drugs." Id.
26. Id. Drug testing may occur before, during, or after participation in any NCAA
championship or in any postseason football game. Id. at 12, 865 P.2d at 639, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 840.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 11, 865 P.2d at 639, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. The urinalysis is conducted
in the presence of an official monitor of the same sex as the student. Id. The student
may request a witness-observer of his or her choice to be present. Id.
29. Id. at 13, 865 P.2d at 639, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838.
32. Id.
33. Id. The court of appeal applied a "compelling state interest" test and required

Ill. ANALYSIS
A.

Scope of the Privacy Initiative

The Privacy Initiative governs the conduct of private, nongovernmental
entities. To determine whether the NCAA's conduct violated the California Constitution, the court first had to determine whether the Privacy
Initiative that created the right to privacy governs the conduct of private,
nongovernmental entities.'
The court stated that, because the constitutional section does not define its terms, it must be "interpreted and applied in a manner consistent
with the probable intent of the body enacting it: the voters of the State
of California. "' In determining the voters' intent, the court relied heavily
on the official ballot pamphlet that contained arguments for and against
the initiative.'
The arguments favoring the initiative relied on the need for "effective
restraints on the information activities of government and business."

the NCAA to prove that
(1) the program furthered its stated purposes, i.e., to safeguard the integrity
of athletic competition and to protect the health and safety of student athletes; (2) the utility of the program manifestly outweighed any resulting impairment of the privacy right and (3) there were no alternatives to drug testing less offensive to privacy interests.
Id. at 13, 865 P.2d at 640, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841.
34. Id. at 15, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842. The court was forced to
determine this issue because the NCAA raised its private status as a bar against application of the Privacy Initiative. Id. at 16, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
35. Id. at 16, 865 P.2d at 641, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843 (citing Legislature v. Eu, 54
Cal. 3d 492, 505, 816 P.2d 1309, 1315-16, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283, 289-90 (1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992); In re Lance W., 37 Cal. 3d 873, 889, 694 P.2d 744, 754, 210
Cal. Rptr. 631, 641 (1985)).
36. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 16, 865 P.2d at 642, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843.
When, as here, the language of an initiative measure does not point to a definitive resolution of a question of interpretation, "'it is appropriate to consider indicia of the voters' intent other than the language of the provision itself.' . . . [Sluch indicia include the analysis and arguments contained in the
official ballot pamphlet"
Id. (quoting Eu, 54 Cal. 3d at 504, 816 P.2d at 1315, 286 Cal. Rptr. at 289 (quoting
Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 53 Cal. 3d 245, 250, 806 P.2d
1360, 1363, 279 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1991))).
37. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 17, 865 P.2d at 642, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843 (citing Ballot
Pamphlet, Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov.
7, 1972) p. 26) (hereinafter Ballot Pamphlet). The argument further stated:
This amendment creates a legal and enforceable right of privacy for every
Californian. The right of privacy... prevents government and business
interests from collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information about us
and from misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve
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Rather than contesting the impact of the initiative on business, however,
the arguments against the initiative merely challenged the need for additional privacy safeguards.' Finding that these arguments supported the
belief that the citizens of California intended the Privacy Initiative to
reach private businesses, the court held that the Privacy Initiative "creates a right of action against private as well as government entities."'
B.

Standardsfor Determining an Invasion of Privacy Under the
.Privacy Initiative

The court next focused on the standards to be applied in determining
whether an invasion of privacy has occurred. ' The court first analyzed
the decisions of the trial court and the court of appeal.4 ' The lower
courts assumed that private entities were required to prove "(1) a 'com-

pelling state interest' in support of drug testing; and (2) the absence of
any alternative means of accomplishing that interest."' The court, however, determined that this standard does not apply to invasions of priva-

cy by private entities.' In reaching this conclusion, the court traced the
sources of the right to privacy to determine whether the right to privacy
is a fundamental right worthy of utmost protection. 4
Considering both common law'

and federal constitutional privacy

other purposes or to embarrass us ....
Even if the existence of this information is known, few government agencies or private businesses permit individuals to review their files and correct errors.
Id. (emphasis added).
38. Id. (citing Ballot Pamphlet, p. 27). This argument stated: "To say there are at
present no effective restraints on the information activities of government and business
is simply untrue." Id.
39. Id. at 20, 865 P.2d at 644, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845. The court noted that its
holding was limited to the Privacy Initiative and that it did not create any other rights
of action under either article I, section 1 or any other section of the California Constitution. Id.
40. Id. at 20, 865 P.2d at 644, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845-46.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 31, 865 P.2d at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853.
44. Id. at 23-31, 865 P.2d at 646-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-53.
45. Id. at 23-28, 865 P.2d at 646-49, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 847-51. The court discussed
the theory of the common law right to privacy originated by Samuel D. Warren and
Louis D. Brandeis in their seminal law review article. Id. at 23, 865 P.2d at 646, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 848 (citing Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L REV.
193 (1890)). The court discussed the four traditional privacy torts and concluded that

rights'8 the court concluded that "privacy interests and accompanying
legal standards are best viewed flexibly and in context." 7
With this framework, the court proceeded to establish the elements of
a cause of action for invasion of the state constitutional right to privacy.' Initially, the court reviewed its decision in White v. Davis,'" which
required a "compelling interest" standard to determine whether law enforcement authorities had violated the Privacy Initiative.' The court
analyzed its decision and concluded that White "did not establish a blanket 'compelling interest' test for all state constitutional right-to-privacy
cases."" Accordingly, the court limited the White holding to those cases
in which government action invades privacy interests "which overlap the

"the common law right of privacy is neither absolute nor globally vague, but is carefully confined to specific sets of interests that must inevitably be weighed in the balance
against competing interests before the right is judicially recognized." Id. at 26, 865 P.2d
at 648, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850. Therefore, the common law right to privacy is not
fundamental. See id.
46. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 28-32, 865 P.2d at 649-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851-53. The
court discussed attempts to find a federal constitutional right to privacy in the First,
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments and in the "penumbras" of specific constitutional
guarantees. Id. at 28, 865 P.2d at 649, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)). The court noted that federal cases have created
two distinct privacy lines: the "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters" and the "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. at 30, 865 P.2d at 650, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 852 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977)). The court noted that in cases involving informational interests such as disclosure, federal courts have avoided applying a "compelling interest"
standard and have applied balancing tests in determining violations. Id. at 30, 865 P.2d
at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851. The court concluded that because the Privacy Initiative
was intended to protect these information interests, a "compelling interest" test was
not required. Id. at 28-32, 865 P.2d at 649-52, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 851-53.
47. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 31, 865 P.2d at 651, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853.
48. Id. at 32, 865 P.2d at 652, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853.
49. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
50. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 32, 865 P.2d at 652, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854. In White, a police department conducted covert surveillance of classes at the University of California
at Los Angeles by police officers disguised as students. Id The officers compiled information on individuals and reported on classroom discussions without any evidence of
illegal activity. Id. (citing White, 13 Cal. 3d at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at
97). The plaintiff, a taxpayer, sought to enjoin expenditure of public funds for these
actions. Id. The court, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs statements, held that
the facts as alleged revealed government conduct "likely to pose a substantial
restraint upon the exercise of First Amendment rights" and observed that
"the challenged surveillance activities can only be sustained if defendant can
demonstrate a 'compelling' state interest which justifies the resultant deterrence of First Amendment rights and which cannot be served by alternative
means less intrusive on fundamental rights.
Id. (quoting White, 13 Cal. 3d at 772, 533 P.2d at 232, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 104).
51. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 33, 865 P.2d at 652, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854.
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First Amendment."'
Finding that White does not apply to cases outside this limited scope,
the court next defined what constitutes a cause of action for invasion of
state constitutional privacy.
1.

Plaintiff Must Assert a Legally Protected Privacy Interest

To establish a violation of the state constitutional right to privacy, a
plaintiff must identify a "specific, legally protected privacy interest"'

The court recognized two classes of privacy interests: "(1) interests in
precluding the dissemination or misuse of sensitive and confidential
information ('informational privacy'); and (2) interests in making intimate
personal decisions or conducting personal activities without observation,
intrusion, or interference ('autonomy privacy').""
The court noted that the focus of the Privacy Initiative was on infor-

mational privacy,' but concluded that the Privacy Initiative also protects autonomy privacy.6 The court stated that identification of either
privacy interest satisfies a plaintiffs initial burden. 7 Additionally, the
court concluded that the determination of whether there exists a legally
recognized privacy interest is a question of law.'

52. Id. The court further restricted this category to include only those areas which
relate to "'our expressions,' 'our freedom of communion,' and 'our freedom to associate
with the people we choose.'" Id, (citing Ballot Pamphlet, p. 27).
53. Hil, 7 Cal. 4th at 35, 865 P.2d at 654, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. The court stressed that
the "California constitutional right to privacy 'prevents government and business interests from [1] collecting and stockpiling unnecessary information from us and from [2]
misusing information gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass us.'" Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 654, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856 (citing Ballot Pamphlet, p. 27).
56. Id.
57. Id. The court noted that
[w]hether established social norms safeguard a particular type of information
or protect a specific personal decision from public or private intervention is
to be determined from the usual sources of positive law governing the right
to privacy-common law development, constitutional development, statutory
enactment, and the ballot arguments accompanying the Privacy Initiative.
Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 654-55, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856.
58. Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859 (citing Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., Inc., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953), Johnson v. Harcourt,
Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 892, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 379 (1974)).

2.

Plaintiff Must Assert a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

Secondly, plaintiff must show a reasonable expectation of privacy
based on the surrounding circumstances.' The court stated that a reasonable expectation of privacy depends on the "customs, practices, and
physical settings surrounding particular activities."' Additionally, the
court determined that an objective standard is to be applied in determining whether such an expectation exists and that expectations must be

"founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms. " "
Finally, the court noted that whether a reasonable expectation of privacy
exists is a mixed question of law and fact.'
3.

Plaintiff Must Assert a Serious Invasion of a Privacy Interest

Finally, the court held that an invasion of privacy must be "sufficiently

serious in [its] nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute
an egregious breach of the social norms underlying the privacy right."'
The court reasoned that this requirement is necessary because society
could not function if every invasion into privacy was actionable." The
court also noted that whether a serious invasion of privacy has occurred

is a mixed question of law or fact.'
C.

Defenses to a Privacy Cause of Action

Once the plaintiff has established the three requisite elements, the
defendant is entitled to present competing or countervailing privacy and

59. Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 856. The court noted that because
privacy interests are not independent of circumstances, actions such as advance notice
may justify an intrusion. Id. (citing Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1346, 743 P.2d
1299, 1316, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42, 59 (1987) (upholding the use of sobriety checkpoints)).
60. Id. at 36, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
61. Id. at 37, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c). The court also noted that the ability to voluntarily consent
to potentially invasive activities affects the expectations of the participant. Id. at 37,
865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
62. Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. The court also indicated that
when undisputed material facts exist which show no reasonable expectation of privacy,
the question may be decided as a matter of law. Id.
63. Id. at 37, 865 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
64. Id. The court stated: "(c]omplete privacy does not exist in this world except in
a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D, cmt. c).
65. Hi//, 7 Cal. 4th at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. If undisputed
material facts show no substantial invasion of privacy, the question of substantiality
may be decided as a matter of law. Id
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nonprivacy interests in support of its actions.' In establishing defenses

to a privacy claim, the court noted that, "[p]rivacy concerns are not absolute; they must be balanced against other important interests."' A
defendant's conduct must be evaluated in light of legitimate and important competing interests."
Once a defendant has established a competing interest, the plaintiff
may prove that a defendant's conduct still constitutes a privacy violation
by showing "the availability and use of protective measures, safeguards,
and alternatives to defendant's conduct that would minimize the intrusion on privacy interests."' The court noted that whether a sufficient

countervailing interest exists is a question of law while the strength of
the interest and the feasibility of alternatives are mixed questions of law
and fact.7
The court also asserted that, in weighing these competing interests,
courts must distinguish between private organizations and governmental

agencies 7' because government action generally poses a greater threat to
individual freedom than actions by private individuals.' The court noted

that, because individuals generally have greater personal freedom in
dealing with private organizations, the need to regulate intrusions into
individual privacy by these organizations is lessened.' Finally, the court
acknowledged that private conduct itself is constitutionally protected by
freedom of association under which individuals have the right "to com-

66. Id. at 37-38, 865 P.2d at 655-56, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
67. Id. at 37, 866 P.2d at 655, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (citing Doyle v. State Bar, 32
Cal. 3d 12, 20, 648 P.2d 942, 946, 184 Cal. Rptr. 720, 724 (1982)). The court noted that
the process of balancing countervailing interests against the privacy interests was exercised in both common and constitutional law. Id.
68. Id. at 37-38, 865 P.2d at 655-56, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
69. Id. at 38, 865 P.2d at 655-56, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58 (citing Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 600-02 (1972); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602,
626 n.7 (1989)).
70. Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. If material facts are undisputed, all issues may be determined as a matter of law. Id.
71. Id. at 38, 865 P.2d at 656, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
72. Id.
73. Id. The court specifically discussed an individual's freedoms pertaining to landlords, employers, and vendors. Id. at 38-39, 865 P.2d at 656, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858.
The court acknowledged that the competition in the marketplace tends to narrow the
range of choices, but stressed that individuals still have the option to take their complaints to the legislature for redress. Id. at 39, 865 P.2d at 656, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
858.

municate and associate with one another on mutually negotiated terms
and conditions."74 Therefore, when balancing competing interests of private individuals and private organizations, courts must consider the

individual's ability to choose freely among competing private services.'
D. Application of Privacy Right to NCAA Drug Testing
After defining the elements of a cause of action for a violation of the
state constitutional right to privacy, the court turned to the record and
the findings made by the trial court to determine whether the facts of the
case at bar constituted an invasion of privacy." First, the court determined whether the plaintiffs had established a proper cause of action for
invasion of privacy.7
1.

Elements of Invasion of Privacy

The court initially determined that the plaintiffs had set forth a legally
protected autonomy privacy interest' because the monitoring of urination by the NCAA intrudes on a human bodily function that under social
custom is private. 7 The court also noted that the collecting and testing
urine and inquiring about an athlete's medications allows the NCAA to
obtain personal and confidential information regarding individuals, there-

74. Id. at 39, 865 P.2d at 656, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. The court noted that the
freedom of association applies "to all legitimate private organizations, whether popular
or unpopular." Id (citing Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 844, 854, 574 P.2d 766,
772, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 701 (1978)).
75. Id. at 39, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. Conversely, if an organization, either public or private, controls access to a necessity, the impact on privacy
rights may be much greater. Id. at 39, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858-59.
76. Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859. Justice Kennard concurred
with the majority's analysis regarding the application of the Privacy Initiative to private,
non-governmental entities, as well as with their discussion of the elements of the state
constitutional right to privacy cause of action. Id. at 58, 865 P.2d at 669, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 871 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard, however, did not
join in the majority's application of these rules to the facts of this case. Id. (Kennard,
J., concurring and dissenting). Rather, she stated that the case should have been remanded for further consideration by the trial court. Id. at 62, 865 P.2d at 672, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 874 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority, on the other
hand, concluded that, although they could remand the case to the lower court, there
was no reason to do so because uncontradicted evidence demonstrated, as a matter of
law, that the NCAA program was constitutionally valid. Id. at 47, 865 P.2d at 662, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
77. Id. at 40-43, 865 P.2d at 657-59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-61; see supra notes 53-65
and accompanying text for a discussion of the elements of a cause of action for invasion of privacy.
78. Id. at 40, 865 P.2d at 657, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859.
79. Id at 40-41, 865 P.2d at 657-58, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-60.
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by implicating informational privacy." Because the NCAA drug testing
program implicated both autonomy privacy and informational privacy,
the court concluded that the program impacted a legally protected privacy interest.8
Next, the court determined whether the plaintiffs had a reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding urination.' Because the plaintiffs were
college athletes, the court viewed plaintiffs' expectations within the context of intercollegiate athletic activity.' The court analyzed the nature of
intercollegiate athletics and concluded that participation in these programs diminished the athletes' expectations of privacy in both internal
and external conditions." The court also stated that the NCAA's drug
program involves advance notice and the opportunity to consent, diminishing the student athlete's reasonable expectation of privacy.' Howev-

80. Id. at 41, 865 P.2d at 657-58, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-60.
81. Id. at 41, 865 P.2d at 658, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 859-60.
82. Id. at 41, 865 P.2d at 658, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 41-42, 865 P.2d at 658, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860. The court focused on the
"close regulation and scrutiny of the physical fitness and bodily condition of student
athletes." Id. at 41, 865 P.2d at 658, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860.
Required physical examinations (including urinalysis), and special regulation
of sleep habits, diet, fitness, and other activities that intrude significantly on
privacy interests are routine aspects of a college athlete's life not shared by
other students or the population at large. Athletes frequently disrobe in the
presence of one another and their athletic mentors and assistants in locker
room settings where private bodily parts are readily observable by others of
the same sex. They also exchange information about their physical condition
and medical treatment with coaches, trainers, and others who have a "need
to know."
Id.
85. Id. at 42, 865 P.2d at 658-59, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860. The court acknowledged
that an athlete who refuses to be tested for drugs may be disqualified from competition, but asserted that this consequence does not render the athlete's consent involuntary. Id. at 42, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860-61. The court focused on the
fact that participation in college athletics is not "a government benefit or an economic
necessity" and that such participation "necessarily entails a willingness to forgo assertion of individual rights one might otherwise have in order to receive the benefits of
communal association." Id. at 42-43, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
Specifically addressing the NCAA and college athletics, the court stated:
The NCAA is democratically governed by its member institutions, including
Stanford. Acting collectively, those institutions, including Stanford, make the
rules, including those regarding drug use and testing. If, knowing the rules,
plaintiffs and Stanford choose to play the game, they have, by social conven-

er, the court concluded that, although the student athlete's reasonable
expectations of privacy are diminished, they are not "thereby rendered
de minimis."
The court next determined whether the invasion into these privacy
interests was serious. 7 The court concluded that the method of specimen collection utilized by the NCAA was a serious invasion into the
privacy of plaintiffs.' The court found that because the NCAA used a
"particularly intrusive monitored urination procedure" which was "unique
to the NCAA's program," the testing warranted further inquiry, regardless
of the athlete's diminished expectation of privacy.?
2.

Competing Interests Asserted by the NCAA

Next, the court considered the competing interests set forth by the
NCAA in support of its drug testing program:' "(1) safeguarding the integrity of intercollegiate athletic competition; and (2) protecting the
health and safety of student athletes."'
Initially, the court acknowledged that the NCAA's imposition of a drug
testing program was reasonably calculated to further its interest in safeguarding the integrity of collegiate sports. The court traced the implementation of the testing program and found that the benefits of the testing outweighed the intrusion into the privacy rights of the athletes.'

tion and legal act, fully and voluntarily acquiesced in the application of those
rules. To view the matter otherwise would impair the privacy and
associational rights of. all NCAA institutions and athletes.
Id. at 43, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861 (footnotes omitted).
86. Id. at 43, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 43, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
91. Id. at 43-44, 865 P.2d at 659, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861. Prior to discussing the
validity of these interests, the court emphasized the importance of the NCAA, stating:
"The NCAA is, without doubt, a highly visible and powerful institution, holding, as it
does, a virtual monopoly on high-level intercollegiate athletic competition in the United
States." Id. at 44, 865 P.2d at 660, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862. The court also noted that
because neither Congress nor the legislature had interfered with the NCAA's
rulemaking functions, the court would "regard the NCAA's stated motives and objectives, not with hostility or intense skepticism, but with a 'respectful presumption of
validity.'" Id. (citing NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Oka, 468 U.S. 85, 101 n.23
(1984)).
92. Id. at 44, 865 P.2d at 660, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
93. Id. at 44-46, 865 P.2d at 659-61, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-63. The court initially
noted that before implementing its program, the NCAA commissioned a study which
showed extensive drug use by student athletes. Id. at 44, 865 P.2d at 660, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 862. The court then examined the effect of the program on the students and
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Because the NCAA set forth adequate countervailing interests to justify
the invasion into the plaintiffs' privacy, the court then considered the
plaintiffs' assertions that the NCAA failed to justify its conduct as the
"least offensive alternative.' 4 The plaintiffs argued that the NCAA could
have utilized educational programs and suspicion-based drug testing to
achieve its stated goals.' In a case involving diminished expectations of
privacy, however, the court refused to impose, on the NCAA or any other
private organization, the burden of proving that its conduct is the "least
offensive alternative."'

The court expressed concern over the NCAA's method of monitoring
urinalysis.' The court asserted that the athletes maintained a right of
privacy regarding observation of their excretory functions, and therefore
the NCAA had to justify its use of direct monitoring.' In response, the
NCAA argued that direct monitoring of urination was the only accurate
means to accomplish drug testing.' The plaintiffs, however, failed to
offer any evidence on the availability of less invasive alternatives.'"

concluded that "[a] drug testing program serves to minimize ... pressure by providing
at least some assurance that drug use will be detected and the user disqualified" resulting in "significant and direct benefits to the student athletes themselves, allowing
them to concentrate on the merits of their athletic task without undue concern about
loss of a competitive edge." Id. at 45, 865 P.2d at 660, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
The court also acknowledged the NCAA's role as a business, which offers athletic
events as public entertainment. Id. at 46, 865 P.2d at 661, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863.
Drug use in this arena impairs the NCAA's reputation in the eyes of its viewing customers. Id.
Finally, the court noted the importance of drug testing to the health and safety of
college athletes. Id. Because the NCAA sponsors athletic events, it creates the potential
for injuries which justifies protecting the athlete's safety. Id.
94. Id. at 50, 865 P.2d at 664, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
95. Id. The court analyzed these alternatives and concluded that neither option
would adequately serve the NCAA's goals. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. During the drug testing process, an NCAA official of the same sex as the
athlete stands five to seven feet away while the urine sample is collected. Id.
98. Id. at 50, 865 P.2d at 664, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
99. Id. The NCAA presented evidence which indicated that detection could be evaded by altered or substituted urine samples. Id. The NCAA further argued that testing
alone was not enough to achieve its goals; rather, "effective and accurate testing of unaltered and uncontaminated samples" was necessary. Id.
100. Id. at 51, 865 P.2d at 664, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866. The supreme court rejected
the trial court's finding that direct monitoring of urination was not necessary to ensure
a valid urine sample, claiming that this conclusion was not supported by substantial
evidence. Id.

Therefore, because the plaintiffs failed to satisfy their burden, the court
found direct monitoring valid."'1
Finally, the court examined the plaintiffs' contentions that the drug
testing program violated their information privacy rights."°a The court
looked to the plaintiffs' reasonable expectation of privacy concerning
informational rights and concluded that student athletes have a diminished expectation of privacy."m The court found, however, that "[d]irect
and specific inquiries about personal medications" constituted a serious
invasion into the diminished privacy rights."°
The court then considered the competing interests set forth by the
NCAA and determined that the information gathering procedure utilized
by the NCAA adequately furthered its stated goals.105 The court concluded that the plaintiffs "did not prove that the NCAA [was] 'collecting
and stockpiling unnecessary information'" in violation of the Privacy
Initiative. ' 6

Because the NCAA adequately set forth justification for its intrusion
into both the autonomy privacy and informational privacy of student
athletes, and because the plaintiffs were unable to prove that less intrusive alternatives existed, the majority held that NCAA drug testing procedures do not violate the California constitutional right to privacy."°

101. Id. at 51-52, 865 P.2d at 665, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. The court, however, indicated that there may be less intrusive alternatives to direct monitoring, thereby leaving
the door open for other athletes to challenge the NCAA's methods of implementing its
drug testing program. Id. at 52, 865 P.2d at 665, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867. If such future
litigation arises, plaintiffs must be able to demonstrate that less intrusive alternatives
will adequately provide valid urine samples. Id,
102. Id, at 52, 865 P.2d at 665, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.
103. Id. The court noted that the exchange of confidential information regarding the
physical and medical condition of athletes is common in the athletic arena. Id. The
court stated:
Coaches, trainers, and team physicians necessarily learn intimate details of
student athletes' bodily condition, Including illnesses, medical problems, and
medications prescribed or taken. Plaintiffs do not demonstrate that sharing
similar information with the NCAA, in its capacity as a regulator of athletic
competition in which plaintiffs have voluntarily elected to participate, presents
any greater risk to privacy.
Id. at 52-53, 865 P.2d at 665, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867-68.
104. Id. at 53, 865 P.2d at 666, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868.
105. Id at 54, 865 P.2d at 666, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. The court analyzed the
protections offered by the NCAA to protect the student athletes' privacy rights such as
'numbering of urine specimens, chain of custody procedures, and control of disclosures
regarding disqualified athletes." Id. at 53, 865 P.2d at 666, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. The
court also noted that the plaintiffs did not criticize the NCAA's methods regarding
these matters. Id.
106. Id. at 54, 865 P.2d at 666, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869.
107. Id. at 9, 865 P.2d at 637, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 838. Justice George concurred in
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E.

Justice Mosk's Dissent

Justice Mosk wrote a scathing and lengthy dissent in which he charged
the majority with abrogating the right of privacy. He wrote:
The majority all but abrogate the right of privacy. They plainly consider it "bad
policy." What of their "policy" assessment? Is the right of privacy "good policy"? Is
it "bad policy"? It simply does not matter. To be sure, the right of privacy reflects
a choice of policy. But it is a choice that has already been made-by the people,
in their capacity as sovereign, in the California Constitution. It is therefore a
choice that we as judges must accept and respect, regardless of personal beliefs
or predilections. Regrettably, in this case the majority have not so conducted
themselves with regard to the people's constitutional policy declaring a right of
privacy."

Justice Mosk, like the majority, traced the passage of the Privacy Initiative, but concluded that the right to privacy is fundamental, compelling, and basic," and as such "should be abridged only when there is
compelling public need.""' Justice Mosk argued that, once a plaintiff
pleads that the defendant has interfered with a right of privacy, the defendant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the conduct was justified by a compelling public need.'1'

the majority decision regarding the application of the privacy initiative to private, nongovernmental entities and the majority decision that the NCAA drug testing program
does not violate the privacy rights of plaintiffs. Id. at 62-63, 865 P.2d at 672-73, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 874-75 (George, J., concurring and dissenting). However, Justice George
dissented from the majority decision regarding the standard to be applied in privacy
cases. Id. at 64-70, 865 P.2d at 673-77, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875-80 (George, J., concurring and dissenting). He argued that the defendant must prove a compelling state interest to justify conduct intruding upon constitutionally protected privacy interests. Id. He
ultimately conclued that the NCAA had set forth such compelling interests. Id. at 70-73,
865 P.2d at 677-79, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 880-82 (George, J., concurring and dissenting).
108. Id. at 73-74, 865 P.2d at 679-80, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(footnotes omitted).
109. Id. at 74-77, 865 P.2d at 680-82, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882-85 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Like the majority, Justice Mosk relied on the Ballot Pamphlet in formulating his opinions. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 78, 865 P.2d at 682, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 885 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
Ballot Pamphlet, p. 27). Justice Mosk also made the following conclusions regarding
the right to privacy. (1) "our traditional freedoms" and "American heritage" are the
source of the right to privacy; (2) privacy is the "right to be left alone"; (3) privacy includes informational privacy, autonomy privacy, and the literal right to be left alone;
(4) the right to privacy is broad in scope; (5) privacy is dynamic in nature; (6) the
right to privacy provides unlimited coverage; and (7) the right to privacy is justiciable.
Id. at 80-85, 865 P.2d at 684-88, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887-91 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 85-86, 865 P.2d at 688, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

Justice Mosk next considered the NCAA drug testing program."' Un-

like the majority, Justice Mosk found that the lower court's findings of
fact withstood appellate scrutiny."3 Based on these findings, he concluded that the NCAA drug testing program violated the California Constitution because the NCAA did not prove a compelling public need to
justify the intrusion on privacy rights."'
Finally, Justice Mosk attacked specific aspects of the majority opinion."5 Justice Mosk concluded by expressing his thoughts on the impact
of the majority decision:
Today, the majority take away from Stanford student athletes-and all other Californians-the right to privacy guaranteed by the California Constitution. At the
same time, they grant to the NCAA-and any other intruding party-a "right of
publicity"
based upon nothing more than their own views of "good" and "bad"
18
policy.

IV.

IMPACT

In the wake of rejected federal constitutional challenges, many commentators hoped that the California Supreme Court would use Hill to
preserve the student athlete's right to privacy."7 In what may be considered a major blow to the athletic community, the court instead further
restricted athletes' rights by determining, as a matter of law, that athletes
have a diminished expectation of privacy. Because the California Consti-

tution offers one of the highest levels of privacy protections,"8 it is unlikely that any future challenges to the NCAA drug testing program will
be successful."9

112. Id. at 86, 865 P.2d at 688, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 891 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 88, 865 P.2d at 690, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893 (Mosk, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the majority's approach to the lower court decision, see id. at 51, 865
P.2d at 664, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866.
114. Id. at 88, 865 P.2d at 690, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 893 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Specifically, Justice Mosk reviewed the findings of the superior court and determined that
its conclusions were supported by the evidence. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
he agreed with the court of appeal that the lower court decision should be affirmed.
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 103, 865 P.2d at 699-700, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk wrote: "Inconducting an analysis that is completely novel, the majority
adopt what must be termed a balanced approach: they do equal violence to both the
law and the facts." Id. at 103, 865 P.2d at 699, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 903 (Mosk, J., dissenting). For the majority' response to Justice Mosk's criticisms, see id. at 56, 865 P.2d
at 668, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870.
116. Id. at 110, 865 P.2d at 704, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 907 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
117. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
119. Although courts may be unlikely to find drug testing violative of the right to privacy in the NCAA setting, they may find that the NCAA's actual techniques are too
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The specific outcome of this case appears to render hopeless the quest
for privacy in the athletic context. However, the court maintained that
each decision must be made on a case by case analysis. In fact, the court
specifically stated that "we intimate no views about the legality of blanket or random drug testing conducted by employers.""Iu Therefore, although commentators may suggest that the court has opened the door to
extensive drug testing and invasions of privacy, this decision cannot be
construed as giving the green light to private or public actors to begin
random drug testing. Rather, the holding itself is limited in scope; although it does wield a heavy blow to the athletic community, its effects
may not be widespread.
On a more positive note for privacy enthusiasts, the court has defmitively stated that the Privacy Initiative does apply to private actors and
has set forth guidelines for plaintiffs to follow. 2' The mere fact that
NCAA athletes did not succeed under these guidelines does not preclude
other injured plaintiffs from asserting valid invasion of privacy claims."u
Although Hill may appear to strip Californians of their right to privacy,
it simply defines the law in the privacy arena."n Hill is not the final
word on drug testing.u Because each privacy violation must be decided
on a case by case analysis, each individual will have the opportunity to
defend his privacy. Therefore, while Hill seems to take away the privacy

intrusive. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
120. Hill, 7 Cal. 4th at 54, 865 P.2d at 667, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. The court stated:
"Employment settings are diverse, complex, and very different from intercollegiate athletic competition. Reasonable expectations of privacy in those settings are generally not
diminished by the emphasis on bodily condition, physical training, and extracurricular
competition inherent in athletics." Id.
121. The privacy analysis set forth in Hill was applied by the First Appellate District
Court when it found unconstitutional a law requiring parental or court consent before
an unemancipated minor could undergo a therapeutic abortion. American Academy of
Pediatrics v. Lungren, 94 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9477 (1994).
122. See, e.g., id.
123. Hill has and will continue to generate criticisms of the California Supreme
Court. The court has chatized in the past for becoming too conservative, and this decision solidifies that title. Philip Hager, State Supreme Court Sheds its Activist Role, L.A.
Times, Dec. 15, 1991, at A3. Whether this shift in the court is seen as a detriment or
a benefit to the state of California depends upon each individual's viewpoint
124. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.

rights embedded in the Constitution, it may in effect preserve these

rights.

JENNIFER L. SPAziANo
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H.

COUNTIES
The Operations Committee of the Retirement Board of the
Orange County Employees Retirement System is not a
"legislative body" within the meaning of the Ralph M.
Brown Act and, therefore, is not subject to the open meeting requirements of the Act: Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.
Orange County Employees Retirement System Board of
Directors.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Orange County Employees Retirement
System Board of Directors,' the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the Operations Committee of the Retirement Board of

the Orange County Employees Retirement System (Board) is a "legislative body" within the meaning of the Ralph M. Brown Act (Act)' and,

therefore, subject to the open meeting requirements of the Act.' Since

1. 6 Cal. 4th 821, 863 P.2d 218, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 148 (1993). Justice Paneli
authored the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian,
Baxter, and George concurred. Id. at 823-34, 863 P.2d at 219-27, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
149-57. Justice Mosk filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Id. at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Kennard filed a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 835-40, 863 P.2d at 22731, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157-61 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-54962 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994). California enacted
the Ralph M. Brown Act to insure that actions and deliberations of public agencies be
conducted openly. See id. § 54950. "The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them . .. [and] insist on remaining informed so
that they may retain control over the instruments they have created." Id. See generally
7 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law §§ 578-583 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1994) (discussing open meeting acts).
3. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 823-24, 863 P.2d at 220, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150. On June
18, 1991, Freedom Newspapers was denied permission to attend a meeting of the Operations Committee of the Retirement Board of the Orange County Employees Retirement
System. Id. at 824, 863 P.2d at 220, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150. The meeting was held to
prescribe recommended changes to the Board's travel policy. Id. The committe excluded Freedom Newspapers because it claimed that the session was not subject to the
open meeting requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Id. at 824-25, 863 P.2d at 220,
25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150.
On June 19, 1991, the Operations Committee, in a public session, read its recommendations to the full Board. Id, at 825, 863 P.2d at 220, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150. The
Board voted to accept the recommendations of the Operations Committee. Id.
Freedom Newspapers unsuccessfully petitioned the trial court for a writ of man-

the Operations Committee is composed solely of members of the Board

and constitutes less than a quorum of the governing body,' the court
held that the Operations Committee is not a legislative body' under California Government Code section 54952.3.' Therefore, the Operations
7
Committee is not subject to the open meeting requirements of the Act.

II. TREATMENT
A.

Majority Opinion

The court acknowledged that the Board itself is a legislative body
under California Government Code section 549528 and is, therefore, subject to the open meeting requirements of the Act.' The court then con-

sidered the conflicting interpretations of the "less-than-a-quorum" excep-

date alleging that the Operations Committee meeting was subject to the open meeting
requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act. Id. at 825, 863 P.2d at 221, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 151. Freedom Newspapers appealed from the trial court's judgment and the court of
appeal reversed. Id.
4. Id. at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. "The Orange County Employees Retirement System is governed by a nine-member Board. Five members of the
Board constitute a quorum." Id. at 824, 863 P.2d at 220, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150. The
Chairman created five advisory committees, each composed of four members of the
Board, to review business matters of the Board and to make recommendations for
action. Id. The full Board considers the committees' recommendations at public meetings. Id. None of the five committees (benefit, investment, liason, operations, and real
estate) has any decision making authority. Id.
5. "'[Llegislative body' means the governing board, commission, directors or body'of
a local agency, or any board or commission thereof, and shall include any board, commission, committee, or other body on which officers of a local agency serve in their
official capacity as members .... " CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54952 (West 1983) (amended

1994).
"'[Liegislative body' also includes any advisory commission, advisory committee or
advisory body of a local agency, created by charter, ordinance, resolution, or by any
similar formal action of a legislative body or member of a legislative body of a local
agency." Id. § 54952.3 (repealed April 1, 1994).
The parties did not dispute that the Operations Committee was "advisory." Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 824 n.3, 863 P.2d at 220 n.3, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150 n.3.
6. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 837, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157. "'Legislative
body' as defined in this section does not include a committee composed solely of
members of the governing body of a local agency which are less than a quorum of
such governing body." CAL GOV'T CODE § 54952.3 (repealed April 1, 1994).
7. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
8. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
9. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 824, 863 P.2d at 220, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 150; see Peter
G. Guthrie, Validity Construction and Application qf Statutes Making Public Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.LR. 3d 1070 (1993); Teresa Dale Pupillo, The Changing
Weather Forecast: Government in the Sunshine in the 1990s-An Analysis of State
Sunshine Laws, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 1165 (1993).
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tion of Government Code section 54952.3.0
The court argued that the mere exemption of less-than-a-quorum advisory committees from the relaxed procedural requirements of section
54952.3 would "result in absurdity."" Under such an interpretation, the
court reasoned that even temporary committees would be required to
hold regular meetings under the Act's general procedural requirements,
even though temporary committees, by definition, do not hold "regular"
meetings.'2 The court concluded, therefore, that section 54952.3 exempted less-than-a-quorum advisory committees from the definition of legislative body for purposes of the Act.'3
The court further reasoned that the intent and the purpose of the Act
are retained even if less-than-a-quorum advisory committees are exempt
from the open meeting requirements since a public meeting must be held
for the Board to consider or act upon the committee's recommendations.'4 The court considered this a reasonable balance between the
public's right to know and the "practical needs of governmental
organizations."'5 Therefore, the court concluded that the Operations
Committee meeting was not subject to the open meeting requirements of
the Act.' 6

10. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 826, 863 P.2d at 221, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 151. The Board
argued that the Operations Committee, as an advisory committee excluded from the
definition of legislative body under § 54952.3, was exempt from all open meeting requirements in the Act. Id. Freedom Newspapers argued that the less-than-a-quorum
exception merely exempted the Operations Committee from the relaxed procedural requirements of § 54952.3. Id.
note 22 and ac11. Id, at 827, 863 P.2d at 222, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 152; see ifm
companying text.
12. Freedom, 6th Cal. 4th at 827-28, 863 P.2d at 222, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 162. "The
the time for holding regular
legislative body of a local agency shall provide ...

meetings." CAL GOV'T CODE § 54954 (West 1983) (amended 1994).
13. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 833, 863 P.2d at 226, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156; see also
Henderson v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App. 3d 875, 144 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1978) (finding
that § 54952.3 expressly exempted an advisory committee composed of less than a
quorum of the governing body from the open meeting requirements of the Act).
14. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 833-34, 863 P.2d at 226-27, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156-57.
15. Id.

16. Id. However, Justice Panelli expressed no opinion as to whether the Operations
Committee would be a legislative body under the newly enacted § 54952(b). Id. at 832
n.11, 863 P.2d at 226 n11, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156 n.11. Section 54952(b) provides in
pertinent partHowever, advisory committees, composed solely of members of the legislative
body which are less than a quorum of the legislative body are not legislative

B. Justice Mosk's Concurring& Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk agreed with the result reached by the majority." However, he dissented from the majority, finding that the repeal of California
Government Code section 54952.3 by newly enacted 1993 legislation
rendered the decision moot. 8 Justice Mosk pointed out that the court
has no responsibility to offer advisory opinions on repealed statutes.'
Justice Mosk concluded that he would have dismissed review since the
new legislation answers the question the court sought to resolve.no
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard disagreed with the majority's conclusion and reasoning.2 Justice Kennard reasoned that the less-than-a quorum provision of

California Government Code section 54952.3 merely exempted advisory
committees from the "relaxed" notice standards of section 54952.3.' Ac-

cordingly, such committees are subject to the more rigid, general requirements that govern legislative bodies.' Justice Kennard stated that the
purpose of the Act was to insure that citizens of California are "fully informed about the legislative decisionmaling process of elected and appointed officials."24
Justice Kennard reasoned that the majority opinion provides a means
by which a legislative body can shield its decisionmaking process from
the public by dividing into committees constituting less than a quorum of

bodies, except that standing committees of a legislative body, irrespective of
their composition, which have a continuing subject matter jurisdiction, or a
meeting schedule fixed by charter, ordinance, resolution, or formal action of
a legislative body are legislative bodies for purposes of this chapter.
CAL Gov'T CODE § 54952(b) (West Supp. 1994).
17. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
18. Id. (Mosk,, J., concurring and dissenting); see supra note 16 and accompanying
text.
19. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
20. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice Mosk interpreted amended
§ 54952(b) to exclude advisory committees from the definition of legislative body unless they qualify as "standing committees". Id, (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
21. Id. at 835, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 838, 863 P.2d at 229, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 159 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
23. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Under § 54952.3, an advisory committee can elect
to give 24-hour written notice of its meetings or to provide for regular meetings in its
bylaws or rules. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54952.3 (repealed April 1, 1994). "No other notice
of regular meetings is required." Id.
24. Preedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 835, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 22: 783, 1995]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the governing body and can, thereby, "contravene the goal" of the Act.'
Justice Kennard concluded that the court should require the Operations

Committee to hold open meetings to effectuate the clear intent of the
Act.
Ill.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

The supreme court's decision makes it clear that, at least prior to April

1, 1994, advisory comnittees composed solely of members of a governing
body that constitute less than a quorum of the governing body are exempt from the open meeting requirements of the Ralph M. Brown Act.
However, with amendment of Government Code section 5 4 9 5 21 and the
repeal of section 54952.3,' the court has yet to decide whether such
advisory committees will continue to enjoy their "exempt" status.' The
court left for another day the question of whether the Operations Committee would qualify as a legislative body under the new legislation.'

MICHAEL WILLIAMS

25. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard noted that the purpose of the June
18, 1991, Operations Committee meeting was to re-evaluate the travel policy of the
Board. Id. at 835, 863 P.2d at 228, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
The travel policy was the subject of controversy after reports stated that Board members used public funds for a European tour. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
26. Id. at 840, 863 P.2d at 231, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 161 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard noted that the majority opinion will be "short-lived" since § 54952(b)
specifies that standing committees are legislative bodies. Id. at 839 n.5, 863 P.2d at 230
n.5, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 160 n.5 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 834, 863 P.2d at 227, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 157.
28. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
29. CAL GOV'T CODE § 54952.3 (repealed April 1, 1994).
30. Freedom, 6 Cal. 4th at 832 n.11, 863 P.2d at 226 nll, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 156
n.11.
31. Id.; see supra note 16 and accompanying text.

IV.

CRIMINAL LAW

A.

The term "clearproof' in section 26 of the California Penal Code places the burden on the prosecution
to prove by clear and convincing evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, that a minor knew of the
wrongfulness of the charged conduct for purposes of
determining when a child becomes a ward of the
state: In re Manuel L.

In the case of In re Manuel L.,' the California Supreme Court analyzed
and determined the meaning of the term clear proof used in section 26 of
the California Penal Code.2 A child under the age of fourteen is presumed incapable of committing a crime unless there is a showing of
clear proof that the child knew of the wrongfulness of the act.' This
standard of proof employed by section 26 of the Penal Code (section 26)
applies to section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 602)
for purposes of determining when a child becomes a ward of the state."

Therefore, a child cannot be made a ward of the state unless the prosecution successfully presents clear proof that the child knew of the
wrongfulness of the charged conduct prior to engaging in it.5
In Manuel L., the state filed a section 602 petition alleging that
Manuel, an eleven year old child, committed the crimes of receipt of
stolen property' and assault with force likely to cause bodily injury.

1. 7 Cal. 4th 229, 865 P.2d 718, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 2 (1994). Justice Panelli wrote the
opinion of the court, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Arabian, Baxter, and
George concurring. Id.at 231-39, 865 P.2d at 719-24, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-8. Justice
Kennard wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Mosk. Id. at 23945, 865 P.2d at
724-28, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8-11 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 232, 865 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3. Section 26 of the California
Penal Code states in pertinent part:
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the
following classes: One - Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear
proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew
of its wrongfulness.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1988) (emphasis added).
3. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 231-32, 865 P.2d at 719, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3.
4. Id. at 232, 865 P.2d at 719, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3.
5. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West 1988); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 602 (West
1984).
6. Manuel allegedly purchased stolen bicycle parts from another minor. Manuel L.,
7 Cal. 4th at 232-33, 865 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3. For a definition of the
crime of receipt of stolen property, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 496 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994).
7. Manuel also allegedly shot sharp pieces of glass at another minor. Manuel L., 7
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Based on a psychiatric report, the trial court determined that Manuel
knew of the wrongfulness of his conduct and ordered Manuel a ward of

the state.8 Manuel appealed the trial court decision, arguing that the
court erred by not applying a reasonable doubt standard in determining
whether he had knowledge of the wrongfulness of his conduct.'
The supreme court focused first on legislative intent with regard to
section 26, noting that other code sections employed the reasonable
doubt standard at the time section 26 was enacted." The court viewed
this as evidence of the legislature's intent to give clear proof a separate
meaning independent from that of reasonable doubt." Drawing on two
court of appeal cases, 2 the Manuel L. court found the clear proof standard to require a showing by clear and convincing evidence."

The court next responded to Manuel's contention that section 701 of
the Welfare and Institutions Code (section 701)' 4 requires use of the rea-

Cal. 4th at 233, 865 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4. For a definition of the crime of
assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 245
(West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
8. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 233, 865 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
9. Id.
10. California Penal Code § 1096, adopted in the same year as § 26, used the rea-

sonable doubt standard for determining guilt. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1096 (West 1985).
In addition, former Penal Code § 262 specifically stated that in order to uphold a rape
conviction involving a child under the age of 14, capability of penetration must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 262, repealed by Stat. 1978,
ch. 29, § 1. Therefore, the court contended -that the differing language pertaining to
minors under the age of 14 in § 26 and § 262 demonstrates the legislature's intent to
have separate burdens in each of these sections. Manuel, 7 Cal. 4th at 234, 865 P.2d at
721, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
11. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 234, 865 P.2d at 721, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 4.
12. See In re Michael B., 149 Cal. App. 3d 1073, 1087, 197 Cal. Rptr. 379, 388 (1983)
(interpreting the clear proof language of § 26 as calling for clear and convincing evi-

dence); People v. Terry, 180 Cal. App. 2d 48, 59, 4 Cal. Rptr. 597, 604 (1960) (same).
For other appellate court decisions giving clear proof a beyond a reasonable doubt
meaning, see In re Billie Y., 220 Cal. App. 3d 127, 269 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1990); In re
Francisco N., 186 Cal. App. 3d 175, 230 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1986); In re Richard T., 175
Cal. App. 3d 248, 220 Cal. Rptr. 573 (1985); Shortridge v. Municipal Court, 151 Cal.
App. 3d 611, 198 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1984).
13. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 234-35, 865 P.2d at 721, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5-6.
14. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (West 1984) (employing the reasonable doubt
standard of proof to find a minor to be a ward of the state under § 602). The legislature changed the standard in § 701 from by a preponderance of the evidence to beyond a reasonable doubt after the United States Supreme Court mandate in In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 235, 865 P.2d at 721, 27 Cal.

sonable doubt standard."6 The court rejected this argument, noting that
section 701 pertains to the elements of the offense charged, while section
26 pertains to capacity."6
In response to Manuel's argument that due process requires the use of
a reasonable doubt standard in light of the holding of In re Winship,"
the court countered that due process only requires the reasonable doubt
standard to be employed in proving the elements of a crime and not the
capacity to commit a crime.' 8 As a result, the court concluded that clear
proof requires clear and convincing evidence which comports with the
due process requirements of the state and federal constitutions. 9
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Kennard, joined by Justice
Mosk, opined that the clear proof standard calls for a showing beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Justice Kennard denounced the majority's reliance
on the two appellate court cases"' asserting that those cases support the
clear and convincing standard only in dicta.' In rejecting the majority
approach, Justice Kennard traced the clear proof terminology to
M'Naghten's Casen, an 1843 English court decision which interpreted

Rptr. 2d at 5.
15. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 236, 865 P.2d at 722, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 5.
16. The court emphasized that a "juvenile's capacity remains, as historically it has
been, subject to a distinct standard of proof." Id.
17. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
18. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 238, 865 P.2d at 723, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7. The court
noted several United States Supreme Court cases that did not require the use of the
reasonable doubt standard. See McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (stating
that sentencing considerations do not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (noting that a state determines the elements of a crime which must be proved by the reasonable doubt standard). In addition, the court cited several California cases rejecting due process claims. See, e.g.,
People v. Boyes, 149 Cal. App. 3d 812, 197 Cal. Rptr. 105 (1983) (rejecting a due process claim to the presumption of consciousness because it was not an element of the
crime). See generally People v. Drew, 22 Cal. 3d 333, 583 P.2d 1318, 149 Cal. Rptr. 2d
275 (1978).
19. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 239, 865 P.2d at 724, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-8.
20. Id. at 240, 865 P.2d at 724-25, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
21. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
22. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 240-41, 865 P.2d at 725, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8-9
(Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also pointed out that both of the justices
who authored the lower court opinions relied upon by the majority changed their view
in subsequent decisions. Id. at 241, 866 P.2d at 725, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 8-9.
23. 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). Although M'Nagten's Case established the definition of
insanity, Justice Kennard focused on the clearly proved language in the case. Justice
Kennard relied on Professor Henry Weihofen, who interpreted clearly proved as equivalent to beyond a reasonable doubt. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 242-43, 865 P.2d at 726-27,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see HENRY WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER
AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE, The Burden of Proof § 3 (1954).
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"clearly proved" as equivalent to "beyond a reasonable doubt". ' Finally,
Justice Kennard noted that "clearly" is an ambiguous term' which
should be adjudged in favor of the defendant, thereby affording the higher burden of proof.'
In re Manuel L. exemplifies the ambiguity of the language in section
26 of the California Penal Code, which has the effect of producing conflicting interpretations of clear proof. Although the majority in Manuel L.
chose to rely on the dicta of two appellate court cases to define clear
proof in section 26 as clear and convincing evidence, Justice Kennard
articulated a strong argument for the adoption of the higher beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof. Accordingly, the time is ripe for
California legislators to amend section 26 to avoid further confusion
surrounding the standard of proof.

ERIC MASAKI TOKUYAMA

24. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 242, 865 P.2d at 726, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9 (Kennard, J.,

dissenting). Many jurisdictions refused to adopt clearly proved as a standard for insanity because it was too harsh. Id. at 243, 865 P.2d at 727, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10
(Kennard, J., dissenting). In support of her conclusion, Justice Kennard cited People v.

Wreden, in which the court held that "'clearly established by satisfactory proof was
tantamount to .. .beyond a reasonable doubt" Id. (quoting People v. Wreden, 59 Cal.
392, 395 (1881)).
25. See WEIHOFEN, supra note 23, § 3.
26. Manuel L., 7 Cal. 4th at 244, 865 P.2d at 727-28, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11. See generally People v. Overstreet, 42 Cal. 3d 891, 726 P.2d 1288, 231 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1986)
(noting that a defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt in statutory inter-

pretation).

B.

Jury instructions stating that mens rea for assault
is established when the state proves that a defendant
wilfully committed an act that by its nature will
probably and directly result in an injury to another
does not create an unconstitutional burden-shifting
presumption: People v. Colantuono.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Colantuono', the California Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether the trial court properly instructed the jury on the charges of assault and assault with a deadly weapon. The supreme court held
that the trial court did not err when it instructed the jury that the requisite mental intent for assault was presumed where "an act inherently
dangerous to others is committed with a conscious disregard of human
life and safety."2
According to trial testimony of the only five percipient witnesses, including that of the victim and the defendant, the defendant withdrew a
.357 magnum revolver from his waistband during a playful verbal exchange.3 The defendant, the victim, and the other three witnesses, all
young men, were engaged in a "certain amount of horseplay" which continued after the revolver was drawn.4 Seconds later, the revolver discharged, shooting the victim in the neck and paralyzing him. The defendant claimed that he did not intend to fire the weapon and was not even
aware the gun was loaded.' Several other witnesses were called to testify to the defendant's character for nonviolence

1. 7 Cal. 4th 206, 865 P.2d 704, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908 (1994). Justice Arabian

authored the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelll,
Baxter, and George joined. Id. at 210, 865 P.2d at 706, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910. Justice
Mosk filed a separate concurring opinion. Id, at 222, 865 P.2d at 715, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 919. Justice Kennard wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, agreeing
only with the majority's result. Id. at 225, 865 P.2d at 716, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
2. Id. at 221, 865 P.2d at 714, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918.
3. Id. at 211, 865 P.2d at 706-07, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
4. Id. at 211, 865 P.2d at 706, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910.
5. Id. The testimony at trial reflected that the defendant was verbally taunted by
his victim, that the defendant aimed the gun at the victim in anger, that the victim
repeatedly attempted to push the gun away, but that the defendant continued to aim
the gun at the victim. Testimony also showed that, either the defendant stated, "I'm
going to shoot you" or that the victim asked, "Are you going to shoot me?" The defendant ran away after the gun discharged but later turned himself into the police. Id.
6. Id. at 211, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910. The defendant had bullets
for the revolver in his jacket pocket, but maintained that he carried the revolver for
protection from gangs and never carried it loaded when he was out on the street. Id.
7. Id. at 211, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 910-11.
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The trial court instructed the jury on assault and assault with a deadly
weapon,8 and added: "[W]hen an act inherently dangerous to others is
committed with a conscious disregard of human life and safety, the act
transcends recklessness, and the intent to commit a battery is presumed."' The jury found the defendant guilty of assault with a deadly
weapon.' The jury also found allegations true that the defendant intentionally inflicted great bodily 2 injury" and personally used a firearm in
the commission of the crimes.1
8. The court gave the standard jury instructions for assault provided in CALIIC No.
9.00:
Every person who (with general criminal intent] makes an unlawful attempt coupled with the present ability, to apply physical force upon the person of another, is guilty of the crime of assault.
In order to prove such crime, each of the following elements must be
proved:
1. An unlawful attempt was made to apply physical force upon the person
of another,
2. At the time of such attempt the person who made the attempt had the
present ability to apply such physical force, [and]
[3. The person making the attempt had a general criminal attempt, which,
in this case, means that such person intended to commit an act, the
natural and probable consequences of which if successfully completed
would be the application of physical force upon the person of another.]
CALUIC 9.00 (5th ed. 1988).
9. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. In its
entirety, the supplemental instruction read as follows:
The requisite intent for the commission of an assault with a deadly
weapon is the intent to commit a battery. Reckless conduct alone does not
constitute a sufficient basis for assault or for battery even if the assault
results in an injury to another. However, when an act inherently dangerous
to others is committed with a conscious disregard of human life and safety,
the act transcends recklessness, and the intent to commit a battery is presumed.
Id. at 211-12, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911. Specifically, the defendant
was found to have violated § 245(a)(2) of the Penal Code:
Any person who commits an assault upon the person of another with
a firearm shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for two,
three, or four years, or in a county jail for not less than six months and not
exceeding one year, or by both a fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars
($10,000) and imprisonment.
CAL PENAL CODE § 245(a)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
11. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911; see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 12022.7 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
12. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911; see CAL.

The defendant appealed his conviction and argued that the stated jury
instructions created a mandatory presumption with respect to the issue
of intent which impermissibly relieved the prosecution of proving every
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 3 The court of appeal
affirmed the defendant's conviction and found that the jury instructions
did not remove the question of intent from the jury's consideration."
The defendant petitioned the California Supreme Court for review" and
the court granted his petition to "resolve a developing conflict in decisions of the Courts of Appeal.""

II. TREATMENT
In a divided opinion, the California Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction.'7 Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, intended for the present case to resolve the conflicts concerning the requisite mental intent for the crime of simple assault, "' and the effects of
jury instructions stating presumptions as to mental intent.'9 In
Colantuono, the court attempted to enunciate the answer that "lies somewhere in between"' the two alternatives proposed by the defendant and
the Attorney General. The defendant argued that the jury instructions
allowed intent to be presumed, thereby relieving the prosecutor of his
burden to prove all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.2
Alternatively, the Attorney General argued that the jury instructions
merely "defined those circumstances sufficient to establish the comnission of an assault."' The court recognized that before it could properly
judge the accuracy of the given jury instructions, it must first determine
the status of the law relating to the requisite mental intent for the crime
of assault.'

PENAL CODE § 12022.5 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
13. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
14. Id.; see People v. Colantuono, 20 Cal. App. 4th 702, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 134 (1992).
15. People v. Colantuono, 841 P.2d 143, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 158 (1992).
16. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
17. Id. at 222, 865 P.2d at 715, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
18. The same general principles govern both assault and assault with a deadly weapon. Neither crime involves an assault coupled with a specific intent crime. Id. at 213,
865 P.2d at 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912.
19. Id. at 212, 865 P.2d at 707, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
20. Id. at 212, 865 P.2d at 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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A.

Intent

In Colantuono, the court held that the prosecution can establish the
requisite mens rea for assault and assault with a deadly weapon upon
proof that the defendant willfully committed an act that by its nature will
probably and directly result in injury to another.' The court found that
simple assault and assault with a deadly weapon are general intent
crimes rather than specific intent crimes.'
This was not the first time the California Supreme Court discussed the
mens rea element of assault.' The court cited to both People v. Hood'
and People v. Rocha, in stating that assault was a general intent
crime." These cases, however, involved situations when intoxication
was pleaded as a defense, and it was not clear whether the general intent
formulation would be applied to other contexts.'

24. Id. at 214, 865 P.2d at 709, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913. "Although the defendant
must intentionally engage in conduct that will likely produce iWurious consequences,
the prosecution need not prove a specific intent to inflict a particular harm." Id.
25. Id. at 215, 865 P.2d at 710, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914. For an excellent discussion
on the possibly inaccurate distinction between general and specific intent for the crime
of assault, see William Roth, General v. Specific Intent: A Time for Terminological
Understanding in California,7 PEPP. L REv. 67 (1979).
26. "Deciphering the requisite intent for assault and assault with a deadly weapon
has been a recurring task for this court." Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 206, 865 P.2d at
708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 911.
27. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
28. 3 Cal. 3d 893, 479 P.2d 372, 92 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1971).
29. The court in Colantuono stated that the decision in People v. Hood "was consistent with the '[mlany cases' holding that neither offense is a specific intent crime."
Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 213, 865 P.2d at 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912 (quoting People
v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 452, 462 P.2d at 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 618). In People v. Rocha,
the court held that the criminal intent required for assault with a deadly weapon is the
"general intent to wilfully commit an act the direct, natural and probable consequences
of which if successfully completed would be the injury to another ....
The intent to
cause any particular injury. . . is not necessary." Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d at 899, 479 P.2d at
376-77, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 176-77.
30. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 213, 865 P.2d at 708, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 912. Here,
the Colantuono court discussed the "other policy considerations" which decided the
issue in Hood, that "'an offense of this nature is not one which requires an intent that
is susceptible to negation through a showing of voluntary intoxication'." Id. (quoting
Hood, 1 Cal. 3d at 458, 462 P.2d at 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 618); see also Roth, supra
note 25, at 78 (discussing the voluntary intoxication defense in Hood and Rocha);
Douglas R. Young, Comment, Retlinking the Specific-General Intent Doctrine in California Criminal Law, 63 CAL. L REV. 1352, 1357 (1975) (discussing the general-specific
intent dichotomy with reference to the crime of assault).

The Colantuono court conceded that "a certain measure of understandable analytical uncertainty continues."3' In People v. Carmen,n the California Supreme Court indicated that the requisite mens rea for assault
was the specific intent to commit a battery.' The Colantuono court stated that this interpretation was incorrect, and probably resulted from the
commonly used technical misnomer of characterizing an assault as an
attempted battery.' Assault is a separate crime, distinct from a failed
battery attempt.' As a result, what is most important to the court is the
defendant's present willful conduct, not an intent to cause further consequences. "The pivotal question is whether the defendant intended to
commit an act likely to result in such physical force, not whether he or
she intended a specific harm."37

31. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 215, 865 P.2d at 709, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913; see also
LAW, Crimes Against the
Person § 401 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing specific intent to commit a battery as an element of assault).
32. 36 Cal. 2d 768, 228 P.2d 281 (1951).
33. The Colantuono court found Carmen to implledly assert that assault was a specific intent crime, arguing, "'[o]ne could not very well "attempt" or try to "commit" an
injury on the person of another if he had no intent to cause any injury to such other
person.'" Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 215, 865 P.2d at 709, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913 (quoting People v. Flannel, 25 Cal. 3d 668, 684 n.12, 603 P.2d 1, 10 n.12, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84,
93 n.12 (1979)).
34. Id. at 215, 865 P.2d at 710, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 913-14; see also 17 CAL JuR. 3D
Criminal Law § 116 (1984) (finding that "[alithough the courts are inclined to minimize the distinction between assault and attempt, a definite distinction does exist"); cf.
1 B.E. WITIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against the
Person, § 401 (arguing that an assault is an attempt); CAL PENAL CODE § 240 (West
1994) (finding "[a]n assault is an unlawful attempt ... to commit a violent injury on
the person of another").
The Colantuono court defined the word "attempt" by arguing that the legislature
in 1872 merely "used the reference only in its ordinary sense, not as the term of art
we currently conceptualize, i.e., a failed or ineffectual effort to commit a substantive
offense." Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 216, 865 P.2d at 710, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 914.
35. Id. The court reasoned that, unless assault is seen as an independent offense in
and of itself, it would be otherwise unnecessary to so distinguish it because the prosecution could charge all potential perpetrators with an "attempt" of the underlying substantive offense. Id.
Both Justice Mosk and Justice Kennard wrote separate concurring opinions, disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of assault as a separate offense from that of
attempted battery, and also disagreeing with each other as to the requisite mental intent. Id. at 223, 224, 865 P.2d at 715, 716, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919, 920. Both justices
concluded that the requisite mental intent for the crime of assault was the "intent to
commit a battery." However, Justice Mosk believed the majority opinion implied that
such an intent must be formulated, whereas Justice Kennard interpreted the majority
opinion to find that the proper mens rea was a specific intent. Id.
36. Id. at 218, 865 P.2d at 711, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 915.
37. Id. at 218, 865 P.2d at 712, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916. Thus, a general intent to

1 B.E. WrrnaN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL
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B.

Jury Instructions

Holding that assault is a general intent crime, the court found that jury
instructions stating "when an act inherently dangerous to others is committed with a conscious disregard of human life and safety, the act transcends recklessness, and the intent to commit a battery is presumed" did
not create an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption.'
In another arena, the 1979 United States Supreme Court case of
Sandstrom v. Montana held that a jury instruction stating that "the
law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts" unconstitutionally shifted to the defense the burden of
disproving the "purposely or knowingly" element of deliberate homicide.' In People v. Burres' , a California court of appeal applied similar
logic in striking down a jury instruction which presumed an intent to
commit a battery where "an act inherently dangerous to others is committed with a conscious disregard of human life and safety."'
The Colantuono court, however, distinguished the Burres conclusion.' Although both jury instructions were substantially similar, the
court found no error in the Colantuono instructions because the language at issue merely addressed "conduct constituting an assault, includ-

"attempt to commit the violence" is sufficient to establish the crime. Id.
Justice Kennard, however, would disagree. Justice Kennard argued that assault is a
specific intent crime that "requires that the defendant intend to inure the victim." Id.
at 225, 865 P.2d at 717, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 921 (Kennard, J., concurring and dissent-

ing).
38. Id. at 224, 865 P.2d at 716, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 920.
39. 442 U.S. 510 (1979).
40. Id. at 524. For an in-depth discussion of the Sandstrom analysis, see Laurie A.
Briggs, Note, Presumptive Mens Rea: An Analysis of the Federal Judiciary's Retreat
from Sandstrom v. Montana, 64 NOTRE DAME L REV. 367 (1989).
41. 101 Cal. App. 3d 341, 161 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1980).
42. Id. at 353, 161 Cal. Rptr. at 599. The Burres court emphasized that it was not
holding presumptions invalid per se, but rather this one in particular because the court
failed to instruct the jury as to its effect. Id.
The jury instruction involved here was almost identical to that employed in an
earlier case cited by the Colantuono court, People v. Lathus, 35 Cal. App. 3d 466, 110
Cal. Rptr. 921 (1973). In Lathus, however, the issue on appeal was the sufficiency of
evidence, not the unconstitutionality of burden-shifting presumptions. Under Lathus,
intent to commit a battery may be presumed when one commits an act inherently
dangerous to others with conscious disregard of human life. Id. at 470, 110 Cal. Rptr.
at 924.
43. Colantuono, 7 Cal. 4th at 220, 865 P.2d at 713, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917-18.

ing the element of general criminal intent."' Intent, the court explained,
always remains an issue of fact, and the "jurymust clearly understand
their responsibility to resolve that question beyond a reasonable doubt,
uninfluenced and unassisted by any other principles of law."' As a final
caveat, the court noted that the use of the word "presumption" may be
problematic and the lower courts are to avoid reference to that term.48
The court finally noted that since the jury specifically found that the
defendant inflicted great bodily harm, there was no prejudicial error."'
III.

CONCLUSION

Although the California Supreme Court attempted to define the requisite mental intent necessary for the crime of assault, substantial uncertainty still remains.' According to the court's analysis, the mens rea element of the crime appears to be subsumed, thereby dispensing with it
altogether.49
Therefore, it is not altogether surprising that the court only superficially addresses defendant's argument, and cautions the lower courts
only against referring to the term presumption in jury instructionsY The
jury found special allegations that the defendant inflicted great bodily
harm. This ameliorated any prejudicial error arising from unconstitutional burden-shifting presumptions within the jury instructions.' This may
be a partial explanation of the court's decision. However, the court has

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id. at 221, 865 P.2d at 714, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918.
Id.
Id. at 222, 865 P.2d at 715, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
This was also the basis for the concurring opinions of Justices Mosk and
Kennard.
48. Justice Kennard, in her concurring and dissenting opinion, exemplifies the continuing confusion. Justice Kennard notes that Justice Mosk read the majority opinion as
holding that the crime of assault requires an intent to injure, despite the majority position that assault is a general intent crime. Id. at 225 n.1, 865 P.2d at 716, n.1 26 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 921 n.1. (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting)
49. For this apparent reason, the majority held that the trier of fact may "look to
the completed battery" to determine if the defendant committed an assault Id. at 218
n.9, 865 P.2d at 712 n.8, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 916 n.9.
50. Id. at 221, 865 P.2d at 714, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 918. The court's casual analysis
is further documented as it comments: "Assault being a general intent crime, once the
jury find that the defendant willfully engaged in the conduct described in the instruction, they will necessarily have determined the question of intent independently of
any legal presumption." Id. at 221, 865 P.2d at 713, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 917-18.
51. Id. at 222, 865 P.2d at 715, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 919.
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yet to formulate a clear approach to SandstromlBurres constitutional
problems and the general-specific intent issue.
ALLISON L. HURST

C.

To prove fear of immediate or unlawful bodily injury in rape cases, the prosecution must show that the
victim subjectively feared immediate bodily injury,
and that the fear was reasonable or that the defendant knew of the victim's unreasonable fear; the
prosecution may establish those elements without
showing resistance or an express statement of such
fear by the victim if the circumstances support such
an inference: People v. Iniguez.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Iniguez,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether
there was sufficient evidence of the element of "fear of immediate or
unlawful bodily injury" to convict Iniguez of rape when the victim did
not resist the defendant and was unable to express a fear of immediate
bodily injury. The court addressed this issue to clarify the relationship

1. 7 Cal. 4th 847, 872 P.2d 1183, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 258 (1994). Justice Arabian
authored the unanimous opinion of the court with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices
Mosk, Kennard, Baxter, George, and Spencer concurring in the opinion.
2. Id. at 851, 872 P.2d at 1184, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259.
On the eve of her wedding, the victim, Mercy P., spent the night at the home of
a close family friend where she met the defendant, her friend's fiancee. Id. Mercy went
to sleep in the living room at approximately midnight and awoke between 1:00 and
2:00 a.m. to find the defendant naked and approaching her. Id. at 851, 872 P.2d at
1184-85, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 259-60. The defendant pulled down Mercy's pants, fondled
her buttocks, and inserted his penis inside her. Id. at 851, 872 P.2d at 1185, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 260. Mercy claimed that she did not resist because she was afraid. Id. at
852, 872 P.2d at 1185, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260. About a minute later, the defendant
ejaculated and walked back to his bedroom. Id. at 851, 872 P.2d at 1185, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 260.
Mercy immediately called her fiance and left a message for him. Id. at 852, 872
P.2d at 1185, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260. She then called her best friend, who later testified that Mercy was so distraught that she was barely comprehensible. Id. Mercy hid
in the bushes outside the house for about half an hour until her friend picked her up.
Id.
Mercy's fiance drove her to the hospital where Mercy underwent a rape examination. Id. The findings showed that intercourse had occurred within a few hours and
that the semen came from a person with a blood type that was consistent with the
defendant's blood type. Id.
When Officer Fagoso interviewed Mercy, Mercy said that she panicked and froze.
Id. At trial an expert on "rape trauma syndrome" testified that victims respond to rape
in many different ways, including being paralyzed by fear. Id. at 853, 872 P.2d at 1185,
30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
The defendant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim and that
the intercourse was nonconsensual. Id. The trial court found the defendant guilty of
rape. Id. at 853, 872 P.2d at 1186, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261. The court of appeal found
that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant used force or fear of immediate
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between the actual evidence of fear and the requirement under California
Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2), that sexual intercourse be
committed against a person's will.s The court held that if, considering
the totality of the circumstances, the plaintiff genuinely and reasonably
responded with fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury, then the
act of sexual intercourse was committed against the person's will.'

II. TREATMENT
The court first noted that when a defendant challenges a verdict based
on insufficiency of the evidence, the evidence supports a conviction if "'a
reasonable trier of fact could have found the prosecution sustained its
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent.6

The court then compared the definitions of rape in California Penal
Code section 261 prior to its amendment7 and in its 1980 amended version.' The court explained that studies have shown that women react

and unlawful bodily injury to accomplish the sexual intercourse and, therefore, reversed. Id.
3. Id. at 851, 872 P.2d at 1184, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
4. Id. at 857, 872 P.2d at 1188, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
5. Id. at 854, 872 P.2d at 1186, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (citing People v. Johnson,
26 Cal. 3d 557, 576, 606 P.2d 738, 750, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 443 (1980)).
6. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 854, 872 P.2d at 1186, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261 (citing
Johnson, 26 Cal. 3d at 576, 606 P.2d at 750, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 443).
7. Prior to 1980, California Penal Code § 261(a)(2)(3) defined rape as "an act of
sexual intercourse under circumstances where the person resists, but where 'resistance
is overcome by force or violence' or where 'a person is prevented from resisting by
threats of great and immediate bodily harm, accompanied by apparent power of execution . . . .'" People v. Barnes, 42 Cal. 3d 284, 292, 721 P.2d 110, 113, 228 Cal. Rptr. 2d
228, 232 (1986).
8. Rape was defined as "an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person
not the spouse of the perpetrator ...
(2) Where it is accomplished against a person's
will by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily Injury on the person
or another." CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 1980). In 1990, California Penal Code
§ 261, subdivision (a)(2) was amended to add duress and menace. Section 261(a)(2)
currently provides:
(a) Rape is an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the
spouse of the perpetrator, under any of the following circumstances: . . . (2)
Where It is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence,
duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of another.

differently to sexual assaults: some women resist, while others become
frozen with fear.' In response to these studies, the legislature amended
section 261 to eliminate the requirement that the victim resist in order to
show fear of immediate or unlawful bodily injury.10 Now, evidence of
fear is used to show that the act of sexual intercourse was committed
against the person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace or
fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another."
The court then summarized its conclusions in People v. Barnes regarding the existence of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury-2 The court stated that there is both an objective and a subjective
component to the element of fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury.'2 The subjective element is met if the woman submitted to sexual
intercourse because she genuinely feared immediate and unlawful bodily
injury." The objective element is satisfied where either the victim's fear
was reasonable, or the victim's fear was unreasonable, but the accused
knew of the subjective fear and took advantage of it.'5

CAL. PENAL CODE § 261(a)(2) (West 1988 & Supp. 1994); see 17 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal
Law § 622 (1984 & Supp. 1994) (defining rape); 2 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN,
CALFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Crimes Against Decency and Morals § 768 (2d ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1994).
9. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 854, 872 P.2d at 1186, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262; see Barnes,
42 Cal. 3d at 299, 721 P.2d at 118-19, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 237 (citing several different
studies that deal with women's reactions to sexual assault).
10. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 854, 872 P.2d at 1186, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262; see 17 CAL
JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 625 (1984 & Supp. 1990) (stating that resistance by the victim
is no longer required); 2 B.E. WrrIuN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW,
Crimes Against Decency and Morals § 775 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994) (same); see
also Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement
from the Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 LoY. LA. L REV. 567 (1983) (presenting reasons for the elimination of the resistance requirement from the definition of rape).
11. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 856, 872 P.2d at 1187, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262.
12. Barnes, 42 Cal. 2d at 304, 721 P.2d at 122, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 240-41. In Barnes,
the court stated that it will still look to the overall circumstances of the case to determine if the victim's fears were genuine and reasonable. Id. A victim's unreasonable
fear is sufficient if the accused knows of the victim's fear and takes advantage of it.
Id. at 304 n.20, 721 P.2d at 122 n.20, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 241 n.20. The trier of fact
should look at the acts of both the alleged attacker and the alleged victim when determining consent Id. at 304, 721 P.2d at 122, 228 Cal. Rptr. at 241. Presently, and at the
time of the crime in Iniguez, under California Penal Code § 261.6, "consent shall be
defined to mean positive cooperation in act or attitude pursuant to an exercise of free
will. The person must act freely and voluntarily and have knowledge of the nature of
the act or transaction involved." CAL PENAL CODE § 261.6 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
13. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 856, 872 P.2d at 1188, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
14. Id; see People v. Harris, 108 Cal. App. 2d 84, 89, 238 P.2d 158, 161 (1951) (stating that the extent or seriousness of the injury feared is unimportant; the physical
force only needs to induce fear in the mind of the woman).
15. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 857, 872 P.2d at 1188, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 22: 783, 1995]

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

Applying these rules to the present case, the court concluded that
there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of both a subjective
and an objective fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury. The
court found that although the victim made no express statement that she
feared immediate bodily injury, the totality of the circumstances supported such an inference. 7 Further, the difference in size between the defendant and victim, the alcohol defendant had consumed, and the location of the incident made it reasonable for the victim to fear immediate
bodily injury." The court rejected the court of appeal's suggestion that
the victim could have stopped the sexual assault by screaming."
I.

IMPACT AND CONCLUSION

In Iniguez, the court reaffirmed its position that the victim of a sexual
assault does not need to resist in order to prove the element of force or
fear.' The result in this case will strengthen the position of rape victims

16. Id. at 857-58, 872 P.2d at 1188-89, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263-64. Subjective fear
may be inferred from the circumstances. Id. at 857, 872 P.2d at 1188, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 263; see People v. Renteria, 61 Cal. 2d 497, 499, 393 P.2d 413, 414, 39 Cal. Rptr.
213, 214 (1964) (holding that victim's fear could be inferred from other evidence even
where victim testified that he was not afraid); People v. Brew, 2 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104,
2 Cal. Rptr. 851, 853 (1991) (holding that victim's fear could be inferred from other
evidence); People v. Franklin, 200 Cal. App. 2d 797, 798, 19 Cal. Rptr. 645, 645 (1962)
(same); People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal. 3d 236, 251, 681 P.2d 291, 301, 203 Cal. Rptr. 450,
460 (1984) (stating that evidence of emotional and psychological trauma may be used
to show subjective fear, but not to prove that the victim was actually raped). The
objective element may also be inferred from the facts. See People v. Jackson, 6 Cal.
App. 4th 1185, 1190, 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 239, 242 (1992) (stating that being attacked in a
private home provides the perpetrator with the "advantages of shock and surprise
which may incapacitate the victim(s)"); People v. Bermudez, 157 Cal. App. 3d 619, 625,
203 Cal. Rptr. 728, 731-32 (1984) (holding that fear was reasonable where victim was
attacked in her home).
17. Iniguez, 7 Cal. 4th at 857, 872 P.2d at 1189, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263.
18. Id. at 858, 872 P.2d at 1189, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.
19. Id. The court reasoned that screaming is an act of resistance and is unnecessary
under both the amended penal code and Barnes. Id.
20. Id. at 856, 872 P.2d at 1187-88, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 262-63. See generally Dana
Berliner, Note, Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape, 100 YALE LJ. 2687,
2692 (1991) (stating that although the resistance requirement has been removed from
most statutes, courts still frequently use resistance as evidence of force and consent).

in court and will help to insure that rape victims are not tried for their
reaction to the rape.

JILL ELIZABETH LUSHER
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D.

Evidence of a criminal defendant's voluntary intox-

ication is admissible at trial to establish that he
lacked the requisite mental capacity to commit murder: People v. Whitfield.

In People v. Whitfield,1 the California Supreme Court determined
whether evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to negate the
required mental state of a defendant charged with second-degree murder.' The court granted review because of the conflicting lower court
decisions concerning an ambiguity contained in section 22 of the California Penal Code.3 After examining the past legislative history of the
applicable statutory provision and applying standard principles of criminal law, the court held that a defendant can introduce such evidence of
voluntary intoxication to the jury in an attempt to reduce his conviction
from murder to manslaughter.4
The court based its holding on the correct interpretation of California

1. 7 Cal. 4th 437, 868 P.2d 272, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 (1994).
2. Id. at 441, 868 P.2d at 272-73, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858-59. Justice George wrote
the majority opinion, and Justices Kennard, Arabian, and Panelli concurred. Id. at 441,
868 P.2d at 272, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 858. Justice Mosk, joined by Chief Justice Lucas,
wrote separately, concurring in part and dissenting in part Id. at 456, 868 P.2d at 282,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. Justice Baxter also wrote separately, concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Id. at 477, 868 P.2d at 296, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 882. The defendant,
Whitfield, had three prior convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol. On the
afternoon in question, Whitfield drove his motor vehicle across a double yellow line
and collided head-on with Ronald Kinsey, who died as a result of the accident. Whitfield was later found to have a blood alcohol content of .24 percent. At his trial for
second-degree murder, Whitfield offered evidence of the degree of his intoxication to
establish that he lacked the requisite mental state for murder. The trial court admitted
the evidence. After the jury handed down a guilty verdict for second-degree murder,
Whitfield appealed the conviction on the ground that the court improperly excluded
certain jury instructions. Id. at 445, 868 P.2d at 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861. The court
of appeal affirmed Whitfield's conviction, and further held that the trial court erred in
allowing evidence of Whitfield's intoxication to prove he lacked the necessary mental
state. Id. The California Supreme Court granted review. Id.
3. Id. at 446, 868 P.2d at 275-76, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-62; see CAL PENAL CODE §
22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
4. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th at 455, 868 P.2d at 282, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868. For a
detailed discussion on the relationship between voluntary intoxication and crimes involving a specific intent, see generally Matthew J. Boettcher, Voluntary Intoxication: A
Defense to Specific Intent Crimes, 65 U. DET. L REV. 33 (1987); Mark S. Levin, Note,
People v. Watson: Drunk Driving Homicide-Murder or Enhanced Manslaughter?, 71
CAL L REV. 1298 (1983).

Penal Code section 22(b), which purportedly limits the admissibility of
evidence of voluntary intoxication to crimes requiring specific intent.5 As
noted by the court, the purpose of the provision is to permit an accused
to defend a murder charge by alleging that his self-induced intoxication
prevented him from forming the requisite mental state.'
The court of appeal observed that second-degree murder required
mere "implied malice," meaning that a specific intent was unnecessary to
sustain a conviction.7 The court maintained that second-degree murder
only required the existence of a general mental state,8 described by statute as a "conscious disregard for human life."9 Therefore, the court of
appeal held that evidence of voluntary intoxication was inadmissible
because the crime of second-degree murder did not necessitate the specific intent required under section 22 of the California Penal Code. °
Notwithstanding the court of appeal's interpretation, the supreme
court maintained that murder was a specific intent crime for the purpose
of Penal Code section 22(b)," and that the trial court properly admitted
evidence of the defendant's voluntary intoxication. 2 The court's rationale flowed from the following considerations: (1) courts consistently
admit evidence of voluntary intoxication to nullify the existence of a
specific intent;'3 (2) a murder charge based on an allegation of express
malice constitutes a specific intent crime, so evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible to prove lack of that intent; 4 (3) section 22 of the
California Penal Code makes no distinction between the treatment of express and implied malice; and (4) previous amendments to section 22
5. Subdivision (b) of § 22 provides:
Evidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought, when a specific intent crime
is charged.
CAL PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
6. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th at 446, 868 P.2d at 275-76, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861-62.
7. Id. at 445-46, 868 P.2d at 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861. For a discussion of implied malice in the case of vehicular homicide, see generally 17 CAL JuR. 3D Criminal
Law § 247 (1984 & Supp. 1994).
8. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th at 445-46, 868 P.2d at 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
9. Id. at 444-45, 868 P.2d at 274-75, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 860-61 (quoting CALIIC No.

8.51).
10. Id. at 445-46, 868 P.2d at 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861.
11. Id. at 450, 868 P.2d at 278, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
12. Id. at 454, 868 P.2d at 281, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.

13. Id. at 446, 868 P.2d at 275, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 861. For a discussion of intoxication as a defense to criminal homicide, see 17 CAL JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 285
(1984); see also 1 B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Defenses § 212 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1994).
14. Whitfield, 7 Cal. 4th at 447, 868 P.2d at 276, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862.
15. Id. at 448, 868 P.2d at 277, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863. For an analysis of mental
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support the conclusion that the lawmakers did not intend to differentiate
between these two categories of mental state."
The majority further sought to justify its holding based on ordinary
principles of criminal law." The majority asserted that the defendant's
degree of intoxication was a critical factor in deciding whether he was

sufficiently criminally negligent to justify a finding of implied malice.'
In light of the relevance of intoxication to the defendant's mental state,
the court believed that excluding such evidence would be antithetical to
the goals of judicial fairness in faithfully ascertaining the defendant's
degree of culpability.
Justice Mosk, in his separate opinion, expressed concern that the majority misinterpreted the clear manifestations of section 2 2 ,' and also
that the court's precedent may permit self-induced intoxication as a justification for criminal activity." Justice Mosk challenged the majority's
decision as contrary to the promotion of increased penalties for criminal
conduct.'
Nevertheless, the court's holding recognizes the practical difficulty in
distinguishing between the requisite mental states for murder and, ac-

states, other than specific intent, supporting murder convictions, see Bernard E. Gegan,
More Cases of Depraved Mind Murder: The Problem of Mens Rea, 64 ST. JOHN'S L
REV. 429 (1990).
16. Whifield, 7 Cal. 4th at 448, 868 P.2d at 277, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863. The court
stated that if the legislature intended to distinguish between express and implied malice with respect to evidence of voluntary intoxication, it would have explicitly addressed this intention. Since no such legislative provision existed, the court was reluctant to judicially make the distinction. Id. at 448-49, 868 P.2d at 277, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 863.
17. Id. at 451-54, 868 P.2d at 279-81, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865-67.
18. Id. at 452, 868 P.2d at 280, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866. For a general definition of
malice, consult 1 B.E. WmaN & NoRMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW, Elements of Crime § 107 (2d ed. 1988). For a breakdown of evidence required for varying
degrees of homicide, consult 41 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 317-320 (1991).
19. Whigfeld, 7 Cal. 4th at 453, 868 P.2d at 280-81, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866-67. While
noting that "drinking drivers exact an enormous toll on society," the majority indicated
that juries are free to reject this proffered defense, and an accused may still be convicted of murder despite the admission of such evidence. Id. at 453-54, 868 P.2d at
280-81, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 866-67.
20. Id. at 459, 868 P.2d at 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870 (Mosk, J., concurring and

dissenting).
21. Id. at 461, 868 P.2d at 285-86, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-72 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
22. Id.

cordingly, permits the benefit of this ambiguity to favor the accused. 2
The court's decision in Whi4field does not, however, relax the state's
burden in proving a murder charge by excluding relevant evidence to the
detriment of the criminal defendant.

MICHAEL G. OLEINIK

23. Id. at 450, 868 P.2d at 278, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864.
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V.

EMPLOYMENT LAW
Misrepresentationsmade by employers in the course
of a wrongful discharge do not create a separately
actionablefraud: Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc.,' a sharply divided California Supreme
Court determined that misrepresentations' made during the course of an

employee's wrongful dismissal do not create a separate cause of action
for fraud.' The court held that to recover in tort, a plaintiff must establish the elements required to prove fraud independent of any insrepresentation made to effect a wrongful termination.'
Charles Hunter resigned from his position as a welding supervisor for
Up-Right, Inc. in 1987, after fourteen years of employment.' Hunter testified that he resigned after being told that there was "a corporate decision
to eliminate his position, and that if he refused to resign, [he would be

terminated]." 7 After discovering that his position had not been eliminated, Hunter brought a cause of action for wrongful termination which was

1. 6 Cal. 4th 1174, 864 P.2d 88, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 8 (1993). Justice Panei wrote the
opinion of the court, joined by Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Baxter and George.
Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Arabian and Justice Kennard.
Id. at 1187, 864 P.2d at 95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15.
2. The Restatement of Torts notes that "words or conduct asserting the existence
of a fact constitute a misrepresentation if the fact does not exist." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
3. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1178, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
4. In California, the elements to prove fraud or deceit are: (a) misrepresentation;
(b) defendant's knowledge of falsity; (c) intent to defraud; (d) justifiable reliance; and
(e) resulting damage. 5 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 676 (9th ed.
1988 & Supp. 1993); see also 34 CAL JUR. 3D Fraud and Deceit § 6 (1977 & Supp.
1994); BAJI No. 12.31 (7th ed. Supp. 1991). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 525 (1977) (defining liability for fraudulent misrepresentation).
5. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1178, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9. Potential litigants frequently prefer to seek recovery in tort because tort damages, which include
the possibility of punitive damages, often significantly exceed wrongful dismissal contract awards. Harriet Chiang, State Court Rules Against Fired Workers: Firms Not Liable For Fraud-Only Wrongful Termination, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 31, 1993, at Al; see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (noting that one policy basis for assessing
damages in tort is "to punish wrongdoers and defer wrongful conduct").
6. Hunter, .6 Cal. 4th at 1179, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
7. Id. at 1178, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 9.

subsequently amended to include allegations of fraud." Although Hunter's
depiction of the episode was disputed at trial, the jury found for the
plaintiff on three grounds: breach of implied contract not to terminate
employment without good cause, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and fraud.'
The court of appeal affirmed the trial court," rejecting the argument
that the California Supreme Court's decision in Foley v. InteractiveData
Corp." barred fraud claims arising out of a fundamentally contractual
employment relationship. 2 The appellate court discussed the difference
in policy between contract and tort remedies, finding that an employer
"perpetuates two separate wrongs" by fraudulently breaching a contract
and should not be shielded from tort liability because of the concurrent
contract violation. 3 The court of appeal also noted that its decision
would not prevent employers from dismissing employees, but rather,
addressed only those terminations accomplished by fraud and deceit."
The California Supreme Court granted review, expressly limiting the
issue to whether Foley "precludes recovery of tort damages for fraud and
deceit predicated on a misrepresentation made to effect termination of
employment." 5

II. TREATMENT
The majority began its analysis with an examination of the Foley decision. 8 The court observed that Foley recognized that the "distinction
between tort and contract is well grounded in common law, and divergent objectives underlie the remedies created in the two areas."" Additionally, the court recognized that a discharge in violation of public policy can still sustain a tort recovery where the policy affects the public at
large, and not merely the individual parties. 8

8. Id. The court noted that Hunter amended his complaint after the filing of the
Foley decision. Id.; see infra notes 16-23 and accompanying text for a review of the
majority's discussion of the Foley decision.
9. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1180, 864 P.2d 90, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10.

10. Hunter v. Up-Right, Inc., 20 Cal. App. 4th at 721, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 (1992).
11. 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (1988).
12. Hunter, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 727, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
13. Id. at 728, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
901 (1977) (discussing differing policy goals of tort and contract remedies).
14. Hunter, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 728, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 197.
15. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1178, 864 P.2d at 89, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9.
16. Id. at 1180, 864 P.2d at 90, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
17. Id. (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at 388, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 227).

18. Id. (quoting Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 665-71, 765 P.2d at 376-80, 254 Cal. Rptr. at
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Although the Foley court noted that breaches of the covenant of good
faith have traditionally been limited to contract damages, it noted that an
exception, justified by "a variety of policy reasons," had been created to
provide tort recovery for the breach of insurance contracts."9 However,
the court rejected extending the exception to the employment relation20
ship.
The Foley court also expressed its concern that "[v]irtually any termination could provide the basis for an allegation that the employee's discharge was in bad faith," and extending tort liability could impede the
ability of an employer to dismiss an employee without fear of litigation." Concern was also expressed by the court in Foley for "the stability of the business community."'
The Hunter majority affirmed the Foley court's analysis in declining
"to extend tort remedies for breach of the good faith covenant in a contract of employment."' The court rejected the appellate court's conclusion that Hunter had established the elements of fraud,' 4 specifically
finding that he failed to prove the "justifiable reliance" element.' In the
majority's opinion, the defendant had "simply employed a falsehood to

214-18).
19. Id. at 1180-81, 864 P.2d at 90, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11.
20. The Foley court noted that the relative positions of a wrongfully terminated individual, and one who has had an insurance claim improperly denied, are greatly incongruous: whereas the employee can always seek other employment, the insured cannot
find another insurance company to cover the pre-existing loss. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at
1181, 864 P.2d at 91, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (citing Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 765
P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 234).
21. Id. at 1181, 864 P.2d at 91, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (citing Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at
697, 765 P.2d at 398, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 236-37). The court noted that "[flraud is easily
pleaded . . . . Much harder, however, is the defense of such claims and their resolution at the summary judgment or demurrer stage of litigation." Id, at 1185, 864 P.2d at
93-94, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14.
22. Id. at 1181, 864 P.2d at 91, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (citing Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at
692-93, 765 P.2d at 395-96, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233-35). The Foley court asserted, "[t]he
expansion of tort remedies in the employment context has potentially enormous consequences for the stability of the business community." Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 699, 765 P.2d
at 401, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 239.
23. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1181-82, 864 P.2d at 91, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 11 (citing
Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 692-93, 765 P.2d at 395, 254 Cal. Rptr. at 233).
24. Id. at 1184, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13; see also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
25. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1184, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13. The court
found that the result of the termination misrepresentation was "indistinguishable from
an ordinary constructive wrongful termination." Id.

do what it otherwise could have accomplished directly."28 As a result,
the court concluded that Hunter had not relied to his detriment on defendant Up-Right's misrepresentation, and accordingly could not sustain a
claim of fraud.' Underscoring its position, the Hunter majority declared

that "it is difficult to conceive of a wrongful termination case in which a
misrepresentation made by the employer to effect termination could ever
rise to the level of a separately actionable fraud."'
Three justices dissented from the majority in two separate dissenting
opinions.' Justice Kennard's dissent alleged that under the majority's

"troubling" holding, employers are effectively provided with an incentive
to commit fraud.' She explained that an "employer has everything to
gain-if the fraud succeeds, the employee will never discover the true
reason for the termination, and will never trouble the employer with a
wrongful termination action."3
Justice Kennard also rejected the majority's position that Hunter did
not detrimentally rely on the defendant's misrepresentation,' arguing

that Hunter relied on the defendant's misrepresentations in resigning
voluntarily, and consequently impaired his ability to learn of and enforce
his contractual rights.'
Justice Mosk's dissenting opinion, which was joined by Justice Arabian, accused the majority of "inexplicably revis[ing) the law of fraud to
exclude fraudulent termination of employment contracts."' Mosk noted
that the majority's opinion stems from a belief that, in this case, fraud

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1184-85, 864 P.2d at 93, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 13. However, the majority noted that a misrepresentation in the employment context, which was not aimed at effecting termination of employment, could potentially give rise to tort liability for fraud.
Id. at 1185, 864 P.2d at 94, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 14 (noting that the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed such a situation in Miller v. Fairchild
Indus., 885 F.2d 498, 609-10 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 494 U.S. 1056 (1990)). The
court viewed its decisions in Foley and succeeding cases, including Hunter, as validating the availability of tort damages for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, so long as the action is "predicated on a fundamental, well-established, substantial
policy that concerns society at large rather than the individual interests of the employer or employee." Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1186, 864 P.2d at 94, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 14-15.
29. See supra note 1 for a listing of the justices and their positions.
30. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1198, 864 P.2d at 102, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 23 (Kennard, J.,

dissenting).
31. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 1196, 864 P.2d at 101, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
33. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1196-97, 864 P.2d at 101-02, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 22-23
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 1187, 864 P.2d at 95, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 15 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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and breach of contract are "conceptually indistinguishable."' Rejecting
the majority position, Justice Mosk argued that fraud and breach of contract are distinguishable because they address different injuries.'
Justice Mosk also rejected the majority's claim that a different ruling
would potentially result in a flood of tort claims.' Justice Mosk explained that detriment is still a required element, and that claims that
cannot prove detrimental reliance, including all employment situations
which are terminable at will, are likely to be resolved by summary judgment.'
I.

CONCLUSION

The court's decision in Hunter clearly narrowed the remedies available
to an employee who is deceived' by an employer in the process of being discharged.4 At least one commentator has noted that Hunter fol-

35. Id. at 1189, 864 P.2d at 96, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 16-17 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1190, 864 P.2d at 97, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk stated that tort law is concerned with the vindication of social policy and the
prevention of future wrongs, while contract law focuses on enforcing the intentions of
the individual parties to the agreement. Id. at 1190-91, 864 P.2d at 97-98, 26 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 18 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citing Foley, 47 Cal. 3d at 683, 765 P.2d at 389, 254
Cal. Rptr. at 227; see also WnnUM L PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th
ed. 1971); W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 4, at
25 (5th ed. 1984).
37. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1194, 864 P.2d at 100, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting); see supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
38. Hunter, 6 Cal. 4th at 1194-95, 864 P.2d at 100, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 20-21 (Mosk,
J., dissenting) (citing Slivinsky v. Watkins-Johnson Co., 221 Cal. App. 3d 799, 805-06,
270 Cal. Rptr. 585, 588 (1990) (granting summary judgment in a wrongful termination
claim where the employment contract was terminable at will)).
39. See Bill Mandel, In Workplace, Lying is Just Good Business, S.F. EXAMINER, Jan.
16, 1994, at B-2 (satirically criticizing the Hunter majority's position that "[a] company
that dumps a worker by lying to him commits no fraud").
40. See Divided California Supreme Court Rejects Fraud Remedy in Wrongful Discharge Cases, DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 10, 1994, at 6. Hunter's attorney, Nicholas J.P.
Wagner, called the decision "another example of a conservative majority on a political
mission to narrow the legal remedies available to employees. Id. In contrast, the
defendant's attorney, Armen L. George, characterized the opinion as increasing the
rights of employees, "recognizing for the first time in California a cause of action for
violation of implied-in-fact, 'good-cause only' termination provisions." Id.

lows a trend in recent supreme court cases in which nearly all relevant
decisions during 1993 limited tort liability.'

MARJORIE ANN WALTRIP

41. Daniel U. Smith, Standing on SHAKY Ground,. Examining the California Supreme Court's Opinions for the Past Year, an Appellate Specialist Details the Declining Power of the Plaintiff, THE RECORDER, Feb. 8, 1994, at 8 (asserting that in tort
cases, the California Supreme Court's decisions from the advance sheets of 1993 were
almost uniform--only one ruling favored the plaintiff; every other decision either reaffirmed or expanded a defense to liability).
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VI.

INSURANCE LAW
A. A liability insurer has a duty to defend its insured
against claims arising out of criminal, wiyful, and
other noncovered conduct if the complaint alleges
potentially covered conduct; therefore, summary
judgment is improper unless the insurer can prove
that none of the claims asserted against the insured
are covered under the policy:
Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Barbara B.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Horace Mann Insurance Co. v. Barbara B. involved a junior
high-school teacher who was insured under an educator's liability policy
and who had pled guilty to criminal sexual child molestation charges.'
The California Supreme Court considered whether the insurer had a duty
to defend the teacher against a civil negligent public embarrassment
claim arising out of the sexual molestation' and other related misconduct.3

1. 4 Cal. 4th 1076, 846 P.2d 792, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210 (1993). Justice Panelli
authored the majority opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk, Kennard,
and George concurring. Id. at 1078, 846 P.2d at 793, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. Justice
Baxter wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id.. at 1087, 846 P.2d at 800, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 218. Justice Arabian dissented. Id. at 1087, 846 P.2d at 800, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
218.
The California Supreme Court granted review to resolve an apparent conflict in
the courts of appeal: the conflict between the fourth district court of appeal's ruling in
Horace Mann and the second district court of appeal's decision in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hubbard, 208 Cal. Rptr. 806, 811-12, 162 Cal. App. 3d 939, 947 (1984)
(holding "that if the reasonable expectations of an insured are that a defense will be
provided for a claim, then the insurer cannot escape that obligation merely because
public policy precludes it from indemnifying that claim."). See also CAL. R. CT. 29(a)
(requiring the supreme court to review a court of appeal decision where it appears
necessary to "secure uniformity of decision").
2. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1078-81, 846 P.2d at 793-95, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
211-13; see also CAL. INS. CODE § 533 (West 1994) (excluding wilful conduct from liability coverage); J.C. Penney Casualty Ins. Co. v. M.K., 52 Cal. 3d 1009, 1019-21, 804 P.2d
689, 693-95, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68-70 (relying on the California Insurance Code, § 533
exclusion to affirm summary judgment in favor of a liability insurer where the complaint alleged injuries caused by sexual molestation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 280
(1991).
3. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1078, 846 P.2d at 793, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 211. Barbara B. and her parents both alleged injuries caused by her insured teacher's inten-

The trial court held that the insurer had no duty to defend the civil
action and granted summary judgment to the teacher's liability insurer.!

The court of appeal also found for the insurance company, concluding
that the insurer had no duty to indemnify the teacher because the
teacher's conduct was intentional and was unrelated to educational activities.'

The supreme court reversed both courts, holding that summary relief
for an insurer is only proper if the insurer proves "that no potential for
liability under its policy arose out of the underlying suit against its insured .... "'

tional sexual molestation and "other negligent conduct," including the following acts
that the supreme court noted might support the victim's negligent public embarrassment claim:
(1) allowing Barbara B. to sit on his lap in front of other students;
(2) kissing Barbara B. on the forehead in front of other students;
(3) hugging Barbara B. in front of other students;
(4) putting his arm around Barbara B. in front of other students;
(5) regularly making sexual and sarcastic jokes in regard to Barbara B. in
front of the band class, referencing the way a girl dressed, and malng jokes
offensive to females;
(6) general discussions of sexual conduct in front of the class;
(7) allowing and perpetuating common rumors among students of a relationship between him and Barbara B. as a joke;
(8) the dollar dance and the insinuation that Barbara could be bought for a
dollar,
(9) joking about how female students came back to see him when they
turned eighteen;
(10) joking about female students in front of his friends;
(11) referring to Barbara B. as Pebbles;
(12) referring to Barbara B. as "jail bait," or "San Quentin jail bait" in front
of students, his friends, band parents and student teachers;
(13) telling Barbara's other teachers that Barbara was with him at all times
and that they should assume that she was with him if she was late or absent from their classes;
(14) Barbara B. was teased by students in front of adults as being the
teacher's girlfriend and was also laughed at by the students, adults, and the
teacher.
Id, at 1079, 846 P.2d at 794, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 212.
4. Id. at 1080-1081, 846 P.2d at 795, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
5. Id. The supreme court held in J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance Co. v. M.K, 52
Cal. 3d 1009, 1019, 804 P.2d 689, 693, 278 Cal. Rptr. 64, 68 (1991), that child molestation is wilful conduct and, therefore, excluded as a matter of law by Insurance Code

§ 533.
6. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1087, 846 P.2d at 800, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218; accord State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Nycum, 943 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding
that (1) an allegation that the insured sexually molested the plaintiffs daughter did not
preclude coverage under a homeowner's policy, absent a showing that the insured's act
was intentional, and (2) an allegation that the insured touched the child in the anal
and vaginal area did not raise a conclusive presumption that the touching was intentional child molestation); see also Dietmar Grellmann, Comment, Insurance Coverage
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m.
A.

TREATMENT

The Majority Opinion

In his majority opinion, Justice Panelli explained that a possible duty
to indemnify an insured for one covered claim translates into a duty to
defend against all claims.7 The duty to defend against all claims continues until the insurer provides undeniable evidence that a portion of its
funds are being used to defend uncovered claims.8 The court emphasized
that an insurer must compare the insurance policy with the complaint
and other extrinsic evidence to determine whether coverage might extend to any claim asserted against the insured.9
The court further stated that summary judgment is proper only if all

the claims asserted against the insured are not covered by the policy or
are excluded as a matter of law, resolving any doubt concerning the

insurer's duty to defend in favor of the insured.'" Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that summary judgment for an insurer is only

appropriate when the insurer proves that the allegations in the complaint
and any extrinsic facts reveal no potential for an ultimate indemnification duty."
for Child Sexual Abuse Under California Law: Should Intent to Harm be Specifically
Proven or Imputed as a Matter of Law?, 18 Sw. U. L REv. 171 (1988) (analyzing
California's and other jurisdictions' treatment of intent to harm in child sexual abuse
cases prior to J.C. Penney and concluding that an insurer must always specifically
prove intent to harm under California law).
7. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1080-81, 846 P.2d at 795, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213.
8. Id. (citing Hogan v. Midland National Ins. Co., 3 Cal. 3d 553, 564, 476 P.2d 825,
831-32, 91 Cal. Rptr. 153, 159-60 (1970)).
9. Id. at 1081, 846 P.2d at 795, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213. A trial court may consider
evidence outside of the complaint to find possible policy coverage. Id. (citing Gray v.
Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 276, 419 P.2d 168, 176-77, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104, 112-13
(1966)). It is unclear, however, whether an insurer may point to extrinsic evidence to
negate its duty to defend.
Insurance Code § 533 excludes wilful conduct from coverage as a matter of law.
CAL INS. CODE § 533 (West 1994). In Horace Mann, contractual coverage extended to
"damages 'which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as a result of any
claim arising out of an occurrence in the course of the insured's educational employment activities, and caused by any acts or omissions of the insured' . . . [and] contained a promise to defend [the insured] in 'any civil suit against [him] seeking damages which are payable under 'the terms of this policy even if such suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent.'" 4 Cal. 4th at 1079-80, 846 P.2d at 794-95, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
212-13.
10. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1081, 846 P.2d at 796, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214.
11. Id. For a complete discussion of relevant case law construing an insurer's de-

The majority clarified its holding in J.C. Penney Causualty Insurance
Co. v. M.K and explained how HoraceMann Insurance was distinguishable. The court stressed that J.C. Penney narrowly excused the duty to
defend when only sexual molestation is alleged. 2 In light of this clarification, the court concluded that in the case at hand, the insurer's duty to
defend survived summary judgment because the complaint alleged more
than sexual molestation, and, therefore, the plaintiff might ultimately
prove the existence of covered conduct.'"
B. Justice Baxter's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Baxter concurred in the judgment, noting that it was uncertain
whether or not Horace Mann's motion for summary judgment established
that all of the alleged conduct was not covered by either the policy or
Insurance Code section 533's wilful conduct exclusion." Justice Baxter
wrote separately, however, because of his disagreement with the
majority's enumeration of the alleged acts which might support an
indemnifiable claim. 5 Finally, Justice Baxter agreed with Justice

fense obligation and rules for when an insurer must defend intentional and negligent
torts, see 3 CAL. INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE §§ 41.31-.43 (1993); 1 CEB, LIABILITY INSURANCE PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION, Defense Analysis §§ 4.1-.33 (1991); 6 B.E.
WITIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 1135-1142 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993);

39 CAL JuR. 3D Insurance Contracts and Coverage §§ 414-418 (1977 & Supp. 1993); 15
McKINNEY, CALIFORNIA DIGEST OF OFFICIAL REPORTS, Insurance Contracts and Coverage

§§ 45, 80, 107 (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1993); James M. Fischer, Broadening the Insurer's
Duty to Defend: How Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. Transformed Liability Insurance
Into Litigation Insurance, 25 U.C. DAVIS L REv. 141 (1991) (analyzing the origin and
scope of the duty to defend and examining rationales for and against the
"extra-contractual" duty to defend); see also Frank Revere & Arthur J. Chapman,
Insurer's Duty to Defend, 13 PAC. LJ. 889 (1982) (analyzing the duty to defend and
delineating a procedure for Insurers to minimize the costs of determining whether it
must defend); James L Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability Insurance: Intoxication or
Other Mental Incapacity Avoiding Application of Clause in Liability Policy Specificaily Exempting Coverage of Injury of Damage Caused Intentionally by or at Direction of Insured, 33 A.LR. 4th 983 (1984) (discussing lack of mental capacity as a
means for avoiding the "intentional act" exclusion).
12. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1082, 846 P.2d at 796, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 214 (citing J.C. Penney, 52 Cal. 3d at 1028, 804 P.2d at 700, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 75).
13. Id. at 1083-84, 846 P.2d at 797, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 215 (stating that "unlike the
dissent, we cannot, at [the declaratory relief stage] and on this record, confidently
conclude that no such duty existed"); see supra note 3 for a list of the evidence the
court believed could ultimately lead to damages based on covered conduct. The court
concluded with a warning that Horace Mann is not a license for plaintiffs to "plead
around" J.C. Penney. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1086, 846 P.2d at 799, 17 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 217.
14. Id. at 1087,846 P.2d at 800, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218 (Baxter, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 1088, 846 P.2d at 800-01, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218-19 (Baxter, J., concur-
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Arabian's contention that although an insurer may use the litigation process to dispel frivolous claims from a lawsuit, the cost to defend might
pressure the insurer into settling noncovered claims out of court.'6
C.

Justice Arabian'sDissenting Opinion

Justice Arabian disagreed with the majority's premise that the continuous course of conduct alleged here, which culminated in the sexual
molestation of a minor, could be divided into separate acts that are potentially insurable.'7 Justice Arabian emphasized that a child molester
will often engage in separate acts preparing for the actual molestation
which, considered individually, do not amount to criminal sexual molestation."8 Justice Arabian concluded that because the cost of defending
an entire lawsuit will often exceed an insurer's settlement costs, insurers
will settle more often when the complainant "truthfully allege[s] pre- or
postmolestation acts designed to facilitate or cover up the sexual misconduct, [effectively nullifying the court's] holding in J.C. Penney that
the insurer owes no duty to pay for damages resulting from child molestation."'9
H.

CONCLUSION

When a complaint against an insured child molester alleges acts that
may have harmed an interest other than the harm done by the actual

ring). Specifically, Justice Baxter maintained that the allegations of "public hugging,
kissing, and lap sitting" concerned wilful acts, which are excluded from coverage as a
matter of law. Id.

16. Id. at 1089, 846 P.2d at 801, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219 (Baxter, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 1090, 846 P.2d at 801-02, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 219-20 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 1091-92, 846 P.2d at 803, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221 (Arabian, J., dissenting).

Justice Arabian stated that the facts surrounding the molestation should be viewed in
their entirety to determine whether each act was performed for an inherently harmful
purpose and whether the insurer must defend its insured. Id. at 1092, 846 P.2d at 803,
17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 221 (Arabian, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 1094, 846 P.2d at 804, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 222 (Arabian, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted). See generally 6 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts
§§ 1143-1149 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (analyzing an insurer's implied duty to settle
claims); Robert W. Bollar, Comment, Termination of the Duty of an Insurance Carrier
to Defend: Did the California Supreme Court Send the Wrong Signal?, 17 PAC. L.J. 283
(1985) (advocating the position that, under California case law, the duty to defend
should terminate when the insurer has exhausted the policy's indemnification limits).

molestation, the insurer's duty to defend attaches until the insurer proves
that there exists "no potential for liability under its policy."'
As a result, an insurer must weigh the costs and benefits of settling
with the plaintiff at the commencement of the lawsuit versus litigating
against the insured and putting on a comprehensive summary judgment
motion to relieve its duty to defend the insured.2' The insurer must also
consider the costs of defending the insured if it loses the expensive motion for summary judgment. Under Horace Mann Insurance, a
strong-armed plaintiff gains leverage to hold out on a settlement until the
offer approaches the cost of the insurer's summary judgment motion or
potential litigation costs.' The insurer's duty to defend now effectively
extends to groundless, false, or fraudulent claims against an insured in
standard liability insurance policies.' The cost of litigation rises if a
plaintiff alleges one potentially covered claim because the insurer will
lose its motion for summary judgment on that claim and then must defend the insured until it can present "undeniable evidence supporting an
allocation of a specific portion of the defense costs to a noncovered
claim."14
A final consideration is that in the future, trial courts deciding motions
for summary judgment based on the duty to defend may be faced with
calculating a pre-trial award which roughly apportions the damages
caused by intentional versus negligent conduct. Although this may invade
the province of the jury, a jury determination of the damages caused by
negligent and intentional acts of the insured would arrive too late for an
insurer that is ultimately found not liable for indemnification under its
policy.

MICHAEL EMMET MURPHY

20. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1087, 846 P.2d at 800, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 218.
21. See Fischer, supra note 11, at 144-45 (concluding that liability insurance is equivalent to litigation insurance because the duty to defend includes the duty to negotiate
a settlement of noncovered claims); see also 3 CAL INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE

§ 41.31[9] (reporting that there are no California decisions holding that the duty to
defend is terminated upon the exhaustion of policy limits by payment of judgments or
settlements).
22. The prohibitive cost of putting on a full summary judgment motion combined

with the burden the insurer must meet for summary relief from its duty to defend will
effectively discourage insurers from taidng this expensive route.
23. See 1 CEB, CAL LIABILTY INSURANCE PRACTICE: CLAIMS AND LITIGATION, § 4.10
(1993) (discussing Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. and Horace Mann and their impact

on the insurer's duty to defend groundless, false, and fraudulent claims).
24. Horace Mann, 4 Cal. 4th at 1081, 846 P.2d at 795-96, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 213-14.
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B.

Voluntary ingestion of a known hazardous and
illegal substance does not provide a basis for coverage within the terms of a life insurance policy
affording coverage for death by accidental means:
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co.
I.

INTRODUCTION

California courts have generally upheld the distinction between "accidental means" and "accidental results" in insurance policy language.' In
Weil v. Federal Kemper Life Assurance Co.,' the issue before the California Supreme Court was whether the distinction should be preserved,
and if so, whether the voluntary ingestion of cocaine provided a basis for
coverage where the life insurance policy afforded coverage for death by
accidental means.' The supreme court held that the distinction should be

preserved and that death resulting from the voluntary ingestion of cocaine was not death by accidental means."
II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On April 14, 1975, the defendant issued a life insurance policy for Michael P. Weil6 which included an "additional accidental death benefit"
provision affording additional benefit in the event the insured's death
occurred solely by accidental means.6 On August 17, 1985, Michael Weil

1. 3 HARNETT & LESNICK, TIHE LAW OF LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE § 7.02 (1993).
But see Russell A. Thomson, The Judicial Approach to "Accidental Means" Policies in
California, 13 HASTINGS L.J. 255, 264 (1961) (stating that California courts have not
applied the distinction in practice); 1B APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §360
(1981) (mentioning the distinction but finding that most courts merely give it "lip service").
2. 7 Cal. 4th 125, 866 P.2d 774, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 316 (1994). Justice George
authored the court's opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian,
and Baxter concurred. Justice Mosk wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice
Kennard joined. Id. at 150, 866 P.2d at 789, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 129, 866 P.2d at 775, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317.
4. Id. at 129-30, 866 P.2d at 775, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 317.
5. Id. at 130, 866 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. The plaintiffs, Lola and
Michelle Well, were the policy's named beneficiaries. Id.
6. Id. The provision, termed a "supplemental rider," provided that payment would
be made to the beneficiaries if the insured "suffered the loss of life as the direct result of bodily injury, independent of all other causes, effected solely through external,

died of "acute cocaine poisoning" in a San Francisco hotel room." Although the defendant paid the basic benefit provided by the policy, the
insurance company denied a claim by the decedent's beneficiaries (plaintiffs) for the additional benefit, claiming that Weil's death did not occur
by "accidental means."8
On March 31, 1987, the plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant in the Superior Court of Orange County for declaratory relief and
damages.' On June 30, 1989, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment
or summary adjudication of the issues.'0 The defendant filed an opposition and its own motion for summary judgment on the ground that, as a
matter of law, Weil did not die from "accidental means."" The superior
court summarily adjudicated that the plaintiffs were entitled to the additional proceeds under the accidental death provision." On February 6,
1991, the superior court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs for
$100,000. Kemper appealed, and the court of appeal affirmed the judgment. "

The California Supreme Court granted review. 1" The court reversed
and directed the court of appeal to remand the case to the trial court to
reconsider its ruling that Weil's death occurred by accidental means."

violent and accidental means." Id.
7. Id. at 130-31, 866 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. Went was accompanied by
a prostitute who claimed to have seen him "put some white powder in his mouth" and
shortly thereafter develop shortness of breath. Id. at 188, 866 P.2d at 814, 27 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 356 (Mosk, J., dissenting). A substantial amount of cocaine was found in Weil's
system, and there was no external or internal trauma to his body other than that consistent with an overdose of cocaine. Id. at 149, 866 P.2d at 788, Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
8. Id. at 130, 866 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. See generally, Robert L
Simpson, Annotation, Death or Injury from Taking Illegal Drugs or Narcotics as Accidental or Result of Accidental Means Within Insurance Coverage, 41 A.LR.3d 654
(1972).
9. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 131, 866 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318. The plaintiffs
sought damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, and violation of § 790.03(h) of California's Insurance Code (unfair
claims settlement practices). Id.
10. Id. at 131, 866 P.2d at 776-77, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318-19.
11. Id. at 131, 866 P.2d at 777, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.
12. Id. at 132, 866 P.2d at 777, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319. The superior court determined that, as a matter of law, an unintentional overdose of cocaine was an "accidental means" covered by the policy. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 132-33, 866 P.2d at 777-78, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319-20. The decision of the
court of appeal was divided and produced three separate opinions. Id. at 133, 866 P.2d
at 778, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 150, 866 P.2d at 789, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
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Ill.
A.

TREATMENT

Justice George'sMajority Opinion

Justice George, writing for the court, first noted that the distinction
between accidental means and accidental results in insurance policy
language was a valid distinction." He pointed out that the distinction
was well recognized by California's courts.'8 The court acknowledged
that many other jurisdictions, including the federal courts, no longer
recognize the distinction but argued that the reasons for doing so were
not persuasive. 9
Justice George found that the phrase "accidental means" as set forth in
the insurance policy was not an ambiguous phrase.' Because the content of an insurance policy is normally within the control of the parties,
it is for the insured to contract for extended coverage.2' Justice George
maintained that it is not appropriate for courts to reinterpret clear policy
language to eradicate the distinction.'

17. Id. at 138-40, 866 P.2d at 781-82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323-24.
18. Id. at 134, 866 P.2d at 778-79, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 320-21. The first California
case which upheld the distinction was Rock v. Travelers' Insurance Co., 172 Cal. 462,
156 P. 1029 (1916). In Rock, the court found that an insured who collapsed and died
after carrying a funeral casket down a flight of stairs did not die through "accidental
means" because "'there must be some element of unexpectedness in the preceding act
or occurrence which leads to the injury or death.'" Wel, 7 Cal. 4th at 135, 866 P.2d at
779, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 321 (quoting Rock, 172 Cal. at 465, 156 P. at 1029). For a
discussion of Rock and subsequent California cases upholding the distinction, see
Thomson; supra note 1, at 257-71.
19. Well, 7 Cal. 4th at 138-39, 866 P.2d at 781-82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323-24. The
court found support in the federal diversity case of Landress v. Phoenix Insurance Co.,
which upheld the distinction over a vigorous dissent by Justice Cardozo. Cardozo
claimed that "[t]he attempted distinction between accidental results and accidental
means will plunge this branch of the law Into a Serbonlan Bog." Id. at 137, 866 P.2d
at 780-81, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 322-23 (quoting Landress v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 291 U.S. 491,
499 (1934) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)).
Since the Landress decision, however, 25 jurisdictions have expressly repudiated
or rejected the distinction. Id. at 138, 866 P.2d at 781, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 323; see,
e.g., Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1086 (1st Cir.), cert. denied 498 U.S. 1013 (1990); see also APPLEMAN, supra note 1, at 454.
20. Well, 7 Cal. 4th at 139-40, 866 P.2d at 782, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324. Justice
Mosk, however, stated that the contention of ambiguity is "plausible." Id. at 160 n.10,
866 P.2d at 796, n.10, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 338 n.10 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 139, 866 P.2d at 782, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324.
22. Id.

The court then attempted to define death through "accidental

means. " " California courts have taken two approaches.' The first approach focuses on the circumstances surrounding the insured's voluntary
act for evidence of an accidental element or an intervening accident.2
The second approach focuses on the insured's voluntary act in terms of
its foreseeable consequences." The court held that both considerations
may properly be invoked in a given case."

The court then addressed whether death by voluntary ingestion of a
known hazardous and illegal substance such as cocaine was death by

"accidental means. "' In Hargreaves v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co.,' the court of appeal synthesized both approaches and determined
that death from a heroin overdose was not a death by "accidental
means. "' Justice George rejected Hargreaves' holding of a "high probability" standard and relied instead on "whether the insured knew or
should have known that death or injury was common, natural, or substantially likely."3 Applying this standard, the court found that an insured who dies by a lethal overdose of a known hazardous and illegal
substance "is not entitled to coverage for such a death.... because he or
she should know that death is a common, natural, or substantially likely
result of such activity. "'

23. Id. at 140-41, 866 P.2d at 782-83, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 324-25.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 140, 866 P.2d at 783, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325; see, e.g., Harloe v. California
State Life Ins. Co., 206 Cal. 141, 142, 273 P. 560, 561 (1928) (denying recovery to sunstroke victim based on foreseeabilty of Injury); Losleben v. California State Life Ins.
Co., 133 Cal. App. 550, 554-56, 24 P.2d 825, 827 (1933) (finding means were "accidental" where insured's jump from a three-foot high bench resulted in a twisted small
intestine, peritonitis, and death); Davilla v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 114 Cal. App. 308, 31316, 299 P. 831, 838 (1931) (allowing recovery by beneficiaries of a policeman thrown
from motorcycle when car suddenly stopped in front of him).
27. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 141, 866 P.2d at 783, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325.
28. Id. at 141-42, 866 P.2d at 783-84, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 325-26.
29. 104 Cal. App. 3d 701, 163 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1980).
30. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 142, 866 P.2d at 784, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 326 (citing
Hargreaves, 104 Cal. App. 3d at 708, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 857). The Hargreaves court
based its decision on: (1) the voluntariness of the act; (2) the absence of any unforeseen or unexpected acts; and (3) the instances in which the insured reasonably could
expect death to result. Id.
31. Id. at 145, 866 P.2d at 786, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 328. The Well court rejected the
specific language in Hargreaves that death or serious injury is a "probable result of
ingestion of controlled substances." Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 148, 866 P.2d at 788, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330. Justice Mosk argued, with
some persuasiveness, that the majority opinion was flawed because it failed to differentiate between types of illegal substances and their respective risks. Id. at 203, 866
P.2d at 824-25, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67 (Mosk, J., dissenting); see also infra note 42
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As a result of the court's decision, the plaintiffs were not entitled to
summary judgment because they failed to show that Weil's ingestion was

the result of "unknown external forces. " '
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting View
Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion expressing his view

that the distinction between accidental means and accidental results
should be abolished.' In the alternative, Justice Mosk argued that, even
under the majority's test for accidental means, Weil's death should be
considered effectuated by accidental means.'
Under Justice Mosk's analysis, the distinction does not withstand scrutiny in light of standard contract construction.' He cites numerous au-

and accompanying text.
33. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 149, 866 P.2d at 788, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330.
34. Id. at 150, 866 P.2d at 789, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk found the defendant's stare decisis argument "unpersuasive." Id. at 162, 866 P.2d
at 797, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 (Mask, J., dissenting). He claimed that the distinction
had not been used by the California courts for at least 60 years, and that the majority
ruling "resurrected" a doctrine the efficacy of which had long been questioned by other
jurisdictions. Id.; see also Thomson, supra note 1, at 263-64 (arguing that the distinction is "illusory" in practical application); but see Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 162 n.11, 866 P.2d
at 797 n.11, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 m1.,
35. Id. at 203, 866 P.2d at 824-25, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk cited extensively from government statistics to demonstrate that death
could not be considered "a common, natural or substantially likely consequence of
cocaine use." Id. at 203, 866 P.2d at 825, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (Mosk, J., dissenting);
see also intfra note 42.
36. Wel, 7 Cal. 4th at 151-52, 866 P.2d at 790, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). "While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to
which ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply." Id. (Mask, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264, 833 P.2d 545, 55152, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 538, 544-45 (1992)).
Justice Mosk asserted that there are three basic rules for the interpretation of
contracts, all of which support a finding that the distinction between accidental means
and accidental results is "fanciful, if not downright bizarre." Id. at 151, 866 P.2d at
790, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The first rule states that where the
words of insurance policies are clear and unambiguous, they "are to be understood in
their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning."
Id. at 152, 866 P.2d at 790, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 332 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1644). The second rule states that, in cases of ambiguity, the language
"must be interpreted in the sense in which the promisor [e.g., the insurer], believed, at
the time of making it, that the promisee [e.g., the insured] understood it" Id. at 161,
866 P.2d at 796, 27 CaL Rptr. 2d at 338 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE

thorities holding that a layperson would not distinguish coverage for
death by accident from death by accidental means." Justice Mosk argued that the "natural and probable consequences" test, derived from
criminal and tort law, "defeat[ed] the very purpose of insurance by im-

pairing the reasonable expectations of those who purchase the policies." '
Justice Mosk proposed that the Wickman test be adopted in Califor-

nia.' Applying the Wickman test to the facts of this case, Justice Mosk
reasoned that Weil's death should be covered under the insurance policy
because Weil's "subjective expectation that his conduct was not tantamount to suicide [was] objectively reasonable."'

§ 1649). The third rule of interpretation states that any remaining ambiguous language
must be "interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty to exist." Id. at 161, 866 P.2d at 797, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 339 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting
CAL CIV. CODE § 1654).
37. Id. at 158-60, 866 P.2d at 794-96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 336-38 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "It is a distinction without a difference in so far as the average lay person is
concerned." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Murphy v. Traveleis Ins. Co., 2 N.W.2d
576, 580 (1942)).
38. Id. at 168, 866 P.2d at 801-02, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 343-44 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Appleman pointed out that the insured's need for financial reimbursement is no less
great in situations where an injury resulted from an voluntary act than in those situations where the injury was caused solely by external forces. See APPLEMAN, supra note
1, at 454 ("The act of a housewife In standing on the arm of a rocking chair to hang
a picture may be careless, but it was such hazards that induced her husband to take
out a policy to cover her acts.").
39. Wickman v. Northwestern Nat'l. Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077 (1st Cir.), cert. denied
498 U.S. 1013 (1990). In Wickman, the First Circuit Court of Appeals proposed a twostep test for determining when an insured's act would be considered tantamount to
suicide and not covered as accidental, and when the insured's act resulting in death
was merely "an accident" Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 180, 866 P.2d at 809, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
351 (Mosk, J., dissenting). The factflnder must first determine "whether the insured
actually expected that his conduct would be highly likely to result in injury or death."
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). If the factflnder so determines, he or she must then determine whether such expectation was objectively reasonable. Id. at 181, 866 P.2d at 811,
27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 252 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 187, 866 P.2d at 811, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 353 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 196, 866 P.2d at 820, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 362 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk argued that Well's "recreational use of [cocaine]," as established by the facts, "fit
into a well-established societal pattern." Id. at 192, 866 P.2d at 817, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
359 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk argued that it could be fairly concluded that
Well did not subjectively expect to be harmed when he ingested cocaine orally. Id.
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk cited several government statistics to support his finding that Well's
subjective expectation was objectively reasonable. Id. at 194-96, 866 P.2d at 818-20, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 360-62 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Based on these statistics, Justice Mosk
argued that the risk of death for cocaine use was "extraordinarily low" in the year of
Weil's death, possibly much less than a mortality rate of fourteen ten-thousandths
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Alternatively, under the majority's "natural and probable consequences" test, Justice Mosk argued that Weil's death occurred through accidental means.' Justice Mosk concluded that Weil's beneficiaries were
entitled to recover and that the judgment of the court of appeal should
be affirmed.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court held in Weil that death resulting from
the voluntary ingestion of a known hazardous and illegal substance is not
death by accidental means." Because of the broad formulation of
"known hazardous and illegal substances," it does not appear that the
majority adequately evaluated the risk involved.' The majority based its
conclusion on its cursory analysis that cocaine was a known hazardous
and illegal substance and that its ingestion would naturally and probably
result in death.' In fact, the majority appeared to have placed more emphasis on the fact that cocaine is illegal than on its hazardous nature."
There are two criticisms of this approach, both advanced by Justice
Mosk in his dissenting opinion.' First, "the illegality of an insured's act

(0.0014) of one percent Id. at 195-96, 866 P.2d at 819-20, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 361-62
(Mosk, J., dissenting).
42. Wel, 7 Cal. 4th at 203, 866 P.2d at 824-25, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 366-67 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting). Justice Mosk questioned both the majority's reference to a "known hazardous and illegal substance" rather than the specific drug "cocaine" in its determination
of "natural and probable consequences" and its application of the use in this case. Id.
at 203, 866 P.2d at 825, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk
demonstrated the "reductio ad absurdum" in the majority's argument by pointing out
that, under the majority's broad classification of "illegal substances," one who "smokes
a joint" would be deemed "substantially likely" to die. Id. (Mask, J., dissenting). Furthermore, the "airy assertion" that cocaine is likely to kill "evaporates in face of the
cold reality of governmental statistics." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 204, 866 P.2d at 825, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 367 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
44. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 150, 866 P.2d at 789, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 331.
45. See id. at 198-99, 866 P.2d at 821-22, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363-64 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("Te majority apparently find it easier to decide the broader question they have
formulated, but it is the wrong question nonetheless and leads the majority to the
wrong answer.")
46. Id. at 147-48, 866 P.2d at 788, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 330.
47. See id. at 200, 866 P.2d at 823, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365 (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(claiming the word "illegal" is a "leitmotif echoing throughout the majority opinion").
48. See id. at 200-01, 866 P.2d at 823-24, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365-66 (Mosk, J., dis-

senting).

*is wholly irrelevant to the beneficiary's right to recover on the policy."49
Unlike tort and criminal law, it is not the insured who benefits from illegal actions, but the innocent beneficiary.' Second, the insurance policy may be drafted in such a way to preclude coverage for death resulting
from the commission of illegal acts." Exclusions in the policy for such
deaths would both protect the insurer and serve the reasonable expectations of the insured.

ALLISON L. HURST

49. Weil, 7 Cal. 4th at 201, 866 P.2d at 823, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "The insurance company does not represent the public safety concerns of
society but the commercial interests of its owners." Id. at 174, 866 P.2d at 806, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 348 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 201, 866 P.2d at 823, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 365 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice
Mosk criticized the majority for its adherence to outdated rationales and analyses: "But
once again the train is leaving the station without the majority on board." Id. (Mosk,
J., dissenting).
Justice Mosk claimed that the "public policy" rationale was "absurd on its face."
Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). "It is not to be presumed that policyholders as a class, or
any appreciable number of them, will go out and seek death in unlawful pursuits in
order to mature their policies." Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting) (quoting Home State Life Ins.
Co. v. Russell, 53 P.2d 562, 563 (1936)).
51. Wel, 7 Cal. 4th at 175, 866 P.2d at 806, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (Mosk, J., dissenting). "An accident insurance policy may contain a clause generally excluding coverage for injury or death resulting from 'voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger.'" Id.
(Mosk, J., dissenting). Alternatively, the "company may exclude any death resulting
from the use or while under the influence of any narcotic or other controlled substance." Id. at 176, 866 P.2d at 806, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 348 (Mosk, J., dissenting). In
this case, the insurance policy included an exhaustive list of seven exclusions, including "committing an assault or felony." Id. at 130, 866 P.2d at 776, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
318. The superior court ruled that this exclusion did not apply because death resulted
from a "misdemeanor use of cocaine." Id. at 132, 866 P.2d at 777, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
319; see also James M. Fischer, The Exclusion from Insurance Coverage of Losses
Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy in Search of a Justification,
30 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 95 (1990).
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VII.

JUVENILE LAW
The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a motion for change of placement where the moving
party failed to show changed circumstances under which
the requested placement would be in the best interest of
the child: In re Stephanie M.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Stephanie M.,' the California Supreme Court reviewed a decision of the juvenile court denying a motion for custody modification
seeking placement of a child with her maternal grandmother rather than
with her foster parents.2 As a preliminary determination, the court held
that the juvenile court had jurisdiction over the case under the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).' The court then concluded that

the juvenile court properly denied the motion for change of placement
because the change would not serve the best interests of the child.4
Stephanie M. was born on January 26, 1989, in Guadalajara, Mexico.
Stephanie M. and her mother illegally entered the United States to settle
in San Diego County where Stephanie's father resided.5 Five months
later, Stephanie entered a hospital and was diagnosed with battered child

1. 7 Cal. 4th 295, 867 P.2d 706, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 595 (1994). Justice Mosk wrote
the unanimous opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Kennard,
Arabian, Baxter, George and Panelli concurred. Id. at 302, 867 P.2d at 708, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 597.
2. Id. at 302-26, 867 P.2d at 708-24, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597-613; see 10 B.E. WrrKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 138-140 (9th ed. 1989) (discussing
modifications of custody awards); 32 CAL JUR. 3D Family Law §§ 933-938 (1994).
3. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 308-13, 867 P.2d at 712-15, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60104; see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3400-3425 (West 1994); see also 10 B.E. WrrIuN, SUMMARY OF
CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child §§ 39-42 (9th ed. 1989) (explaining the general provisions of the UCCJA); 32 CAL. Ju. 3D Family Law §§ 970-988 (1994) (providing a
general discussion of the UCCJA); Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, Progress Under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act and Remaining Problems: Punitive Decrees,
Joint Custody, and Excessive Modifications, 65 CAL. L. REv. 978 (1977) (stating the
problems that arise in applying the UCCJA); Henry H. Foster & Doris J. Freed, Child
Snatching and Custodial Fights: The Case for the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, 28 HASTINGS LJ. 1011 (1977) (advocating the adoption of the UCCJA).
4. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 315-26, 867 P.2d at 717-24, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60613.
5. Id. at 303, 867 P.2d at 709, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.

syndrome.' The Department of Social Services filed an action under section 300 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code and the juvenile
court, at the detention hearing, ordered foster care for Stephanie. In
later hearings, the court ordered continued placement with foster parents
despite Stephanie's grandmother's expressed desire to take care of her
grandchild.8 In a motion for change of placement, Stephanie's parents
asked the court to place Stephanie with either her grandmother or an
aunt.9 The juvenile court denied the motion in view of Stephanie's special emotional needs, her attachment with the foster mother and the lack
of a substantial relationship with her grandmother. Pursuant to this
holding, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of Stephanie's
parents on January 15, 1992.1 On March 17, 1992, the juvenile court received a letter from the Mexican government informing the court that a
Mexican court had asserted jurisdiction over Stephanie. 2
The court of appeal held that the juvenile court erred in refusing to
grant the motion for change of placement and reversed the order of termination of parental rights." The California Supreme Court reversed. 4

II. TREATMENT
A.

JurisdictionalIssues

Stephanie's mother argued that the juvenile court's failure to give notice to the Mexican consulate regarding the pendency of the action as
required by the Multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
and Optional Protocol on Disputes" (Convention) deprived the juvenile

6. Id. Stephanie had three bone fractures, bruises, and signs that she had been

suffocated. Id.; see CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300(a), (b) (West 1984).
7. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 303, 867 P.2d at 709, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598. For an
outline of the judicial procedure in child custody cases, see Cynthia D. v. Superior
Court, 5 Cal. 4th 242, 247-50, 851 P.2d 1307, 1308-11, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 698, 699-702
(1993).
8. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 304-05, 867 P.2d at 710, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599. The
juvenile court received evidence that Stephanie suffered from malnutrition while staying
with her grandmother In Mexico. Id. at 305, 867 P.2d at 710, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 599.
Furthermore, the court recognized that because the grandmother refused to believe that
Stephanie's parents could have abused their child, she would be unable to protect
Stephanie from potential future mistreatment Id.
9. Id. at 306, 867 P.2d at 711, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 600.
10. Id. at 308, 867 P.2d at 712, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 308, 867 P.2d at 712, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 302, 867 P.2d at 709, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 598.
15. Multilateral Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on
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court of jurisdiction. 6 The court dismissed this claim because the Convention expressly states that its notice requirement is subject to the laws
of the receiving state. 7 The court next determined that the juvenile

court had jurisdiction over Stephanie's dependency hearing because a
child facing potential or actual abuse is in an emergency situation which
necessitates exercising jurisdiction pursuant to the UCCJA.
The court then addressed whether the juvenile court should have relinquished this jurisdiction to Mexico based on forum non conveniens under the UCCJA. 9 To aid a court in this determination, the UCCJA presents several factors for consideration.n Upon review of these factors,

Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 37, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Convention].
16. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 308, 867 P.2d at 712, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601. The
Convention provides that authorities in member countries have the duty to "inform the
competent consular post without delay of any case where the appointment of a guardian or trustee appears to be in the interests of a minor ...
who is a national of the
sending State." Convention, supra note 15, art. 37, 21 U.S.T. at 102, 596 U.N.T.S. at
294. However, this notice requirement is "without prejudice to the operation of the
laws and regulations of the receiving State." Id.
17. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 309, 867 P.2d at 712-13, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 601-02.
18. Id. at 309, 867 P.2d at 713-14, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 602-03; see CAL FAM. CODE
§ 3403(a)(3)(A) (West 1994). The court also stated that jurisdiction could be asserted
under Family Code § 3403(a)(2) under which a court has jurisdiction if "[i]t is in the
best interest of the child that a court of this state assume jurisdiction because (A) . . .
the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with this state, and
(B) there is available in this state substantial evidence concerning the child's care."
Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 310, 867 P.2d at 714, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603 (quoting CAL
FAM. CODE § 3404(a)(2) (West 1994)). Stephanie and both her parents lived in California with significant connections to the state, and substantial evidence relating to
Stephanie's personal relationships and the care she received could be found within the
state. Id.; see 10 B.E. WrriuN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 47 (9th
ed. 1989) (discussing emergency jurisdiction).
19. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 310-11, 867 P.2d at 714, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603; see
CAL FAM. CODE § 3407(d) (West 1994). The UCCJA accords a court the discretion to
decide suna sponte if it is an inconvenient forum to resolve a dependency matter.
Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 311, 867 P.2d at 714, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 603. The UCCJA
provides that when considering if the court Is an inconvenient forum, it must ask if
another forum would better serve the interest of the child. Id.; see CAL FAm. CODE
§ 3407(c) (West 1994); 10 B.E. WITIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child
§§ 50-52 (9th ed. 1989) (discussing the forum non conveniens doctrine).
20. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 311-12, 867 P.2d at 714-15, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 60304. The UCCJA states that in determining forum non conveniens, the court may look
at the following factors:
(1) If another state is or recently was the child's home state.
(2) If another state has a closer connection with the child and the child's

the California Supreme Court determined that the juvenile court did not
abuse its discretion21 in assuming jurisdiction over the minor.'
The court also addressed the father's contention that, as a matter of
comity, the court should honor the Mexican court's decree appointing a
guardian to take custody of the child and return with her to Mexico.' In
response, the court held that under its interpretation of Family Code section 3414, if a court enters a custody order with proper jurisdiction, it
maintains continuing exclusive jurisdiction over any subsequent modification of the custody decree provided that the state retains "significant
connection" jurisdiction under the UCCJA.' Thus, the court declined to

give effect to the decree issued by the Mexican court.'
B.

Abuse of Discretion

After resolving the issues relating to jurisdiction, the court considered
whether the juvenile court abused its discretion' in refusing to grant

family or with the child and one or more of the contestants.
(3) If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state.
(4) If the parties have agreed on another forum which is no less appropriate.
(5) If the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this state would contravene
any of the purposes stated in Section 3401.
CAL FAr. CODE § 3407(c) (West 1994).
21. Courts have applied the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a court's decision to retain jurisdiction under the UCCJA. See CAL FAm. CODE § 3407(d) (West
1994); see also Pleri v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. App. 4th 114, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 742 (1991)
(using the abuse of discretion standard of review); In re Marriage of Fox, 180 Cal.
App. 3d 862, 225 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1986) (same); Pis v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d
1008, 202 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1984) (same).
22. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 312, 867 P.2d at 715, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 604. The
court observed that: (1) California had emergency jurisdiction over Stephanie; (2) the
evidence regarding abuse, the possibility of reunification, and Stephanie's present and
future care remained in the state; and (3) Stephanie and her parents all resided in
California. Id.
23. Id. at 313, 867 P.2d at 716, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605.
24. Id. at 314-15, 867 P.2d at 716-17, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 605 (citing Kumar v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 3d 689, 696, 652 P.2d 1003, 1007, 186 Cal. Rptr. 772, 776 (1982)).
The court noted that Mexico did not even request the enforcement of its decree. Id
25. Id. Mexico also argued that the lack of notice given to the Mexican consulate
regarding the case violated the due process rights of Stephanie, her parents, and her
grandmother. Id. at 315, 867 P.2d at 717, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606. However, the court
stated that although the due process right attaches to individuals, it does not belong to
a foreign consulate. Id. at 31-16, 867 P.2d at 716, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 606.
26. The determination of the juvenile court in a dependency hearing will not face
review on appeal without a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Id. at 318, 867 P.2d
at 718, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (citing In re Michael B., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1698, 1704, 11
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the motion for change of placement brought under section 388 of the
Welfare and Institutions Code.' The court determined that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion because the juvenile court carefully
weighed the evidence in light of the Stephanie's best interest.' Therefore, the court disagreed with the court of appeal and proceeded to discuss the issues raised by that court."

Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (1992); In re Corey, 230 Cal. App. 2d 813, 832, 41 Cal. Rptr. 379,
391 (1964)). The test for abuse of discretion is "'whether the trial court exceeded the
bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the
facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the
trial court.'" Id. at 318, 867 P.2d at 719, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608 (quoting Shamblin v.
Brattan, 44 Cal. 3d 474, 478-79, 749 P.2d 339, 341, 243 Cal. Rptr. 902, 905 (1988)).
27. Id. Section 388 provides in pertinent part:
Any parent or other person having an interest in a child who is a dependent
child of the juvenile court . . . may, upon grounds of change of circumstances or new evidence, petition the court in the same action in which the child
was found to be a dependent child of the juvenile court for a hearing to
change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made or to terminate the jurisdiction of the court.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 388 (West 1984). The most important concern in the best
interest analysis is the "goal of assuring stability and continuity." Stephanie M., 7 Cal.
4th at 316, 867 P.2d at 718, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 607 (citing Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal.
3d 531, 538 & n.6, 724 P.2d 486, 491 & n.6, 229 Cal. Rptr. 800, 804 & n.6 (1986)). The
moving party bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of evidence that in
light of changed circumstances or new evidence, a change of placement would be in
the child's best interest. Id. at 317, 867 P.2d at 718, 27 Cal Rptr. 2d at 607. In so
doing, the moving party must rebut the presumption that foster care is in the best
interest of the child. Id. (citing In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th 295, 302, 851 P.2d 826,
830, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 548 (1993)); see Nancy B. Shernow, Comment, Recognizing
Constitutional Rights of Custodial Parents: The Primacy of the Post-Divorce Family
in Child Custody Modification Proceedings, 35 UCLA L REv. 677, 678-85 (1988) (discussing the standards for custody modification).
28. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 318-19, 867 P.2d at 719, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608. The
juvenile court considered the following evidence: (1) the grandmother maintained little
or no contact with the child during her stay with foster parents and had not written,
seen or talked with the child in over a year, (2) lack of any substantial bond between
Stephanie and her grandmother, (3) the language barrier between the two; (4)
Stephanie's fragile emotional condition and the solid bond with her foster parents; and
(5) Stephanie's manifested uneasiness during her grandmother's authorized visits. Id.;
see 10 B.E. WmrlTN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 140 (9th ed.
1989) (same); 32 CAL JuR. 3D Family Law § 937 (1994) (discussing the circumstances
justifying modification).
29. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 319, 867 P.2d at 719, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 608. The
court of appeal held that the juvenile court abused its discretion by: (1) denying due
deference to the relative placement preference stated in § 361.3 in force at time of the

First, the court stated that the relative placement preference of section
361.3 of the Welfare and Institutions Code is not a statutory presumption
dictating automatic custody to a relative.' It reasoned that the "preferential consideration" accorded to a relative, as defined by the statute
itself, merely means that the family member requesting custody will be
considered and evaluated before any other potential parties.3 Since the
evidence indicated that Stephanie's placement with her grandmother
would be contrary to her best interest, the court held that the juvenile
court did not abuse its discretion by ordering foster care.'
Second, the court discussed the importance placed by the juvenile
court on the suitability of the grandmother's home .' The court acknowledged that the juvenile court conclusively determined that the
grandmother's home was suitable.' Nevertheless, the court agreed with
the juvenile court that this option failed the best interest of the child
test .3
Finally, the court reached a similar result regarding the grandmother's
interest in preserving family relations with Stephanie.' The court ruled,
as did the juvenile court, that this interest did not outweigh Stephanie's
best interest.' The court, therefore, concluded that the juvenile court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing a change of placement that would
not promote Stephanie's best interest.

hearing; (2) failing to give sufficient consideration to the suitability of placing the child
under her grandmother's care; and (3) giving priority to the child's relationship with
her foster parents over her bond with her grandmother. Id.; see CAL WELF. & INST.
CODE § 361.3 (West 1984).
30. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 320, 867 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609. Section
361.3 provided that "in any case in which a child is removed from the physical custo-

dy of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be
given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative." CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 316(a) (West 1984).
31. Stephanie M, 7 Cal. 4th at 320, 867 P.2d at 720, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609; see
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.3(c)(1) (West 1984).
32. Stephanie M., 7 Cal. 4th at 321, 867 P.2d at 720-21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 609-10.
The court observed that Stephanie's emotional vulnerability and the close bond developed with her foster parents militated against her placement with her grandmother. Id.
33. Id. at 321-23, 867 P.2d at 721-22, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610-11.
34. Id. at 322, 867 P.2d at 721, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 610. The juvenile court considered an evaluation report by the Mexican social services of the grandmother's home
stating that her home was suitable for the child. Id.
35. Id. at 323, 867 P.2d at 722, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611.
36. Id. at 324-25, 867 P.2d at 722-23, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 611-12.
37. Id. at 325, 867 P.2d at 723, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 612.
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III.

CONCLUSION

In Stephanie M., the California Supreme Court further bolstered the
rule that the change of circumstances test.is merely an adjunct of the
best interest of the child standard. A mere showing of different circumstances will not suffice. Thus, the moving party has the burden of not
only proving that there are changed circumstances, but also that these
new developments shift the scale so that custody modification would be
in the child's best interest. This rather heavy burden is justified where a
child's welfare is at stake in which stability and continuity of care are
paramount concerns.

ANNA HuR

VIII.

PROBATE LAW
Enforcement of a '"no contest clause" against a widow
pursuingsurviving spousal rights to community property assets included in the trust estate is consistent with
California law and does not prevent herfrom obtaining
all she is entitled to under community property orfederal labor laws, but rather merely prevents her from obtaining those benefits in addition to the property conditionally left to her within the trust: Burch v. George.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Burch v. George,' the California Supreme Court considered three
issues concerning "no contest" clauses.' First, the court examined

1. 7 Cal. 4th 246, 866 P.2d 92, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165 (1994). Justice Baxter wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian, and
George concurred. Id. at 251-74, 866 P.2d at 94-110, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 167-82. Justice
Kennard wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 274-94, 866 P.2d at 110-22, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 183-95 (Kennard, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk also dissented from the majority opinion. Id. at 274, 866 P.2d at 109, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (Mosk, J., dissenting in part,
abstaining in part).
2. Id. at 253, 866 P.2d at 96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
In December 1985, Frank Burch and his fifth wife, Marlene, were married. Id. at
252, 866 P.2d at 95, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168. After their marriage, Frank became the
sole shareholder of a prior investment interest known as Pacific Coast Ford. Shortly
thereafter, Frank became a participant in the company's pension plan. Id. In 1988,
Frank retained counsel to create a will and testamentary trust designating Frank's
blood relatives as the primary beneficiaries. Id. During their marriage, and unbeknownst to Marlene, Frank transferred several assets to the trust including the stock
and pension plan interests he held in Pacific Coast Ford. Id. The resulting Frank
Burch Family Trust (FBFr) included a subsidiary marital trust for Marlene that did not
contain any of Frank's interests from Pacific Coast Ford. Id.
Both the FBF' and will instruments contained a "no contest clause" providing that
any beneficiary challenging the provisions of the FBFT or the trustor's last will, or
seeking to set aside such instruments, be treated as if it had been determined that
.such person had predeceased the execution of this . . . instrument without issue." Id.
at 256, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171. In addition, the FBFr recited that, "the
property subject to this Trust is [the trustor's] separate property and that his interest
therein ...
shall remain his separate property." Id. at 256, 866 P.2d at 97, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 170.
When Frank died in March of 1989, the assets of his estate were valued at
greater than $7 million. Id. at 252, 866 P.2d at 95, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168. Marlene
received $800,000 in joint tenancy interests, and $200,000 in life insurance proceeds
outside of the trust. Id. Under the FBFT provisions, she received an additional $60,000
in life insurance proceeds, Frank's Mercedes Benz, a 53-foot yacht, a $1 million beach
house still under construction, and a life estate providing approximately $6,000 per
month. Id. at 252-53, 866 P.2d at 95, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168. Under the remainder of
the FBFr, the balance of Frank's interests, comprised of approximately $4 million in
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whether such a clause in a trust agreement is triggered when the surviving spouse seeks state and federal rights beyond the provisions of the
trust instrument.3 Second, the court analyzed whether California law provides a precedent for precluding such effects, once triggered, for claims
involving community property rights.4 Third, the court considered whether the pursuit of pension benefits granted by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) is exempt from the application of a no contest clause."
The majority of the court concluded that the terms of the trust reflected the testator's specific intent to foreclose any opportunity for his surviving spouse to retain the trust distribution while pursuing alternative
claims to the assets involved.! The court further determined that enforcement of the no contest clause did not preclude the surviving
spouse's right to pursue state community property or federal pension
benefit interests, and therefore, did not violate legal or public policy
concerns.' Recognizing that the trust agreement forced the spouse to
make an election as to the survivorship rights sought, the court articulated that its position was not an "'endorsement' of marital duplicity",
nor of a "trustor's alleged breach of trust", but merely an acknowledgement that the testator's intent to limit recovery of assets, either by will
or by law, would prevail.'

proceeds upon sale of Pacific Coast stock and the corresponding pension plan death
benefit of $169,000, would transfer to his blood relatives. Id. at 253, 866 P.2d at 95, 27
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168.
Upon the death of her husband, Marlene petitioned the probate court to determine
whether she could seek her community property rights in the assets held by the trust

estate, and claim her rights under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA), without violating the no contest clause of the trust instrument. Id.
The probate court ruled that both proposed actions would trigger the no contest
clause because they would thwart the intent of the trust. Id. The court of appeal affirmed. Id. at 253, 866 P.2d at 95-96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 168-69. Although the parties
settled out of court, the supreme court granted review because the issues were "important and of continuing interest" Id. at 253 n.4, 866 P.2d at 96 n.4, 27 Cal. Rptr 2d at
169 n.4.
3. Id. at 253-54, 866 P.2d at 96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
4. Id. at 254, 866 P.2d at 96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.
5. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
6. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 254, 866 P.2d at 96, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169.

7. Id. at 273, 866 P.2d at 109, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
8. Id.

9. Id. at 273-74, 866 P.2d at 109, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.

II.

A.

TREATMENT

Majority Opinion

The majority began its analysis by reviewing contemporary laws governing the enforcement of no contest clauses." Probate Code sections
21303 and 21304 codify the general principle that a no contest clause is
enforceable against a beneficiary who challenges the instrument within
the terms of the clause, thereby triggering forfeiture." Therefore, such
clauses must be strictly construed to reflect the intent of the transferor.
Surveying previous judicial inquiry, the court found that "contest" was a
fact specific determination, dependent upon the individual circumstances
involved, as well as the specific language employed."2 Further, the court
reasoned that because the testator's intentions are controlling, the court
should avoid immunizing any legal proceeding designed to thwart such

intentions." Thus, it was necessary to evaluate whether filing the state
community property complaint or the federal ERISA complaint would
constitute contest within the meaning of the Frank Burch Family Trust
(FBFT) no contest clause. 4
1.

Would the No Contest Clause Be Triggered?

The proposed state complaint alleged that, under California community
property laws, Marlene Burch was entitled to one half of the stock of
Pacific Coast Ford and one half of the proceeds from various life insurance plans purchased by the Pacific Coast pension plan, assets which
were improperly included in their entirety within the FBF. 15 The com-

10. Id. at 254-55, 866 P.2d 96-97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-70.
11. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21303 (West 1991), (stating "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in this part, a no contest clause is enforceable against a beneficiary who
brings a contest within the terms of the no contest clause"); see also CAL PROB. CODE
§ 21304 (West 1991), (providing "[i]n determining the intent of the transferor, a no
contest clause shall be strictly construed").
12. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 254-55, 866 P.2d at 96-97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 169-70. The
court cited to the following cases in its examination: Estate of Lindstrom, 191 Cal.
App. 3d 375, 381, 236 Cal. Rptr. 376, 379 (1987) (finding that an in terrorem provision
creates a condition on dispositions under the instrument); Estate of Watson, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 569, 572, 236 Cal. Rptr. 14, 16 (1986) (following the rule of strict construction); Estate of Black, 160 Cal. App. 3d 582, 587, 206 Cal. Rptr. 663, 665-66 (1984)
(finding that "contest" under a no contest clause is fact and language specific); Estate
of Kazian, 59 Cal. App. 3d 797, 802, 130 Cal. Rptr. 908, 910 (1976) (examining the
intent of the testator).
13. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 255, 866 P.2d at 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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plaint sought return of those assets through various causes of action
directed at the trustees and other beneficiaries of the FBFT. 6
The proposed federal complaint alleged that under ERISA, Marlene
was entitled to 100 percent of the proceeds arising from the pension plan
death benefits, which were improperly denied her by the plan's administrators, or alternatively, that under community property law, she was
entitled to fifty percent of all the death benefits, and one-half of any
benefits payable under the life insurance policies purchased by the
plan. 7 The complaint sought further relief from the plan administrators
for breach of fiduciary duty and unlawful conversion of said benefits.
The court next examined the FBFT instrument, paying particular attention to the "preliminary recitals," the provision for the "division of the
trust estate upon the trustor's death," and the no contest clause." The
recitals state that all of the property within the trust estate and subject
to the trust, including all proceeds and income derived therefrom, were
and would remain Frank Burch's separate property. The FBFT distribution plan required, after certain distributions and payments, the creation
of essentially six individual trusts. Twenty percent of the remaining estate was placed in marital trust for Marlene, and the other eighty percent
was split among four other trusts for Frank's blood relatives, while a
sixth trust provided life insurance proceeds for the benefit of his mother." Lastly, the no contest clause stated that any beneficiary under the
trust who sought to adjudicate the terms of the trust shall be treated as
if they had predeceased the execution of the FBFr without issue.'
The task before the court was to determine whether it was Frank

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256, 866 P.2d at 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 256, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171. The Trust reads in part
In the event that any beneficiary under this Trust... seeks to obtain in any
proceeding in any court an adjudication that this Trust or any of its provisions ... is void, or seeks otherwise to void, nullify or set aside this Trust
or any of its provisions, then the right of that person to take any interest
given to him or her by this Trust shall be determined as it would have been
determined had such person predeceased the execution of this trust instrument without issue.

Burch's "unequivocal intention" that his wife forfeit all her rights under
the FBFT distribution plan if she pursued her rights as surviving spouse

in the trust estate.n If the court determined clear intent, the no contest
clause would be triggered. 4
The court noted that Frank Burch clearly intended to dispose of the
trust assets in aggregate and that such assets were his separate property.

Citing Witkin, the court acknowledged that in circumstances where the
trustor declared all of the property as separate, and intended to dispose
of his entire estate, it was immaterial that he was mistaken in his belief

that his spouse has no community property interests in the assets.2 It is
his "manifest intention" that is controlling.' Therefore, compliance with
the testator's intentions required an election by the spouse either to ac-

quiesce to the terms of the FBFT, or to pursue an alternative course. '
As the court explained, "'[t]he purpose of the election is to adjust the
distribution of the property under the will to conform to the express or
implied intention of the testator.'" 2

Marlene Burch argued that the instrument did not specifically name
the Pacific Coast Ford stock, "the pension plan benefits or the insurance
policies" as assets of the FBFT, and therefore, pursuit of marital interests

in the property should not trigger the no contest clause. 2 Unpersuaded
by her position, the court accepted a declaration by a trustee of the
FBFT, which indicated that Frank Burch had specifically added each of
the disputed assets to the trust prior to death.'2 In addition, the court
accepted the testimony offered by an attorney implementing the estate

23. Id See generally Jo Ann Engelhardt, In Terrorem Inter Vivos: Terra Incognita,
26 REAL PRoP. & TRIAL J. 535 (1991) (providing an analysis of the impact of the in terrorem clauses contained in will and trust instruments).
24. Id. See generally 64 CAL. JuR 3D Wills § 368 (1981) (providing i[w]here the action involved falls within the prohibition imposed by the contest clause, the good faith
of one who asserts rights contrary to the prohibition does not prevent forfeiture under
the contest clause").
25. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 257, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
However, if the testator refers to the assets in general terms, "without identifying
it as separate property," it may be fairly concluded that he intended to dispose of only
his interests in the property, and no election is required. See 12 B.E. WinN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate § 54 (9th ed. 1990).
26. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 257, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171.
27. See, e.g., 64 CAL. JUR. 3D WiUs § 364 (1981) (providing "[o]nce a legatee or devisee has presented a claim against the estate ... he cannot, after an adverse
judgement, fall back on his right as legatee or devisee, which he forfeited by bringing
the action. It is immaterial whether the claim was or was not a just debt").
28. Burch, 7 Cal 4th at 257, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 171 (quoting In re
Estate of Wolfe, 48 Cal. 2d 570, 574, 311 P.2d 476, 478 (1957)).
29. Id. at 258, 866 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172.
30. Id.
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plan which further demonstrated Frank's intent to include such assets in
the FBFT. According to the attorney, Frank was aware that Marlene
would have the legal right to assert claims against the assets in the trust,
and had therefore created "an elaborate estate plan" with a no contest
clause to discourage her pursuit of more than the "generous benefits"
conditionally provided by the trust." The court noted that no controverted evidence had been presented.'
Marlene Burch also advanced the theory that her quest for federal
benefits under ERISA should preclude activation of the no contest clause
because she sought no relief directly from the FBFT.' The court declined the merits of this argument noting that, were Marlene successful
in her pursuit of the federal complaint, it would thwart the trust's provisions for distributing all of the assets in the trust to the various mini
trusts.35
Lastly, Marlene Burch contended that case law has held that in certain
cases a creditor's claim for property based upon a source of right independent from the testamentary instruments is not a contest.3 Stating
that the established precedent does not indicate an absolute resolution
concerning any proceeding outside the will or trust, the court distinguished the Frank Burch Family Trust from this line of cases because it
included both an express declaration that all property added to the trust
was subject to the trust, and that all such property was and would remain the trustor's separate property.37 Therefore, Marlene's proposed
actions would seek to defeat the terms of the trust.'
The court concluded that the language of the FBFT instrument coupled with Frank Burch's verbalized intentions at the time of its creation,
served to "evince an unequivocal intention" to arrest any attempt by
Marlene Burch to take under the FBFT while simultaneously pursuing
independent ownership claims against assets within the trust.' As each
of Marlene's proposed causes of action were designed to frustrate
Frank's clear intentions, the court concluded that each was a contest

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 259, 866 P.2d at 99-100, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 172-73.
Id. at 260, 866 P.2d at 100, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 173.

35. Id.
36. Id. at 261, 866 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.
37. Id. at 262, 866 P.2d at 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 174.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 263, 866 P.2d at 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175.

within the 40meaning of the no contest clause and would summarily trigger
its affects.
2.

Does California Law Provide a Basis for Not Enforcing the
Clause in this Case?

After establishing that the no contest clause would be triggered, the
court sought a basis in California law for not enforcing the clause. The
court reviewed the relevant probate code 4' and current case law, and
failed to discover any authority for finding a no contest clause invalid or
unenforceable against a beneficiary who alleges the trust instrument
disposes of property to which he or she has an independent interest.'
Concluding that California law does not provide for an exception, the
court analyzed whether such an exception should be judicially recognized.'
Marlene Burch urged the court to acknowledge a strong public policy
interest in encouraging fair dealing between spouses, a policy endorsed
by the California Family Code,' which would be well served by formulation of such an exception.' She further asserted that allowing a decedent to "lawfully dispose of another's property" interests by enforcement
of the no contest clause encourages "intramarital theft and forfeiture of
community property interests."'

40. Id.; see also 64 CAL JuR. 3D Wills

§ 366 (1981).

The basic question in this respect is the meaning of the word "contest" as
employed by the testator, and this, in turn, is to be arrived at from a consideration of the purpose the testator sought to attain by the clause. Ordinarily,
It means any legal proceeding designed to result in the thwarting of the
testator's wishes as expressed . . . . It need not be a contest instituted in
the probate court, but may consist of the institution of a proceeding in equity before another court to secure participation in the estate other than
through or under the decedent's will and at variance with the testamentary
plan expressed therein.
Id.
41. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21303 (West 1991) (enforceability of a no contest clause);
CAL PROB. CODE § 21306 (West 1991) (exempting clause enforceability against a beneficiary who brings a contest based on forgery or revocation); CAL. PROB. CODE § 21307
(West 1991) (exempting clause enforceability against a beneficiary who contests a provision that benefits a party involved with drafting or witnessing the instrument).
42. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 263-64, 866 P.2d at 102-03, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 175-76.
43. Id. at 264, 866 P.2d at 103, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176.
44. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (West 1994) (prohibiting disposal of community
personal property without the spouse's written consent); CAL. FAM. CODE § 1101 (West
1994) (providing a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action for nonconsenting spouse
under § 1100).
45. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 264, 866 P.2d at 103, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176.
46. Id.
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The court concluded that such clauses do not in fact cause potential
"theft" of community property assets.47 The court explained that surviving spouses with valid community property claims are not inhibited from
asserting those interests because the spouse has a choice between exercising those rights or accepting the terms of the trust distribution.4 The
court further concluded that, "the act of the testator attempting to dispose of the property of another, and the act of the owner in accepting
the benefit provided for him by the testator, united, complete the disposition," therefore implying ratification.'
The court also examined potential legislative support for the creation
of such an exception.' Acknowledging the legislature's current and ongoing affirmation of no contest clauses as viable estate planning tools,
the court determined that the burdens imposed by the creation of such
an exception might run counter to current public policy.5 The court
noted that couples often have complex estates arising from asset acquisition at various points in life, and that testator error in calculating his or
her separate property interests could lead to extensive and costly litigation, resulting in dramatic changes to intended testamentary distributions.'

The court also indicated its belief that such an exception might cause
some settlors to forego alternative spousal provisions in reliance on the
protected community property interests as a method of providing for the
spouse, while insuring distributions to other intended beneficiaries remain undisturbed.' Finally, the court indicated that it was substantially
unfair to allow a surviving spouse to accept the provisions of the instrument when beneficial, while challenging the same instrument when it
was not.'
In conclusion, the court held that a no contest clause was enforceable
against a surviving spouse who brings contest to a trust agreement by

47. Id. at 265, 866 P.2d at 103, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 176-77.
48. Id.

49. Id. at 265-66, 866 P.2d at 104, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
50. Id. at 266, 866 P.2d at 104, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 177.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court also noted that the legislature did not intend the statutes governing no contest provisions to be a complete codification of the law. See CAL. PROB.
CODE § 21301 (West 1991).

53. Burch, 7 Cal 4th at 267, 866 P.2d at 105, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
54. Id.

seeking community property interests in the assets of the trust.'
3.

Is California's No Contest Law Preempted to the Extent Pension
Plan Benefits Are at Issue?

Marlene Burch alleged that the Pacific Coast Ford employees' pension
plan qualified as an employee benefit plan under ERISA.' The terms of
the pension plan dictated that all participants designate a beneficiary for
death benefits, and that participant's with an eligible spouse designate
that spouse as beneficiary unless formal waiver was obtained. 'Failure
to designate a beneficiary resulted in the payment of all death benefits to
the surviving spouse. Marlene's proposed federal complaint indicated that
she did not waive her rights as beneficiary under the plan and that the
plan administrators breached their fiduciary duty by failing to pay her
any death benefits and by refusing to supply requested documents regarding the plan.' Marlene further contended that application of the no
contest clause is preempted by ERISA where she sought recovery of the
pension plan benefits.'
ERISA contains an express preemption clause stating that the act
"shall supersede any and all State Laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.... ." The United Sates Supreme Court has determined that a state law "relates" to employee benefit plans, for preemption purposes, if it is intentionally designed to affect
directly ERISA benefit plans or specifically designates special treatment
for such plans.' However, the California Supreme Court noted that preemption is less absolute when a state law is "a neutral law of general
application" and incidentally affects an ERISA plan.' Therefore, the

55. Id. at 267-68, 866 P.2d at 105, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.

Id at 268, 866 P.2d at 105, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178; see 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461
& Supp. 1992).
Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 268, 866 P.2d at 105, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.
Id. at 268, 866 P.2d at 105-06, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
59. Id. ERISA was designed by Congress "to ensure that 'if a worker has been
promised a defined benefit upon retirement-and if he has fulfilled whatever conditions
are required to obtain a vested benefit . . . he actually receives it.'" Alessi v.
56.
(1988
57.
58.

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 510 (1981).

Employee pension benefit plans are included in the definition of employee benefit
plans defined by the act. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(3) (1988).
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992)
61. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829,
838 n.12 (1988) (determining preemption of a state law which provided special protective treatment to ERISA plans under state garnishment procedures).
62. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 269, 866 P.2d at 106, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179. The court indicated there was established precedence for finding the effect of the law on the
ERISA plan is "'too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that
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court sought to determine the effects of the no contest clause on employee benefit plans, and whether such an intrusion upon ERISA would
mandate preemption.'
The court recognized four basic areas of law that were deemed to
"relate" to ERISA benefit plans: (1) laws which regulate "benefits or
terms"; (2) laws that "create reporting, disclosure, funding or vesting requirements"; (3) laws that regulate the calculation of benefit payment
amounts; and (4) laws and "common law rules" that provide remedies for
improper administration of the plan.' Marlene Burch argued that her
proposed ERISA cause of action is preemptive because it seeks damages
arising from the breach of a plan administrator's duty under ERISA, falls
squarely within ERISA's enforcement provisions,' and that enforcement
of the no contest clause would inhibit her ability to pursue damages for
the administrator's misconduct.'
The court was not persuaded, countering that the no contest law
would neither preclude her ability to pursue damages under ERISA's
enforcement scheme nor serve to "shield" wrongful administrators guilty
of breach. 7 Thus, the court determined that the no contest rule had no
regulatory impact on ERISA plans.'
Marlene Burch contended that the no contest law was preempted because it created a "chilling effect" that renders her rights under the benefit plan "essentially worthless."' Again, the court was unmoved." Acknowledging that if Marlene pursued her interests and prevailed, the no
contest law would not bar her from gaining all she was entitled to, the
court concluded such benefits were not "worthless."7 Thus, there was
no "chilling effect."'

the law relates to the plan.'" Id. (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
100 n.21 (1983)); see Retirement Fund Trust of Plumbing v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909
F.2d 1266, 1280-81 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding state tax levy procedure not preempted).
63. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 269, 866 P.2d at 106, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 179.
64. Id. at 270, 866 P.2d at 106-07, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180.
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (authorizing claims against plan administrators).
66. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 270, 866 P.2d at 107, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 271, 866 P.2d at 107, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 180.
71. Id. at 271, 866 P.2d at 107, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.
72. The court further concluded that the operation of the no contest clause would

Lastly, Marlene Burch argued that the no contest law was an imper-

missible interference with attainment of her rights under ERISA. 7 The
court declined to embrace this position, determining that there was no
apparent authority supporting the proposition that state enforcement of
"the conditional nature of a private gift" constituted "interference" under
ERISA regulations. 4
The court concluded that California's no contest law is "a neutral state
law of general application", and therefore, would only marginally affect
an ERISA benefit plan.7' Consequently, the court held that there was no
preemption concerning enforcement of the no contest clause. 8
B.

JusticeMosk's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Mosk concurred in dissent with Parts I (Background) and II
(No Contest Clauses) of Justice Kennard's opinion. However, believing
that these treatments adequately resolved the issue before the court, he
declined to offer an opinion as to Part III of the Kennard dissent.'
C.

Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion

Justice Kennard, in her dissent, expressed the belief that the majority
decision served as an endorsement of marital breach of trust and confidence which arises from the act of taking a spouses's property and, in
effect, giving it to other relatives without the spouse's knowledge or
consent.' Justice Kennard found this an abhorrent departure from established community property laws and public policy principles designed

only apply to Marlene's participation in the distribution of non pension assets under
the Trust. Id. at 272, 866 P.2d at 108, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181.

73. See 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (1988).
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel,
discipline or discriminate against a participant or beneficiary for exercising

any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee benefit
plan, this subchapter, section 1201 of this title, or of the Welfare and Pension
Plan Disclosure Act, or for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of
any right to which such participant may become entitled under this plan, this
subchapter, or the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act .... The provi-

sions of section 1132 of this title shall be applicable to the enforcement of
this section.
Id.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at
Id. at 273, 866 P.2d
Id.
Id. at 274, 866 P.2d
Id. at 274, 866 P.2d

272-73, 866 P.2d at 108-09, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 181-82.
at 109, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182.
at 109, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 182 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
at 110, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 183 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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to prevent a spouse from "unilaterally disposing" of community assets.'
Justice Kennard further noted that although California is one of a minority of jurisdictions finding no contest clauses effective, such clauses
must be strictly construed.' The Justice noted that strict construction
requires that forfeiture only apply in cases where the breach falls squarely within the strict parameters of the clause.' Having carefully reviewed
the precise language of the FBFT, Justice Kennard sought to determine
whether Marlene's proposed actions would trigger the no contest
clause.'
1. No Contest Clauses
Acknowledging that it was undisputed among the parties that
Marlene's federal and state complaints do not propose that the trust be
set aside, Justice Kennard focused on whether the complaints seek "'an
adjudication that [the trust] is void, or seeks to otherwise void, nullify or
set aside any provision.'"' Marlene's stated cause of action sought declaratory relief "to construe the trust instrument, conversion, breach of
fiduciary duty and partition, and [sought] to impose a constructive trust
and to set aside fraudulent conveyances."' The Justice pointed out that
the proposed suit did not seek adjudication that any portion of the trust
instrument be determined void, or be set aside, and therefore was not,
"on its face," a contest that would trigger the no contest clause.' Justice
Kennard demonstrated that the federal complaint set forth an action
against the pension plan trustees for "breach of statutory obligations
under ERISA, for conversion, for declaratory relief, and for breach of

79. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting)
81. Id. at 278, 866 P.2d at 112, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
also Ronald XL Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 STAN. L REV. 509, 552 n.171
(1992) (citing THOMAS E. ATKINSON, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF WILLS 808-09 (2d ed.
1953)). "Whereas 'strict construction' of wills emphasizes the written word and confines
interpretation to the 'plain meaning' of the words found 'the four comers of the instrument,' a more 'liberal construction' emphasizes the testator's intent as the primary
determinant and thus allows extrinsic evidence of that intent" Id.
82. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 278, 866 P.2d at 112-13, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185 (Kennard,
J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 278, 866 P.2d at 112, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennard quotes directly from the verbiage of the no contest clause of the trust
instrument. See supra note 22.
84. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 278, 866 P.2d at 112, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting).
85. Id. at 278-79, 866 P.2d at 112, 27 Cal.; Rptr. 2d at 185 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

fiduciary duties," and did not seek to have any portion of the trust voided or set aside. Thus, it is not "on its face," an attack on a provision of
the FBFTr.'
Conversely, the trustees claimed that Marlene's actions challenged that
portion of the FBFT instrument that provided, "[t]rustor states that the
property subject to this trust is his separate property and that his interest therein, and in the proceeds and income therefrom, shall remain his
separate property."7 The trustees construed Marlene's position as an
attack on this clause challenging that the FBFT is not indeed Frank's
separate property but marital community property.w The trustees characterize the ERISA complaint as similarly challenging the separate property language in that it sought recovery pension benefits belonging only
to Marlene.'
Justice Kennard found this construction uncompelling for two reasons.
First, Frank did not, in fact, identify within the trust what property he
considered separately his.' Second, Marlene was not attempting to set
aside the provision but rather to have the court judicially interpret the
provision so as not to include property that was rightfully hers.9 Justice
Kennard pointed out that much of Frank's acquisition of Pacific Coast
Ford, and the purchase of certain life insurance policies at issue in this
case, were events occurring during marriage and could be construed as
community property.'
Justice Kennard took a similar approach regarding the ERISA claim,
determining that ERISA generally requires that each plan provide "'a
qualified preretirement survivor annuity'" to the surviving spouse.Y In
addition, she emphasized, "[n]o party other than the surviving spouse has
any claim under federal law to this death benefit."' Justice Kennard further reasoned that the FBFT instrument specified distribution of Frank's
separate property, and that property added to the trust must be added

86. Id. at 279, 866 P.2d at 112-23, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 185-86 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 279, 866 P.2d at 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 279, 866 P.2d at 113-24, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (Kennard, J., dissenting);
see CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West Supp. 1994) (stating "[eixcept as otherwise provided
by statute, all property, real or personal, wherever situated, acquired by a married

person during the marriage while domiciled in the state is community property").
92. See supra note 91.
93. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 280, 866 P.2d at 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (Kennard, J.,
dissenting) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. 1992)).

94. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting)
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"'according to the terms of the Trust.'"' It also did not specify intent to
include the assets at issue." She, therefore, concluded that in strictly
construing the language of the FBFT, community property and Marlene's
separate property could not have been added after the trusts formation
precisely because it was not Frank's separate property.7
Justice Kennard criticized the majority's assertion that their analysis of
the no contest clause was "strictly construed."' She contended that the
majority inappropriately focused on the purpose Frank was trying to
accomplish creating the provisions of the trust and whether the contest
would thwart that intent, rather than examining the nature of the attack
itself and determining whether it challenged the competency of the testator, or alleged the presence of fraud or undue influence.'
Lastly, Justice Kennard considered Marlene Burch's argument for specifically exempting community property claims from the reach of the no
contest laws where such claims trigger its effects."® Justice Kennard's
position would be to hold no contest clauses unenforceable against a
beneficiary who claims that a trustor or testator has disposed of personal
or real property that legally belongs to the beneficiary.'' She provided
several reasons for this conclusion: (1) public policy interests require
that a no contest provision not be enforced where it protects the act of a
trustor who disposes of the property that is not his; (2) enforcement of a
no contest clause that bars assertion of community property rights is in
direct opposition to the public policy concerns exemplified in California

95. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting)
96. Id. at 280, 866 P.2d at 113, 27 Cal. Rptr.2d at 187 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 280-81, 866 P.2d at 113-14, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186-87 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
98. See CAL PROB. CODE § 21304 (West 1991).
99. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 282, 866 P.2d at 115, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 188 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see Andrew S. Garb, The In Terrorem Clause: Challenging California Wills, 6

ORANGE COUNTY BAR J. 259, 262 (1979). Justice Kennard concurs with the author's
analysis regarding an emerging judicial tendency to interpret the rule of "strict construction" so broadly as to render the concept meaningless. Butch, 7 Cal. 4th at 281,
866 P.2d at 114, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187 (Kennard, J., dissenting). She further notes
that the majority's employment of this legal concept closely parallels this broad approach. Id. at 282-83, 866 P.2d at 114-15, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 187-88 (Kennard, J., dis-

senting). She underscores her position by recognizing that the legislative intent behind
enactment of California Probate Code § 21304 was specifically to avoid this type of
application. Id.
100. Id. at 283, 866 P.2d at 116, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 283-84, 866 P.2d at 116, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 (Kennard, J., dissenting).

Family Code sections 1100 and 1101; and (3) enforcement of the no contest clause to penalize a spouse's assertion of community property rights
creates judicial endorsement of spousal breach of fiduciary duty."
Thus, Justice Kennard would hold the no contest clause unenforceable in
this case.I"
2.

No Contest Clauses and ERISA Preemption

Justice Kennard argued that ERISA preempts California's no contest
law where the law hinders access to federally endorsed pension
rights.' She departed from the majority's conclusion that the no contest law is too "tenuous or remote" to the ERISA benefit plan for preemption to apply."® The Justice revealed that the no contest law would
serve to "condition" Marlene's ability to exert her federally granted rights
to receive benefits, or seek judicial interpretation of her entitlement under the act, upon forfeiture of her trust distribution.'"
As support for this position she cited MacLean v. Ford Motor Co.,1 °
in which the federal appellate court held that when "the terms of an employee pension plan under ERISA provide a valid method for determining
the beneficiary, that mechanism cannot be displaced by the provisions of
a will."" Justice Kennard asserted that Frank Burch sought to displace
Marlene's ERISA rights by the terms of the FBFT. As a result, the effects
of the no contest clause are "direct and substantial," because Marlene
must abandon such federally protected benefits or relinquish her rights
to assume under the trust.0
Additionally, Justice Kennard explained that even without express
preemption under ERISA, the United States Supreme Court has endorsed
the doctrine of implied preemption. " Under this doctrine the state law

102. Id. at 284-87, 866 P.2d at 116-18, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189-91 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 287, 866 P.2d at 118, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 288, 866 P.2d at 119, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 192 (Kennard, J., dissenting); see
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988) ("Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.").
105. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 289, 866 P.2d at 120, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 193 (Kennard, J.,

dissenting).
106. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
107. 831 F.2d 723 (7th Cir. 1987).

108. Id. at 728.
109. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th' at 291, 866 P.2d at 121, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194 (Kennard, J.,

dissenting).
110. Id.; see, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-43, 145 (1990)
(finding the doctrine of implied preemption applicable when a state law conflicts with
an ERISA provision); English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (finding that

the doctrine of implied preemption arises when the state law serves as an impediment
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may be preempted when it is an obstacle to achieving the objectives
behind the federal enactment.' Justice Kennard noted that the provisions of ERISA specifically anticipate a cause of action for recovery of
benefits misappropriated from their rightful beneficiary."' Thus, she
concluded that the no contest clause would serve as a barrier to accomplishing Congressional intent."'
In conclusion, Justice Kennard stated that it violated the fundamental
principals of community property to allow a spouse to unilaterally dispose of assets through the trust estate without spousal consent or
knowledge, and then shield such acts by incorporation of a no contest
clause within the trust instrument. The Justice further concluded that the
no contest clause is preempted by ERISA because it created a substantial
obstacle to the pursuit of federally guaranteed benefits."'

III.

IMPACT

In Burch v. George, the California Supreme Court ruled that enforcement of a no contest clause in a trust agreement required the surviving
spouse to pursue community property rights to the assets improperly

included within the trust, forfeiting rights to inheritance under the trust,
or, alternatively, to accept distribution as provided by the trust instrument, forgoing all community property interests. The court based its decision on what it deemed to be important policy considerations for pro-

moting the testator's intent."5 However, the court failed to give equal

to the administration of congressional objectives).
111. Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 133.
112. Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 291-92, 866 P.2d at 121, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194 (Kennard,
J., dissenting); see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1140 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
113. Burch, 4 Cal. 4th at 291-92, 866 P.2d at 122, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 194-95
(Kennard, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 293-94, 866 P.2d at 122, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 195 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 257-58, 866 P.2d at 98, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 171. The majority reiterated their
position in previous decisions as follows:
We described the operative principle this way: "If the testator purported to
dispose of both his and his spouse's share of the community property, and it
appears that the intent of the testator will be thwarted by giving literal effect
to the will while recognizing the community property rights of the surviving
spouse, an election should be required. The purpose of the election is to
adjust the distribution of the property under the will to conform to the express or implied intention of the testator."
Id. (citing Estate of Wolfe, 48 Cal. 2d 570, 311 P.2d 476, (1957)).

footing to well-established and competing policy concerns regarding
spousal community property rights."8 By enabling a spouse to distribute
community property assets within a "personal property" trust, the court
has effectively created a method in which to circumvent California community property laws."7
Thus, a spouse may incorporate all of the marital property interests in
a trust instrument that provides less than fifty percent of the property
will flow to surviving spouse. Inclusion of a no contest clause provision
assures enforceability, effectively allowing distribution of the surviving
spouse's portion of the community property to third parties.
Under California law, where the decedent dies intestate or fails to
provide for a surviving spouse, statutory provisions protect the surviving
spouse by granting entitlement to fifty percent of the community property interests plus an amount of the decedent's separate estate not to exceed fifty percent." ' Presumably, legislative intent behind such enact-

116. See CAL FAM. CODE § 760 (West Supp. 1994). "All property acquired by a married person during marriage is presumed to be community property." Burch, 7 Cal. 4th
at 279, 866 P.2d at 113, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 186 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Additionally, in her Burch dissent, Justice Kennard concludes that, "enforcement of
a no contest clause to prevent a beneficiary from challenging the trustor's disposition
of property that is not the trustor's property, but is the property of another, would not
aid the public policy favoring enforcement of such clauses." Id. at 284, 866 P.2d at
116, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189.
117. Id. at 285, 866 P.2d at 117, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 190 (Kennard, J., dissenting):
Allowing enforcement of a no contest clause to effectively prohibit assertion
of statutorily guaranteed community property rights is contrary to the public
policy embodied in Family Code sections 1100 and 1101. Those sections provide that a spouse may not convey or dispose of community personal property without the written consent of the other spouse, and grant the nonconsenting spouse a right of action against the other spouse for breach of that
duty to obtain written consent.
Id.
118. See 12 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate § 40 (9th
ed. 1990).
[I]f a testator fails to provide by will for his or her surviving spouse who
married testator after execution of the will, the omitted spouse shall receive
a share in the estate consisting of the following property in the estate: (a)
The one-half of the community property that belongs to the testator .

.

. (b)

The one-half of the quasi-community property that belongs to the testator ... (c) A share of the separate property of the testator equal in value to
that which the spouse would have received if the testator had died intestate,
but in no event is the share to be more than one-half the value of the separate property in the estate.
Id.
Intestate shares to separate property are distributed by law as follows: (1) The
entire estate will pass to surviving spouse if decedent did not leave any "surviving
issue," parent, sibling, or issue of deceased sibling; (2) One-half will pass to surviving
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ments was a strong policy interest toward favoring spousal protection
from undisclosed disinheritance by decedent. The Burch decision undermines such policy considerations by creating a method in which a decedent can "rob" the surviving spouse of his/her rights to community property by incorporating such interests within the trust."' As Justice
Kennard argued, it violates the fundamental principals of community
property to allow a spouse to unilaterally dispose of assets through the
trust estate, without spousal consent or knowledge, and then shield such
°
acts by incorporation of a no contest clause within the instrument.'2
This decision is particularly harsh in its conclusion that Marlene
Burch's pursuit of ERISA benefits triggered the no contest clause. Justice
Kennard makes a very compelling argument that it does not. 2 ' Under
the doctrine of implied preemption, a state law may be preempted if it
serves as an obstacle to achieving the objectives of ERISA." ERISA
provisions require that a person wishing to designate a beneficiary other
than a spouse for death benefits provided under the plan obtain a written
waiver of rights from the spouse."n Presumably this requirement provides notice of intent to preclude spouse from a benefit they would normally receive under the plan. Therefore, this decision allows state law to
thwart the provisions of ERISA
Lastly, the Burch decision defeats the right of a married persons to
establish a secure position for the future in the event that the unfortu-

spouse where decedent "leaves only one child" or where there are no children but
decedent leaves parents or their issue; or (3) One-third will pass to surviving spouse
where "decedent leaves more than one child living," one child living, and issue of at
least one child living, or "issue of two or more deceased children" are living. See 12
B.E. WrrKuN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNA LAWS, Wills and Probate § 130 (9th ed. 1990).
California law requires a written and signed waiver by surviving spouse before any
surviving spousal rights can be avoided, including, "intestate succession", "testamentary
disposition" by will pre-existing waiver, "probate homestead", and "family allowance."
See 12 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Wills and Probate §§ 47, 48 (9th ed.
1990).
119. Id. at 284, 866 P.2d at 116, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
120. Id. "[I]f a testator or trustor lays claim to property that does not belong to him
or her, and successfully insulates the disposition of such property from challenge by
use of a no contest clause, theft is the result." Id.
121. See supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
123. The Burch majority acknowledged provisions of ERISA which specify that a
participant "who has an eligible spouse must designate that spouse as the beneficiary
unless the spouse waives in writing

27 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 178.

....

"

Burch, 7 Cal. 4th at 268, 866 P.2d at 105,

nate loss of a spouse occurs. A spouse may remain completely unaware
that the estate plans of their partner precludes recovery of community
property interests and death benefits statutorily provided under federal
and state law.
The court's decision seriously eroded trust and fiduciary duty within
the marital relationship. Therefore, future California court decisions
should interpret the Burch holding narrowly, on a very fact specific basis.

CATHERINE CONVY
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IX.

SALES AND USE TAXES

The assumption of a corporate division's liabilities by a
wholly owned subsidiary as part of the transfer of division assets to the subsidiary constitutes consideration
for sales tax purposes, even when the parent corporation
remains the primary obligor:
Beatrice Co. v. State Board of Equalization.
L

INTRODUCTION

In Beatrice Co. v. State Board of Equalization,' the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether liabilities transferred by a
corporation to its wholly owned subsidiary as part of the transfer of a
division's assets to the subsidiary constitutes consideration for the purposes of sales tax, even when the parent corporation remains primarily
liable on the debts.2 The court sought to resolve the conflict regarding
this issue3 created by the decisions in Macrodyne Industries, Inc. v.
State Board of Equalization,4 and Cal-Metal Corp. v. State Board of
Equalization.' The court held that regardless of whether the parent corporation remains the primary obligor on the debts, the subsidiary's assumption of liability for those debts and obligations constituted consideration and the transaction is therefore a retail sale and subject to the

sales tax.'
Hl. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Beatrice created Standard Dry Wall in 1983,' and in 1984, Beatrice
1. 6 Cal. 4th 767, 863 P.2d 683, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438 (1993). Justice Baxter
authored the unanimous opinion of the court. Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Mosk,
Panel, Kennard, Arabian, and George concurred. Id. at 783, 863 P.2d at 694, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d it 449.
2. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 770-71, 863 P.2d at 685, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440.
3. Id. at 770-71, 863 P.2d at 685, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440.
4. 192 Cal. App. 3d 579, 237 Cal. Rptr. 537 (1987) (finding a parent corporation's
transfer of the assets and liability of its operating division to corporate subsidiary not
consideration where parent remained jointly liable).
5. 161 Cal. App. 3d 759, 207 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1984) (finding transfer of assets to a
commencing partnership in exchange for the assumption of Indebtedness on the assets
constitutes a sale for tax purposes, measured by the amount of the debt assumed).
6. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 771, 863 P.2d at 685, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 440.
7. Id. On October 28, 1993, Beatrice incorporated Standard Dry Wall, which simul-

transferred all of the assets and liabilities of its "Standard Dry Wall Products Division" to Standard Dry Wall in exchange for 9,000 shares of Standard Dry Wall stock.8 Standard Dry Wall "assumed and agreed to pay,
perform and/or discharge in full, when and as the same become due, all
of the debts, liabilities and obligations... of Beatrice's Standard Dry
Wall Products Division"9 except those that could not be assigned or
transferred without the consent or authorization of the obligee, "unless
such consent or authorization was obtained, or a novation agreed to.""0
Standard Dry Wall agreed to perform these obligations on behalf of
Beatrice or to provide Beatrice the means of satisfying the obligation."
The State Board of Equalization determined that the transaction was a
retail sale and required Beatrice to pay sales taxes. 2 The Board then
denied Beatrice's claim for refund."
Beatrice acknowledged that it had transferred the assets and liabilities
of its Standard Dry Wall Products Division to Standard Dry Wall in exchange for Standard Dry Wall stock. 4 However, it maintained the transfer was part of a corporate restructuring and that it remained primarily
liable for the obligations of its Standard Dry Wall Products Division. 5
Beatrice also claimed the transaction fell within Regulation 1595(b)(4),"
which exempts the transfer of assets in exchange for first issue stock of
a commercial corporation from sales tax. 7 Beatrice also argued that
because it continued to be liable for the obligations under the "assumption agreement," the agreement was not consideration pursuant to
Macrodyne.8 The trial court granted summary judgment for Beatrice.'9

taneously issued 1,000 shares to Beatrice. Id. Standard Dry Wall remained inactive until
July 31, 1984. Id.

8. Id. No written contract existed between Beatrice and Standard Dry Wall regarding the exchange, but the agreement was reflected in the Standard Dry Wall board of

directors "Written Consent" to the issuance and sale of the stock to Beatrice. Id.
9. Id. (citations omitted).

10. Id. at 771, 863 P.2d at 686, 25 Cal. Rptr 2d at 441.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 771-72, 863 P.2d at 686, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.

13. Id. at 772, 863 P.2d at 686, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 441.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. CAL CODE OF REGS. tit. 18, § 1595(b)(4) (1994). "Tax does not apply to a trans-

fer of property to a commencing corporation ...

in exchange solely for first issue

stock of the commencing corporation . . . ." Id. "Tax does apply, however, if the
transferor receives consideration such as cash, notes, or an assumption of indebtedness, and the transfer does not otherwise qualify for exemption." Id.
17. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 773, 863 P.2d at 687, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 442. This sales
tax would ordinarily apply to the exchange of personal property for stock. Id.
18. Id.

19. Id. at 774, 863 P.2d at 687, 25 Cal. Rptr 2d at 442.
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The court of appeal reversed, rejecting the conclusion of the Macrodyne
court and re-affirming its decision in Cal-Metal.' The California Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court decision.21

M.

TREATMENT OF THE CASE

The state of California "has imposed a tax on 'the privilege of selling

tangible personal property at retail. '" ' The exchange of personal property for stock is ordinarily a taxable transaction, but Regulation 1595(b)(4)

provides an exception for transfers to newly formed corporations in exchange for first issue stock.'

However, tax will be assessed on the

transfer if the transferor obtains consideration "such as cash, notes, or
an assumption of indebtedness," in exchange for the property.' The
court determined that Standard Dry Wall acquired the assets of the Standard Dry Wall Products Division in exchange for the first issue of stock
and the assumption of indebtedness and thus the transaction was taxable
to the value of the debt assumed.'
A.

Consideration

Beatrice contended that because Standard Dry Wall was a wholly
owned subsidiary, Beatrice had the power to require Standard Dry Wall
to perform its duties under the agreement without having to rely on judicial recourse to obtain the performance.' Standard Dry Wall would then
have a preexisting duty to perform any duty that Beatrice imposed upon
it." Therefore, the assumption agreement did not constitute additional

20. Id. The Cal-Metal court found that an exchange of personal property for the assumption of the transferor's liabilities is a taxable transaction. Id.
21. Id. at 783, 863 P.2d at 694, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
22. Id. at 774, 863 P.2d at 688, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443 (citing CAL REv. & TAX
CODE § 6051 (West Supp. 1994)). For an in-depth discussion of what constitutes a
"sale", see 9 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CAuFoRNIA LAW, Taxation § 297 (9th ed. 1989 &
Supp. 1994); 56 CAL. JuR. 3D Sales and Use Taxes § 34 (1980 & Supp. 1994). See generally 68 AM. JuR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 65 (Supp. 1994).
23. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 774-75, 863 P.2d at 688, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443; see CAL
CODE OF REOS. tit. 18, § 1595(b)(4) (West 1994).
24. Id. at 775, 863 P.2d at 688, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 775-76, 863 P.2d at 688, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
27. Id.

consideration.' The court flatly rejected Beatrice's argument, stating
that no authority exists for the proposition that transactions between
parent and subsidiary corporations should be exempt from sales tax if
the only consideration from the subsidiary is a promise to pay the debts
of the parent corporation.? Because Beatrice received both stock and a
legally enforceable assumption agreement in exchange for the assets of
its Standard Dry Wall Products Division a taxable sale occurred.' Regardless of their parent/subsidiary relationship, the two corporations are
separate legal
entities and are subject to the same rules that apply to all
3
taxpayers.

1

Beatrice also argued that the transaction was not taxable because it
was part of a corporate reorganization.' The Macrodyne court stated
that one determinative factor in evaluating whether it considers a parent
and subsidiary as one entity is "'whether distinct corporate identities
have been maintained and whether the corporations have independent
business purposes.'"' Ifthe parent and subsidiary corporations do not
act as one, then transactions between them are taxable.' The court concluded that Beatrice and Standard Dry Wall were separate corporate

entities and that their transactions could not be characterized as a "corporate reorganization."'
Additionally, Beatrice argued that under Ray v. Alad Corp.,' Standard

28. Id. at 776, 863 P.2d at 688, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 443.
29. Id. at 776, 863 P.2d 688-89, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 443-44. The court also noted that
the plaintiffs argument that a parent corporation retains control over the subsidiary assumes that the parent retains a controlling interest in the subsidiary until it satisfies
the obligations. Id. at 776 n.7, 863 P.2d at 689 n.7, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444 n.7.
30. Id. at 776, 863 P.2d at 689, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
31. Id The court noted that no statutory or regulatory exception was applicable in
the present case. Id.
32. Id. at 776-77, 863 P.2d at 689, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
33. Id at 777, 863 P.2d at 689, 25 Cal Rptr. 2d at 444 (quoting Macrodyne Indus.,
Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 192 Cal. App. 3d 479, 582, 237 Cal. Rptr. 537, 538
(1987)).
34. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 777, 863 P.2d at 689, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444.
35. Id,see Cal-Metal Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization,. 161 Cal. App. 3d 759, 765-66,
207 Cal. Rptr. 783, 786-87, (1984) (finding general partner's trinsfer of equipment and
attendant liability to the partnership a taxable transaction); see also Mercedes-Benz v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 127 Cal. App. 3d 871, 874, 179 Cal. Rptr. 758, 760 (1982)
("The courts have long agreed there is a significant difference between wholly owned,
but separate corporations, and divisions of a single corporation."). The court also noted
that the law does not assume that a parent will necessarily retain a subsidiary which
is a "spin off" of a division. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 777, 863 P.2d at 698, 25 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 444. The nature of the relationship between parent corporation and subsidiary at
the time of the transaction determines how the entities are characterized for tax purposes. Id.
36. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977) (holding a ladder manufac-
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Dry Wall was required by law to perform the division's obligations.' The
court, however, limited Ray's holding to tort liability and stated that a
"purchaser [of corporate assets] does not assume the seller's liability
unless (1) there is an express or implied agreement of assumption, (2)
the transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger of the two corporations, (3) the purchasing corporation is a mere continuation of the seller,
or (4) the transfer of assets... is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping
liability from the seller's debts."' Unlike Ray, the liabilities assumed by
Standard Dry Wall were contractual, not tort, liabilities.' Therefore, the
court rejected the contention that Standard Dry Wall had obligations at
law pursuant to Ray.'
B.

Joint Liability of PrincipalObligor and Transferee of Liabilities

Beatrice argued that because it retained primary liability for the debts
assumed by Standard Dry Wall, the assumption agreement was not consideration." Beatrice relied on the appellate court's decision in
Macrodyne, which found that since the transferor remained primarily
liable on the obligations, it received no benefit from the subsidiary's
assumption.' Without a benefit, there was no consideration and no taxable sale.' The trial and appellate courts in Macrodyne dismissed the
plaintiff's contention that the transaction between parent and subsidiary

turer strictly liable for an
funct corporation that had
poration).
37. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th
38. Id. at 778, 863 P.2d

injury caused by a defective ladder manufactured by a detransferred all of its assets and liabilities to defendant corat 777, 863 P.2d at 689-90, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 444-45.
at 690, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 445 (quoting Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at

28, 560 P.2d at 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 578). The latter three circumstances involve the
dissolution or reformation of the transferor corporation such that its creditors could
not reach it. See Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 180 Cal. 348, 181 P. 780 (1919)
(holding that lease obligation passed from defunct corporation to new corporation continuing same business); Higgins v. California Petroleum & Asphalt Co., 122 Cal. 373, 55
P. 155 (1898) (concluding that transfer of corporate assets to avoid obligations under a

mining lease constituted constructive fraud).
39. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 779, 863 P.2d at 691, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 779-80, 863 P.2d at 691-92, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47 (citing Macrodyne
Indus., Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 192 Cal. App. 3d 579, 583-83, 237 Cal. Rptr.

537, 539 (1987)).
43. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 779-80, 863 P.2d at 691-92, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446-47.

were part of a corporate restructuring." The court of appeal stated,
"'[when the choice is made to conduct business through corporate entities, parties assume both the privilege and burdens of that decision.'"'
The Macrodyne court's finding that the subsidiary's assumption of the
parent division's liability was not consideration conflicts with the holdings in Cal-Metal and Industrial Asphalt, Inc. v. State Board of Equal4
ization.
" In both Cal-Metal and Industrial Asphalt, the assumption of
liability was adequate consideration and taxable.47 The conflict created
by these cases has resulted in uncertainty as to whether assumption
agreements where the transferor remains primarily or jointly liable are
consideration for the purposes of determining whether a transaction was
a taxable sale.' While these decisions have attempted to justify their
holding' in light of Regulation 1595(b)(4)," the inconsistency arises not
from the relationship between the parties, but from a conflict over the
nature of consideration.'
An assumption agreement is the contractual promise to satisfy the
debts of another and is enforceable if supported by consideration.5' The
promisee benefits in that it can compel the promisor to perform, or pay
damages.' Under Civil Code section 1605,' the promisee must only
show that the promisor either suffered a detriment or promised to do
SO."
Efforts to distinguish Macrodyne created unnecessary complexity in
the law.' The Beatrice court agreed with Cal-Metal and IndustrialAs-

44. Id. at 781, 863 P.2d at 692, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447.
45. Id. (quoting Macrodyne, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 582, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 539).
46. 5 Cal. App. 4th 1237, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 444 (1992) (holding that assumption of lia-

bilities was consideration where partnership assumed liabilities of the two corporations
that formed the partnership).

47. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 781, 863 P.2d at 692, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 447; see Newco
Leasing, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 143 Cal. App. 3d 120, 191 Cal. Rptr. 588
(1983) (holding that purchase of outstanding vehicle leases involved assuming seller's
obligation to lending institutions and that those assumptions of liability were taxable
consideration).
48. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 779, 863 P.2d at 691, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 446.
49. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
50. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 782, 863 P.2d at 693, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
51. Id. at 782-83, 863 P.2d at 693, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
52. Id. at 783, 863 P.2d at 693, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.
53. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1605 (West 1982).

54. Id.; see Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 10 Cal. 3d 665, 673-74, 517 P.2d
1157, 1162, 111 Cal. Rptr. 693, 698 (1974) (concluding that the plaintiff suffered a detriment by finding a prospective buyer for the defendant's property and that this detriment was consideration); see also 1 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALFORNiA LAW, Contracts §§ 663, 667 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1994).
55. Beatrice, 6 Cal. 4th at 782, 863 P.2d at 693, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 448.

890

CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey

[Vol. 22: 783, 19951

PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

phalt and, accordingly, disapproved Macrodyne. The supreme court
found that Standard Dry Wall's assumption of liabilities constituted consideration for the assets transferred by Beatrice. 7
IV.

IMPACT

Beatrice resolved the conflicts existing in the lower courts.' The
court reaffirmed the appellate court's holdings that parent and subsidiary
corporations are separate legal entities and transactions between them
are subject to the same rules as transaction between any two separate
entities.' Further, the court concluded that liabilities of the parent corporation assumed by a subsidiary constitute consideration for the assets
received from the parent, and the transaction will be subject to sales
60
tax.
It might be possible for corporations wanting to "spin off" a division
into a subsidiary corporation, to minimize tax liability by simply reducing
or eliminating the liabilities transferred to the subsidiary. Assets exchanged solely for the first issue of stock from the subsidiary will be
exempt from sales tax under Regulation 1595(b)(4).6 If the parent's division satisfies preexisting obligations, no increased tax burden will arise.
However, those liabilities transferred to the subsidiary will determine the
exent to which the assets transferred are subject to the tax. Parent corporations may possibly transfer part of the division's assets and promise
to transfer the division's remaining assets at a later time in exchange for
the subsidiary's first issue of stock. This exchange of assets solely for
first issue stock should qualify for the exemption under Regulation
1595(b)(4).' Such actions allow the parent corporation to retain enough

56. Id. at 783, 863 P.2d at 694, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 449.
57. Id.

58. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.

60. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

assets to reduce or eliminate liabilities before transferring the remaining
assets to the subsidiary, thereby reducing or eliminating sales tax liability.

VICTOR J. WENNER
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X.

TORT LAW
A.

A contractingparty can not be held liable in tortfor
conspiracy to interfere with its own contract:
Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.' presented the
California Supreme Court with the question of whether a contracting
party can be held liable in tort for conspiracy to interfere with its own
contract.2 The court held, as a matter of law, that a contracting party
cannot be liable in tort for conspiracy to interfere with its own contract.
The court reasoned that a contracting party is legally incapable of committing the tort when it is itself a party.' Additionally, the court found
that to impose such liability would obliterate "vital and established dis-

1. 7 Cal. 4th 503, 869 P.2d 454, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 475 (1994). Chief Justice Lucas
authored the majority opinion. Justices Kennard, Arabian, Baxter, George, and Justice
Pro Tern Ramirez concurred. Id. at 507, 869 P.2d at 455, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 476. Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 521, 869 P.2d at 464, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 485.
2. In the facts of the case, the plaintiff, Applied Equipment Corporation, entered
into a subcontract with the defendant, Litton, whereby the plaintiff would procure
spare parts for the defendant as needed, to perform its general contract As part of its
performance under this subcontract, the plaintiff acquired spare parts from a second
defendant, Varian, with defendant Litton's approval. Subsequently, defendant Litton contacted defendant Varian directly and induced Varian to bypass its subcontract with
Applied and sell the parts directly to Litton. As a result, the plaintiff suffered damages
of reduced commissions for transactions with Litton.
The plaintiff sued both Litton and Varian for breach of contract and tortious interference, including conspiracy to interfere. Id. at 508, 869 P.2d at 456, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 477. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded contract
damages in the amount of $112,531.25 and tort damages in the sum of $2.5 million for
conspiracy to interfere with the contract. Id. at 509, 869 P.2d at 456, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 477. Additionally, defendant Litton was further assessed $12.5 million in punitive
damages. Id.
The court of appeal affirmed the contract awards but reversed the tort judgments
due to inconsistencies in the jury's verdicts. Id. They also rejected defendant Varian's
argument that it could not, as a matter of law, be held liable for conspiracy to interfere with its own contract. Id.
The Supreme Court of California granted review to decide the single issue, raised
by defendant Varian, of whether a party to a contract can be liable in tort for conspiracy to interfere with its own contract Id.
3. Id. at 510, 689 P.2d at 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.

tinctions between contract and tort theories of liability."4
II.

ANALYSIS

The court rejected the well-established rule of Wise v. Southern Pacific Co.,' which states that an action for conspiracy to induce a breach of
contract can lie against a contracting party.' The court articulated two
reasons for its rejection, one based on logic and the other based on policy considerations
The court first explained that conspiracy is not a separate cause of
action.' Rather, liability for conspiracy can only "be activated by the
commission of an actual tort."' The court reasoned that tort liability aris-

ing from conspiracy "presupposes that the coconspirator is legally capable of committing the tort."'" The court concluded that because parties
to a contract owe no duty to refrain from interference with its performance, they "cannot be bootstrapped into tort liability by the pejorative
plea of conspiracy.""
The court then addressed the legal distinction between contract and

4. Id.; see CAL. Civ. CODE § 3333 (West 1994) (compensation for breach of obligation other than breach of contract).
5. Wise v. Southern Pac. Co., 223 Cal. App. 2d 50, 71-72, 35 Cal. Rptr. 652, 664-65
(1963).
6. Applied Equipment, 7 Cal. 4th at 516, 869 P.2d at 456-57, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
478. The court of appeal opinion observed that the Supreme Court of California had
"never endorsed the rule of Wise in a manner that would constitute binding precedent." Id. On the other hand, Wise had been "uncritically accepted and applied in several subsequent appellate decisions." Id. at 516, 522-23, 869 P.2d at 456-57, 465, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 478, 486 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 510, 869 P.2d at 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
8. Id.
9. Id.; see also Doctor's Co. v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 3d 39, 44, 775 P.2d 508, 51011, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185-86 (1989) (quoting Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exch., 7 Cal. 3d 616,
631, 498 P.2d 1063, 1073-74, 102 Cal. Rptr. 815, 825-26 (1972)); Note, Civil Conspiracy
and Interference with Contractual Relations, 8 LOYOLA L.A. L REv. 302, 308 n.28
(1975).
10. Applied Equipment, 7 Cal. 4th at 511, 869 P.2d at 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 478.
The court relied upon earlier California cases which refused to impose conspiracy liability either on the ground that the alleged conspirator "was not personally bound by
the duty violated by the wrongdoing," or that the alleged conspirator was not legally
capable "of committing the actual tort because of a statutorily created immunity from
suit." Id. at 512, 869 P.2d at 458, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 479 (quoting Doctor's Co., 49 Cal.
3d at 44, 775 P.2d at 510-11, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86; see Hardy v. Vial, 48 Cal. 2d
577, 582-83, 311 P.2d 494, 496-97 (1957) (holding school defendants in a malicious prosecution suit immune from conspiracy liability because they were performing official
investigative duties).
11. Id. at 514, 869 P.2d at 549, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 480.
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2
tort theories of liability."
The court explained that different damage formulations are available because of the different policy goals motivated by
the two branches of law." Here, according to the court, defendant
Varian "assumed only the obligation to perform the contract or pay damages for breach. It did not assume the independent tort obligation not to
interfere with the performance of its own contract.""
Justice Mosk dissented, arguing that the Wise rule was more appropriate and fair because it recognized the liability of all parties to a con-

spiracy.1

III.

CONCLUSION

In holding that a contracting party may not be held liable in tort for
conspiracy to interfere with its own contract, the court curtailed the use
of punitive damage awards against parties breaching contracts to which
they are a party. The liability of contracting parties is now limited to
those damages foreseeable upon breach of contract. This ruling promotes
better business policies by allowing parties to seek more profitable deals
without relieving them of contractual liability under their existing con-

12. Id. at 514-15, 869 P.2d at 460, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 481.
13. Id. at 514-15, 869 P.2d at 459-60, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 480-81. For example, contract
damages are "generally limited to those within the contemplation of the parties when
the contract was entered into or at least reasonably foreseeable by them at that time."
Id. Tort damages, on the other hand, are not limited by foreseeability, but are designed
instead "to compensate the victim for injury suffered." Id. (citing 6 B.E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts § 1319 (9th ed. 1987)). Additionally, punitive and exemplary damages are not available under contract theories. Id. at 516, 869 P.2d at 460, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 487.
14. Id. at 517-18, 869 P.2d at 461-62, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 482-83. The court bolstered
its argument by pointing out that a contracting party already has a legal incentive to
perform the contract without the imposition of independent tort liability. Id. at 520, 869
P.2d at 463, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
15. Id. at 521-22, 869 P.2d at 464-65, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 485-86 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk also argued that, because the Supreme Court of California had denied review of cases in which the Wise rule had been applied, reliance upon Wise
created a precedent, even though the cases in circulation were opinions of the appellate courts. Id. at 523, 869 P.2d at 465, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 486 (Mosk, J., dissenting).

tract. More efficient business practices are encouraged by rules, such as
this, which limit liability to that which is foreseeable under the contract.

ALLISON L. HURST
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B.

Parents who unsuspectingly administer a medication overdose to an infant, due to incorrect dosage
directions on the pharmacy label, cannot recover
personally from the pharmacy for negligent infliction of emotion distress because the parents are not
the direct victims of the pharmacy's negligence:
Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California, Inc.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Huggins v. Longs Drug Stores California,Inc.,1 the California Su-

preme Court examined whether parents can recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress when they unwittingly administer a harmful
medication overdose to an infant, after following the dosage instructions
as incorrectly labeled by the issuing pharmacy.2 The court granted re-

1. 6 Cal. 4th 124, 862 P.2d 142, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587 (1993). Justice Baxter delivered the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Lucas and Justices Panelli, Arabian,
and George. Justice Mosk filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Kennard concurred. Id. at 133-35, 862 P.2d at 154-55, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593-94 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Kennard also dissented separately, with Justice Mosk concurring. Id. at
135-39, 862 P.2d at 155-58, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594-97 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 129-33, 862 P.2d at 151-54, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590-93. On October 9, 1989,
a doctor prescribed Ceclor, a semisynthetic antibiotic, to treat the ear infection of
Kodie Huggins, the two-month old son of the plaintiffs, Barbie and Robert Huggins.
Mrs. Huggins promptly filled the prescription at Longs Drug Store.
The pharmacist incorrectly labeled the medication. The dosage directions on the
label called for two and one-half teaspoons per eight hours. The doctor had prescribed
only one-half teaspoon every eight hours. The defendant mistakenly instructed the
plaintiffs to administer five times the proper dosage.
Mr. and Mrs. Huggins were not immediately aware that their child had been injured by an accidental overdose. When another pharmacy informed them of the dosage
mistake, however, the plaintiffs became shocked, worried, grieved, and emotionally
distressed.
The plaintiffs sued for negligent infliction of emotional distress and the trial court
granted summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs could not recover. (1) under a
"bystander" theory, due to a lack of contemporaneous connection between any negligent act and their suffering; and (2) under a "direct victim" theory, because the defendant only owed a duty of care to the infant, not his parents. Id. at 128, 862 P.2d at
150, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589. The court of appeal reversed as to the direct victim
claim. Id. at 128, 862 P.2d at 150-51, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 589-90. The court of appeal
reasoned that, when a pharmacy knows or should know that a prescription is for an
infant, who must rely upon another to receive the medication and proper dosage, the
pharmacy's duty of care extends to the parent or caregiver expected to administer the
medication. Id. The supreme court granted review and reversed. Id. at 127, 862 P.2d at

view to clarify a pharmacy's duty of care when filling prescriptions for
patients, such as infants, who must rely upon others for administration
of the medication.3 The court held that the parents were not the "direct

victims" of negligence, and thus they could not recover for negligent
infliction of emotional distress.4
II.
A.

TREATMENT OF CASE

Majority Opinion

The majority rejected the plaintiffs' reliance upon a direct victim theory of recovery.' Asserting that direct victim coverage extends only to
actual patients, or individuals directly affected by the doctor/patient relationship, the court declined to apply such protection to the infant's parents.' The law does not impose a legal duty upon pharmacists to protect
a patient's parents from emotional distress, even if the patient must rely
on the parents to dispense the medication.7 Thus, because the Huggins
were not patients themselves, they could not recover as direct victims of

149, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 588.
3. See id. at 130, 862 P.2d at 151, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590.
4. Id. at 133, 862 P.2d at 154, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. See generally 6 B.E. WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 838-854 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1993) (discussing
cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, noting the necessary relationship required under bystander and direct victim theories of recovery); Julie A.
Greenberg, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: A Proposal for a Consistent
Theory of Tort Recovery for Bystanders and Direct Victims, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1283
(1992).
5. Huggins, 6 Cal. 4th at 133, 862 P.2d at 148, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
6. Id. at 130-33, 862 P.2d at 145-48, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 590-93; see also Marlene F.
v. Affiliated Psychiatric Medical Clinic, Inc., 48 Cal. 3d 583, 591, 770 P.2d 278, 283, 257
Cal. Rptr. 661, 670 (1989) (holding that parents could recover for emotional distress
resulting from doctor's sexual abuse of their children because both the parents and
children were patients of the doctor); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916,
923, 616 P.2d 813, 817, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1980) (holding that hospital and doctor
owed duty to patient's husband after doctor incorrectly diagnosed patient with syphilis
and advised her to inform her husband of the diagnosis so he could receive testing).
But cf Ochoa v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 159, 172-73, 703 P.2d 1, 10, 216 Cal. Rptr.
661, 670 (1985) (rejecting direct victim recovery where parent was simply a witness to,
but not an individual involved in, the doctor/patient relationship). See generally 6 B.E.
WITICN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 845, 852-854 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1993) (discussing the impact of the Molien, Marlene F., and Ochoa decisions).
7. Huggins, 6 Cal. 4th at 131-32, 862 P.2d at 153, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 592. The
court noted that the duty imposed by the court of appeal would have the undesirable
effect of subjecting medical goods providers to an increased potential for liability. Id.
at 133, 862 P.2d at 154, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593. In turn, this heightened potential for
liability would increase medical malpractice insurance costs. Id. The quality of patient
care might also decline as a result of a pharmacist's "self-protective reservations"
caused by the increased risk of liability. Id.
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the pharmacy's negligence. 8
B. Justice Mosk's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk disagreed with the majority and argued in favor of the
court of appeal decision.' Justice Mosk noted that pharmacists have a
statutory duty to properly label medication containers.'" In situations
involving an infant, Justice Mosk argued, such a duty necessarily involves
the child's parents or caregiver." Accordingly, Justice Mosk recognized
a sufficient relationship between the pharmacy and the parents to
withstand a motion for summary judgment.
C.

Justice Kennard's DissentingOpinion

Justice Kennard wrote separately, asserting that the court should allow
the plaintiffs to argue for recovery under a direct victim theory. 3 Justice
Kennard noted that in direct victim cases, the situation warrants recovery if a party assumes a legal duty, there exists an imposed duty upon
the party as a matter of law, or the duty "arises out of a relationship
between the two."' 4 Maintaining that the pharmacist has a legal duty to
correctly label prescribed medication, Justice Kennard reasoned that
such a duty must extend to the patient's parents when the recipient of
the drug is an infant. 5 Justice Kennard would allow recovery if the parents suffer emotional distress when a pharmacist breaches this duty."

8. Id. at 133, 862 P.2d at 154, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
9. Id. at 134, 862 P.2d at 154, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
10. Id. (Mosk, J., dissenting). Justice Mosk cited § 4047.5 of the California Business
and Professions Code which states, in pertinent part: "A pharmacist shall not dispense
any prescription except in a container correctly labeled with ...
[tihe directions for
the use of the drug." CA Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4047.5 (West Supp. 1994).
11. Huggins, 6 Cal. 4th at 134, 862 P.2d at 155, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594 (Mosk, J.,

dissenting).
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 135, 862 P.2d at 155, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 594 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
Id. at 136, 862 P.2d at 156, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 595 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 137, 862 P.2d at 156-57, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-97 (Kennard, J., dissent-

ing).
16. Id. at 137-39, 862 P.2d at 157-58, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 596-97 (Kennard, J., dissent-

ing).

III.

CONCLUSION

The Huggins decision clarifies the class of individuals to which pharmacists owe a legal duty of care.' 7 By refusing to extend the scope of a
pharmacist's duty, the court attempts to curtail the increasing costs of
medical malpractice insurance in order to assure affordable pharmaceu-

tical services.'8 Although the court suggests that extending the scope of

a pharmacist's duty would hinder the quality of care,'" such reasoning
seems questionable." Rather this decision simply represents a
cost/benefit determination of how far liability should extend for pharmacy services.

MICHAEL ALDEN MILLER

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 133, 862 P.2d at 154, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 139, 862 P.2d at 152, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 597 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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XI.

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
The superior court lacks subject matterjurisdiction over
an action to declare provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act invalid and enjoin enforcement of those provisions:
Greener v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.
..
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Greener v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board,' the California
Supreme Court considered whether a superior court has personal jurisdiction over the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and subject matter jurisdiction over an action to declare portions of the Workers' Compensation Act, which are not yet effective, invalid under provisions of the
federal and state constitution.!
Appellants were law school graduates who had not yet been admitted
to the State Bar, but who had been representing applicants seeking
workers' compensation benefits. They sued in superior court to challenge
the sections 4903 and 5710 of the Labor Code terminating the power of
the board to award attorney fees "to applicant representatives who are
not attorneys, and to award fees to unlicensed attorneys for representation of an applicant in a deposition taken by an employer or insurer. " '
The Board moved to quash service of the summons and to dismiss the
claim for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction.' The superior

1. 6 Cal. 4th 1028, 863 P.2d 784, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d 539 (1993). Justice Baxter wrote
the unanimous opinion, with Chief Justice Lucas, and Justices Mosk, Panelli, Kennard,
Arabian, and George concurring.
2. Id. at 1032-33, 863 P.2d at 786, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541.
3. Id. at 1033, 863 P.2d at 786, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541. Specifically, the complaint

soughta declaration that the bills were invalid because they had been adopted in

violation of the open and public hearing requirements of
section 9029 et seq.; denied equal protection in violation
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article
division (a) of the California Constitution; and violated

Government Code
of the Fourteenth
I, section 7, subthe separation of

powers provisions of article III, section 3 of the California Constitution.
Id. at 1033, 863 P.2d at 787, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542.
4. Id. at 1034, 863 P.2d at 787, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542. The board asserted that §
5955 of the Labor Code gave the court of appeal and the California Supreme Court ex-

clusive jurisdiction over this action because it concerned claims regarding workers'

court denied appellants' motion for a preliminary injunction and granted
the board's motion to quash service and dismiss. The court of appeal
reversed this decision, and the supreme court agreed to rule on this
issue.

II. TREATMENT
The supreme court first considered whether the superior court had
personal jurisdiction over the Board.' The court found the Board's argument that the Legislature "conferred exclusive jurisdiction over it on the
[clourt of [a]ppeal and th[e] [supreme court]" misguided, holding that the
superior court did have personal jurisdiction over the Board.'
The court also noted that a motion to quash a summons was an improper method of challenging subject matter jurisdiction. Courts have
only permitted motions to quash in challenges to the sufficiency of the

complaint "in unlawful detainer, where a demurrer is unavailable."8
The court next considered whether the Legislature "intended to reserve solely to the court of appeal and [the supreme] court jurisdiction

compensation benefits. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1034, 863 P.2d at 787, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
542.
5. Id.
6. Id. The court reasoned that the Board confused the issues of personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that § 5955 of the Labor Code, which
provides that "the superior court may not entertain an action which seeks to restrain,
enjoin, or interfere with the Board in its performance of duties created under that
law," conferred exclusive jurisdiction over the Board. Id.
The workers' compensation law nowhere states that the Board is not subject
to suit in the superior court ....

Personal jurisdiction is not determined by

the nature of the action, but by the legal existence of the party and either
its presence in the state or other conduct permitting the court to exercise
jurisdiction over the party. Subject matter jurisdiction, by contrast, is the
power of the court over a cause of action or to act in a particular way.
Id. at 1034-35, 863 P.2d at 787, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 542; see 2 B.E. WMIN, CALIFORNIA
PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 9 (3d ed. 1985) (discussing generally the nature of subject
matter jurisdiction and the principle of personal jurisdiction).
7. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1036, 863 P.2d at 788, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 543. A motion
to quash a summons is proper only when a court lacks personal jurisdiction, not subject matter jurisdiction. Id. To properly challenge subject matter jurisdiction, a party
may bring a demurrer to the complaint, make a motion to strike or motion for judgement on the pleadings, make a motion for summary judgement, or raise the issue in
an answer. Id.; see 2 B.E. WmTKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Jurisdiction § 161 (3d ed.
1985 & Supp. 1993) (generally discussing motion to quash a summons).
8. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1036, 863 P.2d at 789, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544. The court
made clear that It was not creating an exception for use of the motion to quash in
unlawful detalner actions. That question was not before the court. Id. at 1036 n.5, 863
P.2d at 798 n.5, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544 n.5.
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to entertain challenges to the constitutional validity of provisions of the
workers' compensation law, and, if so, whether plaintiffs have any remedy prior to being denied an award of fees and a lien."'
In determining whether the court of appeal and supreme court had
exclusive jurisdiction over the issue at bar, the court looked to article III,
section 3.5 of the California Constitution, which "withholds from administrative agencies the power to determine the constitutional validity of
any statute.""0 Based on this section, the court decided that the Board
must comply with the challenged statutes until an appellate court instructs it otherwise.'"
To decide whether the workers' compensation law "limits plaintiffs'
remedy to a petition for review of an order of the Board," the court
looked to the relevant statutory provisions, focusing on section 5300 of
the California Labor Code. 2 The court determined that section 5300
does not allow the Board to hear cases involving the constitutionality of
a legislative amendment to a workers' compensation law, and stated that
plaintiffs' challenge "must come following exhaustion of the remedies
available in the workers' compensation system, and must be made by
petition for review of the order of the Board.""3
The court noted that section 5955 allows a writ of mandate in "proper
cases" where jurisdiction is "limit[ed]... to the appellate courts." 4 The
9. Id. at 1037, 863 P.2d at 789, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544.
10. Id. at 1038, 863 P.2d at 789, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 544. The section provides:
An administrative agency... has no power (a) To declare a statute unenforceable, or refuse to enforce a statute, on the basis of it being unconstitutional unless an appellate court has made a determination that such statute
is unconstitutional; (b) To declare a statute unconstitutional; (c) To declare a
statute unenforceable, or to refuse to enforce a statute on the basis that federal law or federal regulations prohibit the enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court has made a determination that the enforcement of
such statute is prohibited by federal law or federal regulations.
CAL CONST. art. III, § 3.5.

11. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1038, 863 P.2d at 790, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
12. Id. at 1038-39, 863 P.2d at 790, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545. "The Board is given the
power to adjudicate claims by employees for injury 'arising out of and in the course'
of their employment" Id. at 1038, 863 P.2d at 790, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545. (quoting
CAL LAB. CODE § 3600(a)). "Proceedings which in any manner concern the recovery of
compensation, or any right or liability 'arising out of or incidental thereto' are to be
instituted solely before the Appeals Board." Id. at 1038-39, 863 P.2d at 790, 25 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 545 (quoting Santiago v. Employee Benefits Servs., 168 Cal. App. 3d 898,
901, 214 Cal. Rptr. 679, 681 (1985) (citing CAL LAB. CODE § 5300(a))).
13. Id. at 1040, 863 P.2d at 791, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
14. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1040, 863 P.2d at 791, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546; see infra

court concluded, however, that this was not a "proper case" because
"until the award is made and the lien denied, the Board has not failed to
do an act required by law, and the review procedure provides an equally
adequate remedy." 5 Therefore, the court decided whether "the superior
court has subject matter jurisdiction over a declaratory relief action seeking an adjudication of the constitutional validity of a workers' compensation statute," and if not, "what criteria are to be applied in determining
whether a claim related to workers' compensation legislation is a 'proper
case' for decision by petition for writ of mandate in an appellate
court." 6
In deciding this issue, the court found guidance from Loustalot v. Superior Court." In Loustalot, the court found that while the jurisdictional
provisions of the workers' compensation law were limited in scope, "the
superior court has not been denied jurisdiction over all actions related to
a workers' compensation proceeding." 8 Furthermore, as noted in
Loustalot, section 5955 is modeled after section 67 of the Public Utilities
Act, which the court interpreted in Sexton v. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co.'9 There, the court stated that the clear intent of section 67 "is to place the commission, insofar as the state courts are concerned, in a position where it may not be hampered in the performance
of any official act by any court, except to the extent and in the manner
specified in the act itself."' Relying on Sexton, the court concluded the

note 21 and accompanying text; see also CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1085 (West 1980)
(providing for general application of writ of mandate).
15. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1040, 863 P.2d at 791, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546. (citations
omitted).
16. Id. at 1040-41, 863 P.2d at 791, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 546.
17. 30 Cal. 2d 905, 186 P.2d 673 (1947) (holding that the court may review, under
writ of habeas corpus, a decision of the Industrial Accident Commission to imprison a

worker for contempt).
18. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1041, 863 P.2d at 792, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547; see 2 B.E.
WITIUN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAw, Workers' Compensation §§ 436-437 (9th ed. 1987)
(discussing review of a Board decision and jurisdiction over such an action); 65 CAL
JUR. 3D Work Injury Compensation § 343 (1981) (discussing judicial review of Board
decisions).
19. 173 Cal. 760, 161 P. 748 (1916). In Sexton, which.the court found to be analogous to the present case, the court "rejected an argument that the jurisdictional limitations of § 67 of the Public Utilities Act applied only to review of orders of the commission." Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1041, 863 P.2d at 792, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547. The
court also rejected the argument that "granting the requested- injunction against provi-

sion of free transportation to railroad commission members and employees would not
interfere with the commission's performance of its duties because the commission had
no duty to comply with an invalid statute." Id. at 1042, 863 P.2d at 792, 25 Cal. Rptr.

2d at 547.
20. Id. at 1042, 863 P.2d at 792, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 547. The court further stated
that "[t]he superior court has no power to enjoin the commissioners, or to render any
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plaintiffs challenge was not within the superior court's subject matter
jurisdiction.2 '
The court then considered whether the plaintiff's case could be considered a "proper case" for writ of mandate under section 5955.' They
commented that the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Board denied them
"a lien on an award... or threatened to do so."' Furthermore, the
court recognized that if they denied the plaintiffs a lien, they would allow
them to petition for appeal pursuant to section 5950 of the California
Labor Code.' The court also concluded that because plaintiffs were
challenging a statute prior to it being effective, the plaintiffs were actually seeking declaratory relief, an action over which appellate courts do
not have original jurisdiction.' However, the court noted that they,
along with the courts of appeal, have "entertained challenges to the legislation when brought by petition for writ of mandate, and have done so
prior to the implementation of the measure."2"
While the court recognized that mandamus may be available in "proper
cases" under section 5955, they were unable to find a clear definition of

judgment herein that would 'interfere' with them in the performance of the official duties,'" and consequently, -'[tJhe judgment asked for ... would necessarily be an interference with the commission in the performance of its official duties.'" Id. (quoting
Sexton, 173 Cal. at 764-65, 161 P. at 750).
21. Id. at 1044, 863 P.2d at 793, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548.
22. Id. at 1044 , 863 P.2d at 793-94, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548-49. Section 1085 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure states thatMandamus 'may be issued . . . to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins,
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or to compel the admission of a party to the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is
entitled, and from which he is unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal,
corporation, board or person.'
Id. at 1044, 863 P.2d at 794, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549 (quoting CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. §
1085 (West 1980)). Furthermore, mandamus is only appropriate in "cases where there
is not a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, in the ordinary course of law." CAL CODE
Civ. PRoc. § 1086 (West 1980). For a general overview of mandamus, see 8 B.E.
WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE, Extraordinary Writs § 4 (3d ed. 1985).
23. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1044-45, 863 P.2d at 794, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549.
24. Id. at 1045, 863 P.2d at 794, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549.
25. Id.; CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
26. Id.; see Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286 Cal. Rptr. 283
(1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1293 (1992); Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal. 3d 336, 801
P.2d 1077, 276 Cal. Rptr. 326 (1990); Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d
274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).

what constitutes a "proper case." The court concluded that section 5955
authorizes mandamus against the Board in cases where section 1085 of
the California Code of Civil Procedure allows it." The court held the
case at bar was not a "proper case" under section 5955, and upheld the
superior court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' action.'
III.

CONCLUSION

The California Supreme Court has given the Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board the power to decide cases regarding attorney fees and
other matters of official duty. This is consistent with the legislative intent
as expressed in the pertinent Labor Code provisions. Also, the court has

clearly defined what constitutes a "proper case" for mandamus under
section 5955 of the Labor Code, eliminating much of the confusion that
persists in this area of the law.

ERIC WEITZ

27. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1045-46, 863 P.2d at 794-95, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549-50; see
Betancourt v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 16 Cal. App. 3d 408, 412-13, 94
Cal. Rptr. 9, 12 (1971); Fidelity & Gas. Co. of New York v. Workers' Compensation
Appeals Bd., 103 Cal. App. 3d 1001, 1008-09, 163 Cal. Rptr. 339, 343 (1980).
28. Greener, 6 Cal. 4th at 1046, 863 P.2d at 795, 25 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 550. The court
limited the plaintiffs' remedies In such cases to:
(1) a petition for review if the Board falls to award fees for their representation of an applicant and/or a lien for such fees; or (2) if they are able to
satisfy the Court of Appeal that mandamus is appropriate under Code of Civil
Procedure section 1085, a petition for writ of mandate.
Id.

